Concept
Protection From Third Parties
Duty owed to invitees
Protection From Third Parties
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 carries the possessor’s duty past the conditions and activities on the land and into the conduct of other people. A possessor who holds land open to the public for business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public on the land for that purpose for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the possessor’s own failure to use reasonable care in either of two ways.1 The possessor may fail to discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done,2 or it may fail to give a warning adequate to enable visitors to avoid the harm or otherwise to protect them against it.3 Liability thus rests on the possessor’s own lapse in care; the third person’s act supplies the injury that the lapse allowed.
The section’s own words mark its edges. It speaks of land held open for the possessor’s business purposes and of visitors who are there for that purpose, so it does not reach every possessor who lets the public in.4 Land opened on other terms, such as recreational land under a statutory immunity, raises a different question, and courts have confined that immunity: it has been held inapplicable to highly developed recreational areas, and one court applied it to a lake but not to the dam that created it.5 Within the section’s reach, the standard is reasonable care, so the possessor does not insure visitors against what other people do.
The law asks the possessor to carry this burden because the possessor can carry it and the visitor cannot. A business that opens its premises controls the entrances, the lighting, the staffing, and the layout, and it knows the place better than anyone who walks in. A visitor cannot screen the other people in a store or a parking lot, so the possessor is the party able to guard against foreseeable misconduct at the lowest cost. The subsections below take the two failures in turn, discovery first and then warning or protection, and end with the foreseeability limits that decide whether a third person’s crime breaks the chain of causation.
Discovering Third-Party Harm
Clause (a) of § 344 makes a possessor answerable for failing to “discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done.”6 The acts are the ones the section names at the outset: the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals.7 The clause therefore asks what a reasonable possessor would have learned about other people’s conduct on the premises before it injured a visitor. It covers two moments. Acts being done are already under way where employees can see them, as when a patron menaces others in a lobby. Acts likely to be done have not yet happened but are made probable by what is going on, as when a crowd turns ugly. In both, the test is what reasonable care would have revealed, so a possessor cannot avoid the duty by declining to look.
The section makes discovery a duty of its own because the possessor can see what a visitor cannot. A visitor sees a small part of a theater, store, or parking structure for a short time and cannot tell which of the other people present will cause trouble. The possessor controls the premises, staffs them, and can watch them as long as they are open. The words likely to be done limit the duty from the other side: a possessor must look for harm that the circumstances make probable, not for every harm that could conceivably occur, or reasonable care would become insurance against everyone else’s conduct.
The duty reaches beyond crime, because the covered conduct includes accidental and negligent acts; a careless customer falls within clause (a) as surely as a violent one. Intoxicated patrons are the familiar example. Courts have held that a possessor must take reasonable precautions to prevent an intoxicated patron from harming another, as in McFarlin v. Hall.8 A visibly drunk patron is exactly the sign employees are expected to notice, and noticing it is the discovery that clause (a) demands.
In practice, discovery takes forms that match the setting: patrolling the premises, monitoring parking areas, noticing disruptive or intoxicated patrons, and learning that a particular person is dangerous. In Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co., the operator of a parking ramp owed a duty to a customer who was raped in her parked car, because a ramp gives criminals both a focus and an opportunity. The court framed the duty as reasonable care to deter, with the jury weighing the likelihood of the risk against the financial and practical feasibility of meeting it.9 Other decisions have tied the duty to discovering a dangerous criminal, in dictum in Townsley v. Cincinnati Gardens, Inc., and to becoming aware of a person’s dangerous character, in Repka v. Rentalent Inc.10 The weighing in Erickson is the part to carry forward, because it makes the amount of looking that reasonable care requires depend on how probable the harm is and how cheap the looking would be.
Silva v. Showcase Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc. applies the duty to a failure to patrol. After a showing, patrons were stabbed to death in the theater’s parking lot by moviegoers who had been disruptive inside, and the First Circuit recognized that a theater must take reasonable precautions to maintain order, including precautions against reasonably foreseeable violence in the lot after the film.11 It also held that a jury could reasonably find the theater’s failure to patrol its premises adequately to be a proximate cause of the deaths.12 Disruption inside was the sign that violence outside was likely, and patrolling is how a theater would have seen the sign and acted on it. A theater that never looks cannot later say it had no notice.
A possessor who patrols and monitors sensibly has done what clause (a) asks even when a crime occurs anyway. The theater in Silva was asked only to watch its own premises, where disruption had already shown itself. A demand for more, such as armed protection against crime in the neighborhood generally, meets a different answer, which the next subsection takes up through Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.13
Warning or Protecting
Clause (b) of § 344 charges the possessor with failing to “give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.”15 Where clause (a) asks what the possessor should have learned about other people’s conduct, clause (b) asks what the possessor should have done once it knew, or should have known, that harm was coming. The section joins the two clauses with or, so either lapse can support liability to a business visitor hurt by a third person’s act.16
The clause describes two kinds of response. A warning tells visitors of the danger so that they can steer clear of it. The closing words, “otherwise to protect them,” reach every other reasonable step, such as deterring the offender or keeping order on the premises. That breadth explains the variety of the decisions, which run along a range. At the warning end, the duty has been tied to giving notice of the danger, as in Sinn v. Farmers’ Deposit Sav. Bank, and Banks v. Hyatt Corp. extended it to the entrances of a business that knew of a dangerous condition and failed to warn invitees or take precautions.17 At the protection end, cases require measures that reduce the danger itself, such as deterrence in a parking structure or precautions to keep order in a theater and its lot.18 A possessor thus has several tools, and the question is whether the one it chose fit the danger it faced.
The word adequate tests that fit. A warning works only through the visitor: it supplies information, and the visitor must then be able to act on it by taking another route, waiting, or staying away. A warning that comes too late, says too little, or leaves the visitor no way around the danger informs without enabling, so the possessor must still protect. The two halves of the clause therefore work in sequence. A warning is often the least costly precaution, but when the visitor cannot use it, the possessor must do something that does not depend on the visitor’s choices. Treating any posted notice as the end of the analysis skips that question.
Where protection is the question, the decisions sort into two lines. One line involves claims that the possessor failed to take reasonable measures to reduce the likelihood of dangerous criminal activity. The other involves claims that the possessor’s own actions in the face of a crime negligently endangered the invitee.19
In the first line, Erickson shows the method. The court required the operator of a parking ramp to use reasonable care to deter crime against customers, and it had the jury weigh the likelihood of the risk against the financial and practical feasibility of the means to meet it.20 The balance does work that a fixed list of precautions could not. The likelier the harm, the more a reasonable possessor is expected to spend to prevent it; the costlier or less practical a measure, the more risk it must offset. An operator who faces a real prospect of assaults in a structure it controls, and who has inexpensive deterrence available, risks a jury finding of breach, but the same operator is not an insurer against every crime a determined offender might commit.
Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc. marks the boundary of that balance. The Michigan Supreme Court held that a drug store in a high-crime area owed no duty to hire armed guards to deter robberies and associated violence, because the store lacked sufficient control and any such duty would be difficult to apply.21 The reasoning follows from how the balance works. A possessor can be asked only for precautions it is able to carry out, and a court can enforce only a standard it can state. A duty to supply armed protection against neighborhood crime strains both: the store did not control the source of the danger, and the standard is hard to state, since no one can say how many guards, for what hours. In Erickson the operator was asked to deter crime inside a structure it ran, a demand a jury could scale to the risk. In Williams the store was asked for one demanding measure against crime it could not control. The holding concerns that measure, so it does not excuse a possessor in a high-crime area from every precaution, and it does not mean that security is never required.
In the second line, courts hesitate to second-guess actions taken in the exigencies of an ongoing crime. In Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc., a robber shot the plaintiff’s decedent after a teller, standing behind a bullet-proof shield, refused his demand for money or access to a restricted area, and the court declined to impose a duty of compliance because it would benefit criminals and endanger future business invitees.22 If a refusal could expose the employer to liability, employees would hand over whatever was demanded, robbers would learn that demands succeed, and later invitees would face more robberies. A choice made in seconds under threat also looks different when a court reviews it with hindsight.
The timing of the claimed lapse therefore sorts the analysis. If the plaintiff says the possessor should have warned, deterred, or secured the premises beforehand, ask whether the visitor could use any warning given, weigh the likelihood of the risk against the feasibility of precautions, and check whether the demanded measure is one the possessor could control and a court could define. If the plaintiff says an employee should have reacted differently while the crime was under way, expect courts to resist finding breach.
Foreseeability and Criminal Acts
Foreseeability limits a possessor’s liability under § 344 at two points. At duty and breach, it asks what the possessor should have anticipated, and so how much looking, warning, and protecting reasonable care required. At causation, it asks whether the third person’s act, often a crime, leaves the possessor’s negligence a legal cause of the harm or breaks the chain. The section itself makes the possessor answerable for third persons’ accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts only where the possessor failed to use reasonable care to discover them or to warn or protect against them.24 This subsection takes notice first and causation second. Both answers vary by jurisdiction, so an essay should name the approach it applies and, where the jurisdiction is unspecified, discuss both.
A possessor cannot be asked to guard against harm that nothing on or near the premises suggested, and courts disagree about what counts as a suggestion. One approach looks for prior similar incidents: the plaintiff must show that comparable harm had happened before and so put the possessor on notice of that danger. The other approach looks to all of the surrounding circumstances. The Illinois Supreme Court took the second path in Marshall v. Burger King Corp., where a customer was fatally injured when a car crashed through the wall of a fast-food restaurant. The majority held that the restaurant’s duty to protect customers from the negligent acts of third persons existed even though it had no notice of prior similar incidents, and it overruled earlier decisions that required particularized notice in favor of a broad foreseeability test.25 The court read comment f to § 344 as calling for an inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the accident, and it cited § 40(b)(3) of the Third Restatement as bringing the law up to date in support of a general duty of care.26 Because § 344 covers accidental and negligent acts along with crimes, a car through a restaurant wall belongs in the same analysis as an assault in a parking lot.
Each approach has a reason behind it. A prior-incident requirement gives the possessor a concrete signal about which danger to prepare for and keeps the duty from stretching to every crime a creative imagination could foresee. Its cost is that the first victim bears the whole loss, since no earlier incident means no notice, however plain the danger would have looked to a careful owner. The surrounding-circumstances approach asks what a reasonable possessor would have anticipated from everything it knew about the premises. Earlier incidents remain strong evidence there, alongside the location, the hours of operation, the nature of the business, and the precautions already in place. That weighing resembles the balance of likelihood against feasibility from the prior subsection, which is why a plaintiff in such a jurisdiction can reach a jury where the other approach would end the case.
Because the facts are identical in both jurisdictions, the outcome moves only with the rule on notice, which is why an answer should apply both views when the stem does not say which one governs. Proving notice and breach does not end the case, though, because the possessor will argue that the third person’s crime, not the possessor’s lapse, caused the injury. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 answers that argument when the crime was the very risk the possessor should have guarded against: if the likelihood that a third person will act in a particular way is the hazard, or one of the hazards, that makes the actor negligent, the act does not relieve the actor of liability, whether it is innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal.27 The reason follows from why § 344 exists. The duty to discover and guard against third persons’ acts rests on the prospect that such acts will occur. If the occurrence of the very act the duty anticipates could then excuse the possessor, the duty would bind only where the precaution was never needed, and a possessor who ignored a known risk would be freed by the event that proved the risk real. Counting the crime as the harm the duty guards against keeps the duty from canceling itself.
In Hines v. Garrett a train carried a young woman past her stop, the crew put her off a mile down the line in an area known to be frequented by vagrants, and she was assaulted while walking back. The court rejected the railroad’s argument that the assault was a superseding cause, reasoning that “[t]he very danger to which this unfortunate girl fell a victim is the one which would at once suggest itself to the average and normal mind as a danger liable to overtake her under these circumstances.”28 Leaving her in that place was negligent because of the chance of assault, so the assault realized the risk. Silva applies the same reasoning to a business possessor: the First Circuit held that a jury could reasonably find the theater’s failure to patrol its premises adequately to be a proximate cause of the killings, since patrolling is the precaution that exists to head off violence of that kind.29 Decisions group this situation, a defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against criminal misconduct who fails to do so, among the common settings in which liability survives an intervening crime.30
The contrast case shows the other side of the line. In Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co. a railroad negligently spilled gasoline in a street, and a bystander ignited it with a match. The court held that the railroad would be liable if the match was thrown carelessly, but that a deliberate throw was a criminal act that cut off the railroad’s liability, because the railroad was “not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of others.”31 The court treated a deliberately set fire as outside what the careless spill obliged the railroad to anticipate, and it left the responsibility with the person who chose to do harm. What separates the two cases is the relation between the defendant’s negligence and the crime. The carrier in Hines was negligent because it exposed a passenger to the chance of assault.
Watson no longer states a safe rule, even in the state that produced it. The Kentucky Supreme Court has since noted in Britton v. Wooten that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link, because a spark that ignites negligently accumulated trash may have been set accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or even criminally and still have been foreseeable.32 It is probably impossible to state any comprehensive rule for when a negligent defendant remains liable after a third person’s later crime, and the Third Restatement recognizes that intervening acts that are unforeseeable, unusual, or highly culpable may fall outside the scope of the risk.33 An answer that announces one bright line therefore claims more than the law supports. The safer essay sets out both notice views, applies the facts under each, and then asks whether the crime was the risk that made the possessor’s omission negligent. A possessor who ignored visible signs of violence and was met with violence stands where the carrier in Hines and the theater in Silva stood; a possessor whose negligence had nothing to do with the likelihood of crime, struck by a deliberate and unforeseeable one, stands closer to the railroad in Watson.