Concept
Modern Trends and Limits
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
Modern Trends and Limits
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 remains the working test for child trespassers, and the preceding sections took it apart clause by clause. A possessor is liable for physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition on the land if the five conditions of clauses (a) through (e) are met.1 Three developments now test how far that rule reaches. The Restatement (Third) replaces the list of conditions with a general duty of reasonable care. Courts divide over whether the rule protects only trespassing children or also children who have permission to be on the land. And recreational use statutes can relieve owners of the duty before any clause is reached.
Each development presses on a different feature of § 339. The Third Restatement attacks its structure, because five conditions of duty give way to one general standard. The licensee question attacks its wording, because the lead-in speaks of children who are "trespassing." The statutes attack its availability, because a statute meant to encourage owners to open land for recreation changes what a possessor owes to anyone who comes onto it.
On an exam, § 339 stays the default. Unless the fact pattern signals a different regime, state the threshold of a trespassing child and an artificial condition, then run clauses (a) through (e) in order. The clauses also reappear inside the newer approaches as the factors a court weighs, so that work is rarely wasted. The Third Restatement comes first because it shows what happens to the five clauses when their structure falls away.
The Restatement Third Approach
Section 339 gives trespassing children a special duty by listing five conditions the plaintiff must prove before the possessor owes anything.2 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm dispenses with the list. Its § 51 provides that a possessor owes entrants a duty of reasonable care with regard to natural and artificial conditions, among other things, and for that reason § 339 is described as superseded.3 Comment l to § 51 speaks to child trespassers directly: the principles behind § 339 remain relevant in deciding whether the possessor exercised reasonable care.4 The Third Restatement therefore contains no special rule for child trespassers, on the theory that its general provisions, §§ 51 and 52, do the work.5
The two rules also differ in the conditions they cover. Section 339 reaches only artificial conditions, and a condition becomes artificial once the owner alters the land, as by damming a stream or piling sand where the wind may blow it.6 Section 51 speaks of natural and artificial conditions alike.7
The general provisions absorb the special rule in two moves. Because § 51 states one duty of reasonable care for entrants, the labels invitee, licensee, and trespasser no longer fix the duty by themselves.8 And § 52 keeps a reduced duty only for flagrant trespassers, a narrow class that the word itself marks as the extreme case.9 Child trespassers receive no special treatment under either section. A child who is a flagrant trespasser is owed the lesser duty; a child who is not, as many will not be, is owed reasonable care.10 The question that § 339 answers with five clauses is thereby folded into the duty that every non-flagrant entrant already receives.
The list can be dropped because its content already looks like negligence. Clause (a) asks whether child trespass is foreseeable at the place, clause (b) whether the possessor knows of a condition that poses a serious risk, clause (d) whether the burden of eliminating the danger is slight beside the risk, and clause (e) whether the possessor used reasonable care. The duty § 339 creates therefore comes close to a general duty of reasonable care toward foreseeable child trespassers.11 A general duty reaches that result without asking which category the entrant belongs to.
The practical difference lies in who decides. Questions of duty go to the court and questions of negligence go to the jury, and by writing the rule as a set of duty limitations, § 339 lets courts keep greater control over outcomes.12 Under a general duty, the same considerations are weighed as part of breach, so more of the weighing passes to the jury.
Jurisdictions that never adopted § 339 reach a similar place by a different route. The Massachusetts court in Mathis v. Massachusetts Electric Co. treated the child-trespasser rules as reflecting a national trend toward a uniform standard of care, and the D.C. Circuit in McGettigan v. National Bank of Washington favored an ordinary negligence approach.13 Courts in this group impose a duty of ordinary care, and the breach question is still usually decided by applying the § 339 factors.14 The pit in the box therefore produces the same inquiry in a Third Restatement state and in an ordinary-care state. In both, the five clauses survive as the working vocabulary of reasonableness without being formal conditions of duty.
A minority of courts move the other way and keep a rule far narrower than either. In Anderson v. Claiborne County Recreation Club, Inc. the Mississippi court held that the only duty owed to a child trespasser is not to harm the child willfully or wantonly, and Maryland's decision in Osterman v. Peters is cited in the same group.15 These courts decline to give child trespassers any special rule. That returns the child to the old baseline, in which a trespasser is protected only against a deliberate act of harm or reckless disregard of the trespasser's presence.16 A plaintiff in such a state cannot rely on § 339 at all. Proof that the possessor left the pit uncovered for months shows negligence, and negligence is less than the willful or wanton conduct the rule demands, so the claim fails unless the plaintiff can show more.
Most exam questions call for the fifth step, since a stem that says nothing about the jurisdiction expects the familiar five-clause test. Steps two and three show why that work is rarely wasted: the facts that satisfy or defeat the clauses are the facts a jury would weigh under a general duty of care.
Child Licensees and Invitees
Section 339 is written for a particular plaintiff. Its lead-in makes a possessor liable for physical harm to "children trespassing thereon" when an artificial condition causes the harm and the five clauses are met.19 That wording raises a question once the child has permission to be on the land. A licensee enters with permission for the entrant's own purposes, such as a social guest, and an invitee enters for the possessor's business benefit, such as a customer. Children occupy both classes. A child can be an invitee in the child's own right, as when entering a retail store, or can take the status of the adult invitee accompanying the child, and children can be licensees as social guests or as companions of social guests.20 The question is whether the special protection that § 339 gives a child with no right to be on the land also reaches a child who has one.
Most authority answers yes. Where a possessor owes a duty of care to a trespassing child under the rules in this chapter, the possessor owes the same duty to a child licensee, a result the Second Restatement records in § 343B.21 A child invitee is owed no less, and the decisions that apply the attractive-nuisance doctrine to children who are not trespassers speak of all children rather than of trespassers alone.22 The extension creates no new duty. It only refuses to let a child's permission to be on the land lower the protection the child would have had without it.
The reason follows from what the special rule protects. Section 339 departs from the no-duty baseline because a young child cannot recognize or weigh an artificial hazard, and that incapacity is the same whether the child came over the fence or through the front gate. The possessor's side points the same way. Clause (a) asks whether the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass at the place, and a possessor who has admitted child visitors has at least as much reason to expect children there as one who merely suspects intruders.23 Without the extension the law would produce an anomaly. In the classic English account of the three classes, the occupier owes a licensee no duty to ensure that the premises are safe and is bound only not to create a trap or allow a concealed danger that he knows of or ought to know of.24 If § 339 stopped at the trespasser's edge, a child with permission could receive less protection than a trespassing child who could invoke the section, and the possessor's consent would cost the child protection.
The debate surfaced in S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc., where a child at a private party was launched into the air by an inflatable bungee attraction and seriously injured.25 The child was a licensee, so the question was whether the attractive-nuisance doctrine of § 339 was open to him. A Colorado statute provides that "the circumstances under which an invitee may recover include all of the circumstances under which a trespasser or a licensee could recover," with a parallel provision for licensees.26 Justice Rice, for the majority, held that this language extended the protection the doctrine gives child trespassers to child licensees and invitees.27 As the dissent describes it, the majority also reasoned that Colorado's earlier attractive-nuisance cases, though all involving trespassing children, had never rested their holdings on the children's status as trespassers.28
The dissent deserves study because it states the opposing position in its strongest form. Justice Eid argued that the majority misread Colorado case law: the earlier cases did not turn on trespasser status only because that status was never contested, and in each of them the claim failed on some other requirement of the doctrine.29 He also objected that, even if the child were treated as a licensee, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment because the defendant did not know or have reason to know of the dangerous condition that caused the harm.30 That second point survives whichever side one prefers. Extending the doctrine to a licensee gives the child access to the five clauses, but the plaintiff must still prove each of them, including the possessor's knowledge under clause (b).
The contrary position treats the doctrine as an exception tied to trespasser status. On the dissent's account, children who are drawn onto land by an unusual and enticing condition are treated as though they were invitees instead of trespassers.31 That device exists to lift a trespasser out of the no-duty baseline, and a child who already holds the status of licensee or invitee stands outside that baseline and has no need of it. The reasoning fits Uddin v. Embassy Suites Hotel, where an Ohio appellate court held the attractive-nuisance doctrine inapplicable to a child who was not a trespasser.32 Kentucky's highest court sided with the S.W. majority in Mason v. City of Mount Sterling, so the decisions divide on whether the doctrine belongs only to trespassers.33 The Colorado majority rested partly on a statute, so S.W. shows the extension's reasoning without settling the question in every state.
The split matters less than it first seems, because the child's status already fixes much of what the possessor owes before § 339 comes into play. A child invitee is owed the same reasonable care as an adult invitee, though what counts as reasonable shifts with the child: a danger that is open and obvious to an adult may not be to a child, while some dangers, such as fire, water, and heights, are plain even to children.34 A child invitee therefore has an ordinary negligence claim whether or not § 339 reaches the child. The dispute has real weight for child licensees, who ordinarily receive only the care owed to adult licensees unless the extension applies.35 Under the Third Restatement the question largely disappears, because every entrant except a flagrant trespasser is owed reasonable care and child trespassers receive no special rule.36
Where the injured child is a party guest or a customer, an exam answer should name the child's status first and note that § 339 is worded for trespassers. It then applies the majority extension and runs clauses (a) through (e) in order, since permission opens the doctrine without proving any clause. The answer should also flag that a court following Uddin would stop at the threshold.
Recreational Use Statutes
Section 339 states a common-law duty that a possessor owes to trespassing children, and a legislature can change a common-law duty by statute.38 Recreational use statutes do this for owners who open land to recreation. Their stated purpose is to encourage owners to make private land available for recreation, and they pursue it by reducing the duty an owner owes to people who use the land that way.39 The same statutes may also relieve the owner of the duties recognized under the attractive-nuisance and child-trespasser rules, so a claim by a child hurt on land used for recreation can end before any of the five clauses is reached.40 Whether a particular owner, parcel, and use fall within a given statute is a coverage question for the general study of these statutes, and this subsection assumes the answer is yes.
Statutes differ in how they treat child trespassers, and the pattern in the governing state decides whether § 339 is available at all:
- Some statutes expressly recognize the continuing validity of the attractive-nuisance rules, so § 339 applies as it does elsewhere.41
- Some statutes say nothing about child trespassers, and some courts read in an exception so that the owner remains responsible for negligent harm to foreseeable child trespassers who could not be expected to discover the dangers on the land.42
- Some courts hold that a statute giving landowners special benefits without exception supersedes the attractive-nuisance rules, so the doctrine no longer exists in that state.43
The second and third patterns answer one question differently: what should a statute's silence about children mean? The statutes work by lowering the owner's exposure to suit, so a court that reads one literally and without exception serves that purpose most completely. Every category of claim left in place is a category the owner must still guard against, and an owner who cannot count on immunity has less reason to open the land. A court that reads in an exception reasons from the other direction. A legislature that wanted people hiking and fishing on private land need not have meant to strip protection from a small child who cannot see the danger. The exception such courts supply resembles the core of § 339, since it asks that child trespass be foreseeable and that the child be unable to discover the danger, the concerns of clauses (a) and (c).44 An owner who has no reason to expect children, or whose hazard any child would readily see, should stay protected by the statute even in a state that reads in the exception.
The cost of the literal reading appears when the child is compared with an adult. As the origins section showed, most courts now require ordinary care toward a trespasser whose presence has been discovered. A statute that lowers the owner's duty to something considerably less than reasonable care can therefore leave a child injured by a foreseeable danger with less protection than many adult trespassers receive at common law.45
A fact pattern that places an injured child on land open to recreation therefore raises a question that comes before § 339. Has a recreational use statute preserved the doctrine, been read to contain an exception for foreseeable child trespassers, or been held to supersede it? The answer fixes whether the five clauses are run at all, and a stem that gives no information about the statute calls for an answer that flags the issue and states the alternatives.