Concept
Origins of the Doctrine
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
Child Trespassers and Attractive Nuisance
Origins of the Doctrine
The rule protecting trespassing children is an exception, and it makes sense only against the rule it interrupts. Traditional premises law sorted everyone who enters land into three classes, invitees, licensees, and trespassers, and the duty a possessor owes depends on the class.1 The possessor is whoever occupies the land or, when no one does, its owner.2 Invitees, meaning anyone on the land for business purposes, for the owner's benefit, are owed reasonable care.3 At the other end of the scale stand trespassers, and the law asks almost nothing of the possessor on their behalf.
The classic English statement of that rule is blunt. The occupier owes a trespasser no duty to take reasonable care for his protection, not even a duty to protect him from concealed danger, because the trespasser comes on to the premises at his own risk.4 The occupier is liable only for a willful act that involves more than the absence of reasonable care: some act done with the deliberate intention of harming the trespasser, or at least with reckless disregard of his presence.5
Two practical considerations supported giving trespassers so little. The first was the law's regard for ownership: real property dominated the English and American economies until the late nineteenth century, individualism and the sanctity of private property were central values, and special tort rules favoring owners and occupiers grew up to reflect that balance.6 The second was administrative. When the entrant's class is clear, the duty owed is clear, outcomes are predictable, and adjudication stays cheap, and the arrangement is tolerable so long as people broadly agree about what each class of entrant deserves.7
A third reason was one of principle, and Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co. states it. A boy put his hand into the gearing of the defendants' machinery and was hurt. The court observed that if the boy's act injured the machinery, he was liable to the owners in trespass for the damage and for nominal damages for the entry, and that it was no answer that the owners might have used force to stop him. Having wronged the owners, he could not turn around and hold them liable for neglecting to prevent the very act that injured them both.8 The court set aside, as beside the point, cases of enticement, allurement, or invitation of infants to their injury and cases of setting traps for them.9
That consensus did not hold for children. Courts were reluctant to apply the limited-duty rules for adult entrants to child trespassers and, by various legal devices, most imposed a higher standard of care, chiefly because society has an interest in protecting children from serious injury.10 Once the shared view of what entrants deserve breaks down, categories set at a high level of generality tend to produce inaccurate or undesirable outcomes,11 and for children the rigid categories began to produce just such outcomes.
The first device was an analogy to the trap. Courts held that a landholder who sets before young children a temptation he has reason to believe will lead them into danger must use ordinary care to protect them, relying on English cases that held defendants liable when dogs, lured onto their land by strong-smelling meat set out in traps, were killed.12 The railroad turntable became the standard American illustration. In Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., a seven-year-old lost a leg on a turntable, and the Minnesota court reasoned that the machine appealed to the natural instincts of children while being highly dangerous to them, so that its very attractiveness induced the child to use it. The child was treated as enticed rather than as an ordinary trespasser, the category Buch itself recognized as separate.13
A rule justified by enticement, however, naturally reads as limited to children who were enticed, and Justice Holmes read it that way in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt. Two children trespassed on the defendant's land, discovered a pool that looked clear but was poisoned with sulfuric acid, and went into the water. Holmes held the attractive nuisance doctrine inapplicable because the children had not been attracted onto the land in the first place by the thing that injured them.14 The holding shows what the fiction cost: protection turned on how the child came to be on the land rather than on the danger waiting there.
Other courts resisted the turntable rule altogether. Twist v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad reasoned that a boy's curiosity can make almost any object a plaything, so a duty to guard against such use would make owning property unsafe and would place the burden of protecting children on everyone except the parents and the children themselves. That objection names the design problem: a duty to children needs a limiting principle, and enticement was a poor one.
The first Restatement of Torts answered that problem by dropping the fiction. Its authors abandoned the fictitious language of “attractive nuisance” and retitled the topic “Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children.”15 As an opinion in S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc. recounts, the 1934 Restatement made a possessor liable for bodily harm to young children trespassing on the land caused by a structure or other artificial condition, but only when stated conditions were met. Among them, the possessor knew or should have known that children were likely to trespass at the place, and knew and realized, or should have known and realized, that the condition involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to them.16 The Second Restatement readopted the rule with only a few modifications and states the conditions as five clauses, (a) through (e), taken up in the next section.17 The child rule was thus in place in 1934, decades before the special duty limitations favoring landowners were restricted in the last third of the twentieth century.18
Notice what the list does not contain. No clause asks whether the condition lured the child onto the land, and none asks whether it is a nuisance; liability turns instead on the place, the possessor's knowledge of the condition and its risk, the children's youth, the utility of the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger measured against the risk, and the possessor's reasonable care.19 The rule reaches only artificial conditions, and a condition becomes artificial once the owner alters it, as by damming a stream or piling sand where the wind may blow it.20 Natural conditions generally stay outside because almost all children appreciate their hazards and the burden of altering or guarding them is usually disproportionate.21 The last clause keeps fault at the center of the rule, since the possessor answers only for failing to use reasonable care, in keeping with tort law's general reliance on fault rather than strict liability.22