Concept
Licensees
Possessor of land and entrant status
Licensees
A licensee is a person “privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor’s consent.”1 The word only carries the definition. Consent is the licensee’s single source of privilege: no business dealing with the possessor stands behind the entry, and neither does any purpose for which the land is held open to the public, the two purposes that define an invitee.2 That single source places the licensee above the trespasser, who enters or remains with no privilege from the possessor’s consent or from any other source,3 and below the invitee.
The line that matters has moved over time. Until recently the main distinction separated entrants who came by invitation for business purposes, or onto premises open to the public, from entrants who came for nonbusiness purposes, with or without permission. Today the primary distinction separates entrants who come by invitation, or at least by permission or privilege, from those who come with no consent or other privilege, the trespassers.4 The licensee stands on the privileged side of the modern line and on the lower side of the older one. Most courts still begin by sorting the entrant into the traditional categories, although a substantial number now extend the duty of ordinary care to licensees and even to trespassers.5
The categories belong to the law of land possession, which developed rules of its own. It has been suggested that the special rules on the possessor’s liability reflect the high place land has held in English and American thought, the dominance of the landowning class when the rules took shape, and the heritage of feudalism.6 Those rules may be invoked only by or against the possessor, meaning the person who occupies the land or, if it is unoccupied, its owner, and even a trespasser injured on the land by the negligence of someone other than the possessor is not barred from recovering.7 Status therefore answers a narrow question: what is this entrant to the person in possession?
A licensee comes for the licensee’s own purposes and not for the occupier’s benefit, and the occupier’s traditional duty is to warn of dangerous conditions the occupier knows about and the licensee does not. The standard example is a social guest.8
Two groups of entrants fall into the category. The first consists of entrants whom the possessor merely permits or tolerates, and the next subsection treats them. The second consists of entrants whom the possessor invites for purposes that are neither commercial nor public, chiefly social guests. This unit classifies the entrant; the duty each classification carries is a separate question.
Bare Licensees
A bare licensee is a licensee whose presence the occupier tolerates but does not necessarily approve, such as a person who takes a shortcut across another’s land; the law also calls this entrant a naked or mere licensee.9 A close relative, the licensee by permission, has the owner’s permission or passive consent to enter for the entrant’s own convenience, curiosity, or entertainment.10 In both, consent supplies the whole privilege.
Consent alone ranks below invitation because the entry serves only the entrant. The person who cuts across a back lot comes for personal convenience, and a licensee’s purposes are, by definition, not the occupier’s.11 A public invitee comes as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public, and a business visitor comes for a purpose connected with business dealings with the possessor.12
A caller at the front door shows how invitation, and not mere permission, separates the licensee from the invitee. A salesperson who comes uninvited has no invitation of any kind and is not an invitee.13 The salesperson who comes in response to an implicit or explicit invitation is a business invitee, because the invitation put the salesperson there and the visit is a potential economic exchange.14 A delivery person with an unordered package may also be a business invitee when the possessor has accepted such deliveries for years, on the theory that the deliveries give the possessor a material benefit.15 A salesperson who enters a place open to the public is a public invitee.16 In some jurisdictions the licensee category divides into ordinary licensees and bare licensees; the bare group includes salespersons, canvassers, and social visitors who drop in without an express invitation, and the duty owed to bare licensees is less than the duty owed to ordinary licensees.17
Consent comes in more than one form. An owner who merely permits a hunter or a fisherman to use the land has issued no invitation, even an implied one, and decisions such as Waller v. Smith (a hunter) and Douglas v. Bergland (a fisherman) classify such entrants as licensees.18 Implied consent also suffices. In Singleton v. Jackson, a religious solicitor who came to a home to make contact was implicitly permitted to approach the front door but had not been invited, so the solicitor was a licensee and not an invitee.19 Where neither express nor implied consent exists and no other privilege applies, the entrant is a trespasser.20
The word tolerates in the bare-licensee definition needs care. One explanation sometimes offered is that a possessor’s continued toleration of entries amounts to permission, so that the entrant becomes a licensee. In most cases, however, the mere fact that a railway company or other possessor has failed to take steps to prevent trespassing, steps that would be burdensome, expensive, and perhaps futile, is not in itself any indication that it consents to the entry.21 A railroad that knows residents cut across its unfenced right of way, and leaves it unfenced because fencing the line would be burdensome and probably futile, has therefore ordinarily not made them licensees. Absent some other privilege, they are entrants without consent, and the definition of a trespasser fits them.22 The rule keeps the line sensible: if failing to bear such a burden counted as consent, a possessor with more boundary than it could afford to police would be taken to have admitted the public. Consent requires some indication that the possessor chose to allow the entry.
Social Guests and Similar Entrants
Both invitee definitions are built on purpose. A public invitee enters as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public, and a business visitor enters for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor.25 A friend asked to dinner satisfies neither, so a social guest, although invited and even urged to come, is in law not an invitee but a licensee. The decisions have been essentially uniform on the point since Southcote v. Stanley in 1856.26 The invitation settles whether the guest may come; the purpose of the visit settles which category the guest occupies.
Rowland v. Christian recites the traditional categories in these terms: a trespasser enters or remains on another’s land without a privilege; a licensee is “a person like a social guest who is not an invitee” and who is privileged to enter by virtue of the possessor’s consent; and an invitee is a business visitor invited or permitted to enter for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them.27 The definition of the licensee proceeds by resemblance to the social guest.
Olier v. Bailey shows how completely the absence of any benefit to the host decides the question. The plaintiff came at the defendant’s invitation to view the defendant’s plants. She did not assist with housework, help the defendant move, take the defendant anywhere, or do anything else to benefit her; she came entirely for her own benefit, to look at the plants and perhaps take a sample home. The court held her a licensee as a matter of law.28 Jack, the young man who routinely mows Samantha’s lawn, stands on the other side of that line. If yellow jackets attack him while he works, he recovers as an invitee, because his visits serve Samantha and not only himself.29 A guest who actually helps the host raises a harder question; for decisions weighing a guest’s help against the host’s invitation, see Pinnell v. Bates and Thompson v. Katzer.
A private home can still hold public invitees. The plaintiff in Post v. Lunney was injured on vinyl that had been placed over an oriental rug in the defendant’s home, which Ms. Post had opened for a paid public tour. The Florida Supreme Court nonetheless treated the plaintiff as a public invitee, since Ms. Post had opened up her home for the tour.30 The result follows from the public branch of the invitee definition: she entered as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land was held open to the public.31 She was no friend invited by name, and that fact separates her from the social guest.
Other entrants join the social guest in the licensee category when their presence serves themselves or their families and gives the possessor neither a business dealing nor a public use of the land. In Lemon v. Busey, a part-time church employee brought her five-year-old granddaughter to the church. The arrangement was “for the convenience of her grandmother and parents,” and the church at no time supervised the child. While her grandmother worked, the child wandered off and fell to her death from a roof that she had probably reached through an unlocked elevator door or fire escape. The court held that she was a licensee and denied recovery.32
Statutes can lift the limit that the licensee label imposes. Laube v. Stevenson involved a dangerous condition on a stairwell and illustrates how the result differed between a host who knew of the hazard and one who did not. In 2012, however, a Connecticut statute superseded the majority opinion by requiring the standard of care owed to a social invitee to be the same as that owed to a business invitee.33 Across the country, almost exactly one-half of American jurisdictions have discarded the traditional trichotomy within the past generation and apply a standard of reasonable care to claims by invitees and licensees alike, although a substantial majority of those courts still require trespassers to prove intentional or willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.34 The last section of this chapter takes up those jurisdictions.