Concept
Third-Party Conduct Within the Risk
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Third-Party Conduct Within the Risk
A defendant's negligence often lies in failing to guard against what other people will do. Under § 302A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other or of a third person.1 Section 302B reaches further, to conduct intended to cause harm, even when that conduct is criminal.2
These sections define negligence, yet they settle many superseding-cause problems, because they identify what a careful actor must foresee: how other people will behave in the situation the actor creates. A precaution is required on account of the dangers it guards against. When a third person's conduct is one of those dangers, that conduct is the hazard arriving, and excusing the defendant would leave the precaution guarding against nothing.
Sections 442A and 442B turn the point into rules of causation. Where negligent conduct creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force and is a substantial factor in causing the harm, the intervention is not a superseding cause.3 Where negligent conduct creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing it, the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor, except where a third person intentionally causes the harm and it falls outside the scope of the risk the actor's conduct created.4
'Superseding cause' names a result and supplies no method for reaching it. The phrase states the legal consequence of classifying an intervening force as superseding; it does not tell a court how to make that classification.5 The method this unit follows is to identify what made the defendant's conduct negligent and then ask whether the third person's conduct brought that risk to pass. The three subsections below apply that question to a careless third person, to harm that arrives by an unforeseeable route, and to a third person who acts on purpose.
Third-Party Negligence
The natural defense is that the later actor was careless too: the plaintiff would not have been hurt without that carelessness, so the later actor should answer alone. Courts once accepted that argument as the 'last wrongdoer' rule, under which only the second actor's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. One rationale for the rule was that the first actor should not be responsible for the second actor's negligence. The rule itself disappeared long ago, but some residue of that rationale still lingers in cases of intervention and enablement.6
Sections 302A and 442A answer the lingering argument by changing the question. They do not ask whether the later actor was careless, which is nearly always true. They ask whether that carelessness is part of the reason the defendant's own conduct was careless. A careful actor must allow for the carelessness of others, and a precaution is often required precisely because someone else will not behave perfectly.7 When that is so, § 442A places the later carelessness outside the superseding category, as long as the defendant's negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.8 That requirement states the starting premise: the question of relief arises only after the defendant's negligence has been shown to contribute materially to the injury.
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. shows the rule at work. The jury could have found that the contractor negligently failed to safeguard an excavation site. A prime hazard of that dereliction is that a driver will negligently enter the site and injure a worker, so the driver's negligence, or even recklessness, did not insulate the contractor. It did not matter either that the driver lost control by negligently failing to take medication rather than by a driving mistake.9 The contractor could not have anticipated that mechanism or the exact extent of the injuries, but that does not preclude liability as a matter of law where the general risk and character of the injuries are foreseeable.10
Section 302A speaks of reckless as well as negligent conduct, and lending a car to a driver known to be reckless shows why. The borrower's recklessness is the reason the loan was careless, so it cannot also excuse the lender.11
The shopkeeper who carelessly drops a box lid and delays a customer stands on the other side of the line. Suppose the customer is later hurt in a train wreck she would have avoided without the delay, and suppose the railroad's own negligence caused the wreck. That negligence is an intervening force, but it was no part of what made dropping a lid careless: a dropped lid threatens people near the lid, and a few minutes of delay do not make railroad accidents more likely. The harm falls outside the circle of foreseeability, and a court will refuse to impose liability for it, most likely explaining that the shopkeeper's act was 'not the proximate cause' because it could not be foreseen.12 The lender and the shopkeeper each face a stranger's later carelessness, so the carelessness alone cannot account for the different results. The link between that carelessness and the defendant's reason for care does.
Section 442A is one route to liability, not the only one. When the later carelessness does not match the defendant's reason for care, the plaintiff may still rely on the general foreseeability test and the § 442 considerations treated above, including the rules on escape, rescue, and medical treatment. When the later conduct is intended to cause harm, a separate provision and a narrower exception apply, and the last subsection takes them up.
Harm Within the Created Risk
Section 442B sorts these cases by comparing the harm that occurred with the harm that made the conduct negligent. Where negligent conduct creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing it, the fact that another force brings the harm about does not relieve the actor, except where a third person intentionally causes the harm and it falls outside the scope of the risk the conduct created.14 The rule reaches conduct that only increases an existing risk as well as conduct that creates one, and it names no particular kind of intervening force. Carelessness by others, natural events, and other forces all fall under it. The exception for intentional harm has its own subsection below.
The rule holds even when the intervening force was itself unforeseeable. Suppose explosive gas is negligently permitted to accumulate in an oil barge and lightning unforeseeably ignites it. The defendant is liable even though the intervening cause was unforeseeable, because the result was within the foreseeable risk for which the defendant is responsible.15
The reason is practical. Almost no one pictures the exact chain of events that carries a harm to the plaintiff, so a rule that excused the defendant whenever the chain was unusual would excuse nearly every careless actor. The law asks instead whether the harm that occurred is the kind that made the conduct careless. If it is, the defendant created the danger that was realized, and the force that delivered it is a detail of the route.
A decayed utility pole offers a variation. In Gibson v. Garcia, a company let a pole rot until it threatened to fall, and a driver's car struck the pole and brought it down on a pedestrian. A collision was not how the company would have expected the pole to fall, but the pole's falling on someone was the danger that made the neglect careless, and the company stayed liable.
The line falls where the harm has nothing to do with the risks that made the conduct careless. A defendant who negligently requires someone to make a detour is not liable for that person's death when a tree falls on the car, when an unexpected flood arrives, or when a robber attacks, so long as the defendant had no reason to know the detour subjected the person to an increased risk of such an attack.16 A taxi company that negligently fails to send a car to a customer waiting at a park is likewise not liable when a tornado strikes the park. The dangers the company should foresee from failing to send a car do not include tornados, and a court would very likely call the tornado a superseding cause.17
What separates the barge and the pole from the detour and the park is the relation between the harm and the carelessness. In the first pair, the unusual force was only the means by which the foreseeable harm arrived: lightning stands in for a spark, and a car stands in for a gust of wind. In the second pair, the force produced a kind of harm the carelessness did nothing to make likely, and the defendant merely put the plaintiff within its reach.
Asking only whether the intervening force was foreseeable answers half the question. Section 442B directs attention to the harm, and the defendant escapes only if the harm also lies outside the risk that made the conduct negligent. The hard cases are those in which the mechanism is odd and the kind of harm can be described more than one way.
Archer probably should have been aware of the risk of dangerous chemicals in the area. He may not have known they were explosive, but he probably should have anticipated that they might be, and that is all the law requires. The harder question is whether he should have anticipated that the concussion from a dropped blower would set off a tank. The blower did not fall on the tank; the concussion is a different and unusual mechanism of harm, and Archer can at least argue he had no reason to anticipate it.18 The coworker answers that a dropped load injuring people nearby is exactly the harm that made handling it carelessly dangerous, and the explosion is one way that harm arrived. Neither description is plainly wrong. How broadly the risk is described decides the case, and the argument should be made on that ground.
Intentional or Criminal Acts
Section 302B carries the reasoning of § 302A from careless third persons to malicious ones. An act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm through a third person's conduct that is intended to cause harm, even though that conduct is criminal.20 The preceding subsections showed that another's carelessness can be among the reasons the defendant's conduct was careless; § 302B says that another's wrongful purpose can be too. When the likelihood of the crime is part of the reason a precaution was required, the crime cannot also excuse the failure to take it.
The duty is selective. In Doe v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, the court drew on the comments to § 302B: a reasonable person must anticipate and guard against intentional or even criminal misconduct only in particular situations, generally those in which the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct.21 The limit follows from frequency. Carelessness is common enough that every careful actor must allow for it, while a duty to guard against every conceivable crime would make nearly every ordinary act negligent.
The causation side is the exception in § 442B. Both of its conditions must be present: a third person caused the harm intentionally, and the harm lies outside the scope of the risk the defendant's conduct created.22 A deliberate or criminal act satisfies only the first. It begins the inquiry, and the scope of the risk finishes it.
Two pulls explain why the second condition matters. A deliberate wrongdoer is far more blameworthy than the earlier careless actor, and when the crime had nothing to do with why the defendant was careless, placing the loss on the wrongdoer is fair. But if the danger of crime is exactly why a reasonable person would take a precaution, excusing the defendant because a crime occurred would erase the duty. The scope-of-risk question reconciles the two. When harm caused by a third party's criminal acts is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct, and therefore within the scope of the risk the conduct created, that conduct may be actionable.23
Section 448 states the traditional default from the other side. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause even though the actor's negligence created an opportunity for it, unless the actor, at the time of the negligent conduct, realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created and that a third person might take advantage of it.24 The exception swallows much of the default whenever the crime was one of the hazards that made the conduct negligent.
Brower v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. puts the pattern on a city street. A railroad's negligent collision left the driver of a wagon unable to protect his employer's property, and thieves took it. The court held the railroad answerable: the natural and probable result of the driver's enforced abandonment of the property in the street of a large city was its disappearance, and, quoting a Massachusetts decision, the act of a third person 'intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have been foreseen.'25 The Restatement's illustration under § 448 uses these facts. A railroad negligently runs down a truck carrying barrels of cider, scatters the barrels, and stuns the driver, at night and at a place where thefts from the company's freight cars have been frequent. The railroad's negligence is a legal cause of the loss of the cider to the thieves.26
An alarm installer stands in the same position. Apex was hired to avert the very type of act that caused the plaintiff's loss, and illegal entry by a burglar is clearly one of the hazards that makes it negligent to wire the system improperly. Apex's motion for summary judgment should be denied, because a company that takes a customer's money to protect against theft cannot deny that theft was foreseeable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449.27 The alarm case belongs to a recurring category: the defendant who, by contract or otherwise, is under a duty to protect the plaintiff against criminal misconduct and fails to do so.28
Hines v. Garrett reaches the same result without any contract. A railroad carried a young woman a mile past her stop and put her off at night in an area known to be frequented by vagrants, and she was assaulted on the walk back. The court rejected the railroad's superseding-cause argument, reasoning that the danger she fell victim to was one that would readily suggest itself as likely to overtake her there.
Cole v. German Savings & Loan Society marks the other side of the line. A child who had entered the owner's building maliciously ushered a visitor into an unguarded elevator shaft, and the court treated the malicious act as cutting off the owner's liability, because nothing about the child's presence made such a prank a recognizable danger. What separates the street and the lonely road from the elevator shaft is the link between the crime and the reason for care. Leaving cargo unguarded in a city street, or a young woman near a known haunt of vagrants, carries precisely the risk of the crime that followed.
No fixed rule says when the risk of crime is high enough to require a precaution. As in other negligence cases, the comment to § 302B treats the question as a balance of the magnitude of the risk against the utility of the actor's conduct.29 The factors are these:
- the known character, past conduct, and tendencies of the person whose intentional conduct causes the harm;
- the temptation or opportunity the situation affords that person for such misconduct;
- the gravity of the harm that may result;
- the possibility that some other person will assume responsibility for preventing the conduct or the harm; and
- the burden of the precautions the actor would have to take.
The first two factors go to how likely the crime is, and the unguarded cargo in Brower is a case of opportunity. Gravity raises the stakes of any given likelihood. The last two go to how much the defendant must do about it, since a danger someone else has taken in hand asks less of the defendant, and a costly precaution may not be worth its benefit. Where the risk is relatively slight in comparison with the utility of the actor's conduct, the actor may owe no protection at all.30
Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & Railroad Co. reflects the older instinct that a deliberate act ends the inquiry: the court said that a negligently thrown match would leave the railroad liable for a fire but a deliberately thrown one would cut off its liability. Courts now often reject any such all-inclusive rule. In Britton v. Wooten, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to let a possible arson relieve a defendant who had negligently stacked flammable trash in a grocery store. The modern analysis asks the scope-of-risk question directly. If the intervening criminal act was foreseeable, it may be within the scope of the risk and the defendant may be subject to liability, a scope-of-liability issue that may be left to the factfinder, as the Third Restatement treats it.31 Foreseeability must be real, though. An owner who negligently facilitates the stealing of his car is generally not liable to a victim of the thief's negligent driving unless he should have foreseen a greater than normal risk of such harm.32
Courts divide most sharply in products cases, and the 'superseding' label cannot resolve the split. In Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Corp., a young woman stranded in a remote area by a tire failure was attacked and murdered, and the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, treating the attack as outside the risk of a tire defect. In d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., an arsonist set a hotel fire that killed the plaintiff's decedent, and the court refused to shield the maker of excessively flammable carpet fiber, because the risk of a hotel fire if the carpet ignited was foreseeable. One way to reconcile such decisions is to ask what the product is for. Protection from crime is part of what a burglar alarm is for, so a defect that lets a burglar in realizes the hazard that made it tortious. A tire has no such purpose, which leaves room to describe an attack on a stranded driver as outside its risk. How broadly to describe the tire's risk is where courts disagree, and an answer should argue that description rather than announce a result.