Concept
Sources of Negligent Risk
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
Sources of Negligent Risk
A negligent act or omission may carry an unreasonable risk of harm to another by either of two routes, and Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts names both.1 One route is “the continuous operation of a force started or continued by the act or omission.”2 The other is “the foreseeable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.”3
The scope-of-the-risk principle says that liability reaches the harms that result from the risks that made the conduct tortious. Section 302 says where those risks can be found, and the answer reaches well beyond the first physical effect of the act. A risk can unfold over time as a force the defendant set going keeps running. It can also arrive through the choices of other people, or through the behavior of animals and natural forces, that the defendant should have expected.
The list is broad because negligence looks forward. Conduct is careless when the likelihood and seriousness of harm outweigh the burden of avoiding it, and that weighing reaches everything the act makes likely. If the risk ended with the first immediate effect, an actor who started a hazard and walked away, or who created a situation in which others would predictably cause injury, would escape liability for the very dangers that made the conduct unreasonable. The risk approach works best as an approach rather than a mechanical test. It asks whether the harm threatened and the injury incurred are reasonably closely related, which states a standard and openly leaves room for discretion.4
This unit sorts the two routes and leaves three questions to other discussions: to whom the risk runs, what kind and amount of harm it covers, and whether a later foreseeable act can still relieve the defendant. The last belongs to the doctrine of superseding cause. Here the question is only whether the continuing operation of forces and the actions of others belong on the list of risks that made the conduct wrongful.
Continuing Forces
The first route in Section 302 is a process. The defendant releases a fire, a discharge of steam, or a spill of gasoline, and the force keeps running after the act is over until it reaches someone.5 Because the force keeps running, the risk a Reasonable Person would foresee is the whole course of the process, not only its first moment. The words “or continued” matter too: an actor who leaves a dangerous process running does the same work as one who started it, so an omission can supply the conduct.
A negligently set fire burning toward a building shows the route at its plainest. Someone else’s failure to put the fire out does not relieve the person who set it, even when that someone owed the plaintiff a duty to extinguish it and would be liable for the failure. The authority usually cited is Wiley v. West Jersey R. Co. The reasoning follows from the shape of the risk. A fire is dangerous because it spreads and consumes whatever lies in its path, so its burning toward a building is the danger that made setting it careless. A bystander who stands by adds no new danger and removes none. The defendant also controlled the beginning of the process and could have prevented it at the least cost, which is why the law leaves the loss there.
The same logic covers a quieter force. In Diehl v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co., a company negligently discharged steam onto the sidewalk in front of a building owned by Fidelity, and the steam condensed and froze into a coating of invisible ice. Fidelity had notice of the condition and a duty to clear it, yet did nothing, and a pedestrian slipped and was injured. The court held both liable. Condensing and freezing are the continued operation of the discharge, and a slick pavement is the foreseeable end of that process. Fidelity’s omission was a second wrong beside the first, not a replacement for it.
Gasoline in a street shows the route when the force is a vapor waiting for a spark. In Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co., a tank car derailed through the railroad’s alleged negligence, its valve broke, gasoline ran into the street, and someone struck a match in the vapor; the explosion injured a bystander. The Kentucky court reasoned that if the railroad’s negligence put the gasoline there, the probable result of its meeting fire was too plain to doubt, so a negligent or inadvertent lighting of the match was not the efficient cause of the explosion. The court drew its line at a match thrown deliberately to cause an explosion, a point for the separate treatment of superseding causes. For present purposes the vapor was a force the railroad’s negligence kept in operation.
Not every force qualifies. The Restatement’s factors for judging whether conduct is a substantial factor separate the two situations by asking whether the actor created a force or series of forces in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or created only a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible.6 A burning field is the first kind, because danger already moves toward the plaintiff. A situation that harms only when an independent force supplies the danger is the second kind, and the first route in Section 302 does not reach it.
Whether the company might still be reached through the second route depends on whether a storm was among the risks that made the failure careless, and the next subsection takes up that question. For the first route, the analysis starts by asking whether the defendant’s act or omission started or kept alive the force that did the harm. If it did, the process is the risk, its whole course falls within the scope of liability, and the failure of others to stop it leaves the original actor where the negligence put that actor.
Foreseeable Acts of Others
Section 302(b) supplies the second route: “the foreseeable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.”8 Under the first route the defendant started the force that did the damage. Under this one the damage comes from someone or something the defendant did not set in motion, and liability depends on whether the defendant should have expected that person or event. The condition follows from how negligence is measured. Conduct is careless because of the dangers it makes likely, and one danger a careless act can make likely is that another person, an animal, or the weather will deliver the final blow. When that danger is part of what made the conduct careless, the later actor or event is the channel through which the original risk reaches the plaintiff. It lies within the scope of liability and does not interrupt it.
Section 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the consequence. If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard, or one of the hazards, that makes the actor negligent, the third person’s act does not prevent the actor from being liable for the harm it causes, whether the act is innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal.9 The rule has two parts, and each has its own reason. The first part, that the likelihood of the act must be among the hazards that made the conduct negligent, does the limiting. It ties the later act to the original fault, so a defendant answers only for third-party conduct the defendant should have anticipated in deciding how to act. The second part, that the character of the act stops mattering once it falls within the hazard, closes an escape route. A precaution exists to guard against exactly that kind of conduct, and if the wrongfulness of the conduct excused the defendant, the duty to take the precaution would protect no one. The first part is the one that takes work on an exam, since it asks you to identify the hazard. The second follows automatically once the first is met.
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. applies the rule. A contractor installing a gas main had excavated a worksite in a street in Mount Vernon, New York, and an employee of a subcontractor was sealing the main. A driver who suffered an epileptic seizure lost consciousness, and his car careened into the site and struck the worker with such force that he was thrown into the air and splattered with 400-degree liquid enamel from a kettle the car had hit.10 The plaintiff’s claim was that the contractor had left the site inadequately protected against traffic, and the contractor could not shelter behind the driver. The New York Court of Appeals applied this principle: “An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.”11 Protection against traffic exists to keep vehicles out, so a vehicle entering the site is the foreseeable route for the harm that precaution addresses. The seizure and the position of the kettle are details of how the accident unfolded, and the contractor did not have to foresee them.
A crime between the negligence and the injury is the version of this problem that exam stems favor. The label “criminal” does not settle it; the question is whether the likelihood of that kind of act was among the hazards that made the defendant’s conduct careless. The Kentucky Supreme Court has noted that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link there, because a spark that ignited negligently accumulated trash may have been foreseeable whether it was struck accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or even criminally.12 The decisive facts come from the defendant’s own situation: what the defendant had to guard against and what the defendant knew about the setting.
The motion should fail. An alarm system exists to detect exactly this kind of break-in, so burglary is the hazard that made the faulty wiring careless. Under Section 449 the burglar’s deliberate crime does not prevent Apex’s liability, and the principle in Derdiarian points the same way.14
The railroad cases follow the same pattern. In Hines v. Garrett, a train carried the plaintiff past her stop, and the conductors let her off a mile down the line in an area known to be frequented by vagrants. She was assaulted while walking back. The court summarily rejected the argument that the assault was a superseding cause, because the danger she fell victim to was the one that would at once occur to an ordinary mind. The Restatement’s own illustration runs the same way. A conductor leaves a woman at a closed station in a lonely district late at night, and the only route to the neighboring town passes a construction camp that the conductor knows holds many persons of vicious character. When members of the crew attack her, the railroad is subject to liability.15
The result reverses when the crime has no connection to what made the defendant careless. In Cole v. German Savings & Loan Society, a building owner had let a child trespasser into the building, and the boy maliciously led a visitor into an unguarded elevator shaft. A prank of that kind was not something the owner could be expected to anticipate, and it cut off the owner’s responsibility. What separates Cole from the alarm and railroad cases is what the defendant’s own conduct warned about. The alarm company was paid to stop burglars, and the railroad knew that the place where it left the passenger was dangerous. In each, the crime was the foreseeable hazard. Nothing in the owner’s situation made a deliberate act of that kind one of the dangers to guard against.
The same defendant can land on both sides of the line in a single case. A provider who serves alcohol to an intoxicated person raises the risk that the drinker will drive dangerously and injure others, so a resulting crash is within the scope of liability. Serving drinks does not necessarily create a risk that the drinker will set a house afire or commit rape and murder, and if it does not, those harms fall outside the scope. Whether the provider owed the plaintiff a duty at all is a prior question, resolved largely on policy grounds. Most courts hold that a social host owes third parties no duty to refrain from serving a guest too much alcohol, while a commercial bartender does owe that duty.16 Statutes can draw duty lines as well: in Stone v. York Haven Power Co., a statutory immunity for recreational areas covered a lake but not the dam that created it.17 This subsection assumes that a duty exists and asks only how far the hazard extends.
Proximate cause arises in criminal law as well. In People v. Acosta, a defendant convicted of three counts of second degree murder argued on appeal that the evidence did not show his conduct was the proximate cause of the deaths.18
The “other” in Section 302(b) is the person exposed to the risk, so the route covers the plaintiff’s own foreseeable conduct as well. A plaintiff’s conduct can break the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the injury, but to supersede, it must be more than the contributory negligence that matters in apportioning fault.19 In Mesick v. State of New York, the plaintiff swung on a rope tied to a tree branch out over a water hole and fell onto jagged rocks, and his conduct was not a superseding cause of his injuries.20
Forces of nature fall under the same test, which the risk principle states: the foreseeability limits on proximate cause are essentially the ones that decided whether the conduct was negligent at all.21 A matched pair shows how it works. A railroad that promised to ship apples at once delayed them, and cold weather froze them. The delay was careless in part because of the risk that the weather would turn cold, so freezing was within the hazard and the railroad is liable. A railroad that negligently delays a shipment of motors, which a flood then damages in transit, stands elsewhere. The risk that made that delay careless was commercial loss to the shipper, and the chance of a flood is the same for a trip made a few days earlier or later, so the flood is not among the hazards that made the delay wrongful. The risk approach points toward no liability.
Foreseeability attaches to the hazard, not to the exact event. A court that defines the risk too generally goes wrong: if the defendant need only foresee “personal injury” of some sort, a plaintiff who tripped over a box lid left on the sidewalk, missed her train, and was hurt when the later train crashed could recover.22 The court must focus on the particular types of harm the defendant’s act made foreseeable, without getting bogged down in the idiosyncratic details of the accident.23 That is why a defendant who lets explosive gas accumulate in a barge answers for the explosion even though lightning, not a flame, ignited it. The explosion is the foreseeable hazard, and the trigger is a detail.