Concept
Burden of Proof on Apportionment
Joint and several liability versus apportionment of harm to causes
Burden of Proof on Apportionment
Apportionment looks like arithmetic until the evidence runs out. Whether harm divides depends on proof, and in many cases adequate proof is impossible, so a plaintiff seriously harmed by several defendants may be unable to recover anything from any of them.1 Courts have responded in several ways: by finding concerted action or an indivisible injury for which all are jointly liable, by relaxing standards of proof, and by shifting the burden of apportionment to the defendants.2 This unit covers the last response, which takes two forms that students often confuse. In the first, a defendant who wants to confine its liability to a share of a harm that several actors helped cause must prove the share. In the second, each of several tortious actors must prove that he did not cause a harm that only one of them produced. What separates them is what the plaintiff cannot show: how much each actor contributed, or which actor caused the harm at all.
Defendant's Burden to Apportion
Section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts allocates the burden. Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of them seeks to limit liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.3 The provision departs from the default in § 433B(1), which puts on the plaintiff the burden of proving that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the harm.4 Two conditions trigger the departure. The plaintiff has shown that two or more actors acted tortiously and that their conduct combined to produce the harm, and a defendant has asked the court to confine its liability to a share. A defendant who makes no such request has no apportionment to prove.
The shift is narrow. The plaintiff still proves that each defendant's tortious conduct was a cause, and a defendant the plaintiff cannot tie to the injury leaves the case no matter who carries the burden on apportionment. A cause need not be the only cause. A driver whose negligent maintenance combines with a puddle in the road to produce a crash remains a but-for cause, because the crash would not have happened without his negligence, and the puddle does not exonerate him.5 What moves to the defendant is a single question, asked of actors already shown to have contributed: how, if at all, does the harm divide among them?
The defendant answers with the test for apportioning damages. Damages for harm are apportioned among two or more causes where the harms are distinct, or where there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.6 A defendant meets the burden with evidence of that kind, such as records that let an expert measure each plant's share of a pollutant load. If the defendant cannot supply a reasonable basis, the harm falls into the residual category, and damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.7 At common law, each defendant whose breach was a substantial factor in producing the damage is then jointly and severally liable for the total loss, because no fair and practicable method of apportioning the loss is available.8 A failed showing costs the defendant the limit it sought and nothing more. The plaintiff's case is unchanged, and the defendant owes what the traditional rule would have imposed from the start.
That default has eroded. Many jurisdictions have altered joint and several liability, and a few have abolished it, in favor of apportioning damages in proportion to each defendant's fault, and the statutes vary enough that a lawyer must read the law of the applicable jurisdiction.9 Apportionment nonetheless remains available where joint and several liability survives, provided a defendant carries the burden of reasonably apportioning the damages attributable to each defendant. Florida's contribution statute, for example, gives persons who are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury a right of contribution among themselves.10
The allocation follows culpability and access to proof. The plaintiff has already shown that every defendant acted wrongly, and the impossibility of dividing the harm usually traces to the defendants' own combined conduct, which mixed their contributions into one injury. A defendant who asks for less than full liability asserts a fact, that the harm divides, and knows more about its own conduct than the plaintiff does. If the plaintiff carried the burden, a gap in the proof would leave the injured party to absorb an uncertainty the defendants created. Because the defendants carry it, the loss stays with the wrongdoers. The California court said as much in Summers v. Tice: where apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of redress, and the wrongdoers should be left to work out any apportionment between themselves.11
Enhanced-injury suits against vehicle manufacturers apply the rule under heavy pressure. A manufacturer answers only for the increased harm its defect produced: if proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes without the defect, the seller's liability is limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the defect.12 The Third Restatement's rollover example shows the limit. A defectively designed roof may or may not be responsible for a driver's broken neck, but the roof did not cause the broken arm, so the manufacturer is not liable for that divisible injury. If proof does not support a determination of the harm that would have occurred without the defect, § 16(c) makes the seller liable for all of the plaintiff's harm attributable to the defect and the other causes. The neck injury then becomes the manufacturer's whole responsibility unless its expert can say what a sound roof would have allowed, and the manufacturer's liability is joint and several or several according to the jurisdiction's rules.13
The fight is over who must prove the counterfactual, the harm that would have occurred without the defect, and the federal circuits split. Huddell v. Levin, a federal appellate decision predicting New Jersey law, and Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. put on the plaintiff the burden of proving the extent of the enhanced injuries the defect caused. Fox v. Ford Motor Co. (10th Cir., Wyoming law) and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk (8th Cir., Minnesota law) both rejected Huddell. They reasoned that vehicle manufacturers, like other defendants, are jointly and severally liable for indivisible injuries, such as paraplegia and death, where there is no reasonable basis for dividing causation between them.14 After Huddell, the number of courts following it slowed, and a growing majority, including at least one court in New Jersey, now follows the Fox-Mitchell approach of holding manufacturers of uncrashworthy vehicles responsible in full for indivisible injuries.15
Critics of the plaintiff-burden rule add that it lets the greater wrongdoer escape and ignores the difficulty of collecting full compensation for serious injuries from an individual driver rather than from a manufacturer able to pay.16 The crashworthiness cases also rest on foreseeability. Automobiles are made for the road, where injury-producing impacts are a statistically proved hazard, so a manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product to be involved in an accident when it can easily foresee, and knows the probability is high over the product's life, that the car will be in some injury-producing accident.17 The scale of that hazard is easy to see: an estimated 263,600,000 automobiles were registered in the United States in 2015, about .82 for every man, woman, and child.18
A minority of courts refuse the shift where a statute demands apportionment of all fault. In Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., the Utah Supreme Court rejected the shift in an enhanced-injury case and left the burden with the plaintiff, reasoning that Utah's statute limits each defendant to its own proportion of fault, so all injuries can and must be apportioned. That reasoning follows from the purpose of the shift. Section 433B(2) protects the plaintiff from a gap in the proof by sending the unresolved loss to the wrongdoers under the full-liability default, and a statute that abolishes the default leaves nothing for the shift to guard against.
Alternative Liability Contrast
Section 433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the second burden shift. Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.20 The doctrine is alternative liability, and it began with Summers v. Tice, a 1948 decision of the California Supreme Court.21 Both rules move a burden onto defendants, which is why students blur them, but they differ in what the plaintiff cannot prove. Under § 433B(2), every proven wrongdoer helped cause the harm, and the open question is how much each contributed. Under § 433B(3), only one wrongdoer caused the harm, and the open question is which one.
The plaintiff in Summers was hunting with two companions who shot in his direction at the same moment, hoping to hit a quail.22 Defendant Tice flushed the quail, which rose to about ten feet and flew between the plaintiff and the defendants. Both defendants had an unobstructed view of the plaintiff, knew where he stood, and fired toward him from 75 yards. One shot struck the plaintiff in the eye and another in his upper lip.23 The court could not tell whether the shots came from one defendant's gun or the other's, or one from each. The shot that entered the eye drove the damages, and it could not have come from both guns; it came from one or the other only.24 The California Supreme Court held both defendants jointly and severally liable unless one of them proved that the shot that harmed the plaintiff's eye came from the other's gun, and it affirmed the judgment.25
The court reasoned from the parties' positions. Both defendants were wrongdoers, each negligent toward the plaintiff, and together they created a situation in which the negligence of one of them injured him, so it should rest with each to absolve himself if he can. A rule requiring the plaintiff to name the culprit would put him in an unfair position, because if one defendant could escape by pointing at the other, the other could escape too, and the plaintiff would be remediless. Defendants are ordinarily in a far better position than the plaintiff to offer evidence on which one caused the injury.26 The court added that, as between two negligent defendants and an innocent victim, the defendants should pay even without proof of which one caused the accident.27
The doctrine has a price. Only one shot struck the eye, so the other defendant did not in fact cause that harm, yet the rule holds him liable anyway.28 That departs from the usual requirement that a defendant's wrong cause the injury, and courts accept the departure because the plaintiff has proved that each defendant acted wrongfully and the alternative is a remediless plaintiff.29 The defendants can then sort out the loss between themselves.30
The creek case has the opposite structure. The rancher proved that both plants' discharges were negligent and that together they killed the herd, so causation by both plants was established and the plants carried only the burden of showing how the loss divided. In Summers, causation by each hunter was the very thing no one could show: one pellet reached the eye, and it came from one gun or the other, never both.31 The difference changes what a defendant can win. A plant that proves a reasonable basis for division escapes the excess and pays its share, while one that fails answers for the whole. A hunter who proves the pellet came from the other's gun owes nothing.
The Third Restatement states the rule with an explicit precondition. When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the harm, but the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor or actors caused it, the burden of proof on factual causation, including both production and persuasion, shifts to the defendants.32 Without proof that each defendant acted tortiously, nothing shifts. In McLaughlin, a plaintiff sued two distributors and invoked alternative liability, and the court granted the distributors summary judgment. Because the claim was for a manufacturing defect, only one distributor could have acted tortiously, and there was no justification to join both.33 Each Summers hunter, by contrast, fired negligently in the plaintiff's direction, which made both proven wrongdoers.
Not every jurisdiction accepts alternative liability. On similar hunting facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Leuer v. Johnson granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiff could not prove that it was more likely than not that either had fired the shot that hit him.34 An answer on facts like those in Summers should therefore state the rule and then check whether the jurisdiction has adopted it.