60 So. 3d 1116 (2011)
In 1987, Shirley Sunshine Levin executed a will dividing her estate equally between her two children, Gail Levin and William Levin.1 On May 22, 2008, the decedent executed a new will and trust appointing William as personal representative and trustee.2 Under the new documents, William’s children Jessica and Benjamin would each receive specified sums upon reaching age thirty, with William having discretion over educational expenses, while Gail was to receive $350,000 and William the remainder of the assets.3
Shirley Sunshine Levin died on August 16, 2008, and the May 22, 2008 will was admitted to probate.4 The estate was valued in excess of $3 million.5 Gail Levin filed an objection to the petition for administration and a counter-petition.6
Before the trial, Gail filed a motion for continuance on July 27, 2009, based on a letter from her doctor stating that she was scheduled for surgery on July 30, 2009.7 Gail also requested a continuance due to the fact that she did not receive the medical records from Dr. Davis, a psychiatrist who evaluated the mother, until the eve of trial.8 The trial had been set for August 6, 2009.9 The court denied the motion but allowed Gail to participate by telephone.10 At trial, Gail sought to introduce expert testimony from an estate law practitioner regarding whether the mother was signing documents against her will, but the court excluded this testimony.11
The mother had expressed the belief that Gail had visited her only once in about ten years, repeating this to William and the attorney, and in an email to Gail.12 Gail disputed this in reply.13 The record showed visits in February 2001, August 2002, January 2003, September 2003, January 2004, January 2005, and March 2007.14 During the taped execution, the mother stated she had not seen her daughter but one time in seven years.15
After trial, the trial court determined that William did not exert undue influence and that the mother had testamentary capacity.16 Gail appealed the judgment to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.17
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for continuance?18
Denial of a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.19 A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a request made days before a trial set several months in advance.20 This holds where the movant offers no evidence clarifying whether surgery was elective or medically required.21 The movant participates by telephone after receiving the records.22
No. Gail filed the motion on July 27, 2009, for a trial set to commence on August 6, 2009, which had been set in April.23 She offered no evidence to clarify whether the surgery was elective or medically required.24 Gail was able to testify and participate in the trial by telephone and had received the medical records before trial.25
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for continuance.26
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of appellant’s expert witness?27
No. Gail sought to introduce testimony from an experienced estate law practitioner concerning whether the mother was signing something she did not want to sign.30 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit this witness to testify what is required by the law in the execution of a will.31
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony.32
Whether the evidence established that appellee was active in procuring the will and trust so as to create a presumption of undue influence?33
To raise the presumption of undue influence the contestant must show the beneficiary was a substantial beneficiary who occupied a confidential relationship and was active in procuring the will and trust.34 The trier of fact is vested with discretion to determine whether the facts show active procurement.35
No. William conceded the first two factors of substantial beneficiary and confidential relationship as the primary beneficiary receiving the remainder of a multi-million dollar estate while serving in a close family role.36 The trial court found the evidence overwhelming that William did not use undue influence to procure the will and trust after weighing the Carpenter factors.37 The facts did not show active procurement under the Carpenter factors because William took no steps to initiate or control the drafting process beyond his conceded status.38
The evidence did not establish that William was active in procuring the will and trust so as to create a presumption of undue influence.39
Whether the decedent possessed testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will and trust?40
The probate court’s findings in a will contest shall not be overturned where there is substantial competent evidence to support those findings unless the probate judge has misapprehended the evidence as a whole.41
Yes. The trial court determined that the mother had testamentary capacity after hearing testimony on her understanding of the estate and the changes from the 1987 will.42 Substantial competent evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the mother had the testamentary capacity to execute the will and trust.43 The probate court’s findings shall not be overturned on this record because the evidence showed she comprehended the nature and extent of her property exceeding three million dollars.44
The decedent possessed testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will and trust.45
Whether the decedent suffered from an insane delusion at the time of executing the will and trust?46
Where there is an insane delusion in regard to one who is the object of the testator’s bounty, which causes him to make a will he would not have made but for that delusion, the will cannot be sustained.47 An insane delusion is a spontaneous conception and acceptance as a fact of that which has no real existence adhered to against all evidence and reason.48
No. The mother persisted in the belief that Gail had visited her only once in about ten years.49 She repeated this to William and the attorney despite record evidence of multiple visits in February 2001, August 2002, January 2003, September 2003, January 2004, January 2005, and March 2007.50 The trial court did not address the evidence of visitations or whether the contradiction rose to the level of insane delusion linked to reducing the bequest to Gail.51