Concept
Effect of the Inference
Res ipsa loquitur
Effect of the Inference
Proving the foundation facts does not win a res ipsa case. It settles what the jury may do with circumstantial evidence, and courts disagree about how much force that evidence carries. Their answers come in three strengths: a permissive inference that the jury may accept or reject; a presumption that requires a finding of negligence unless the defendant produces rebutting evidence; and a presumption that also places the burden of persuasion on the defendant.1 Most jurisdictions give the doctrine only the first effect.2
This section takes the majority rule first, then the two stronger effects, and last the ways a defendant can answer the inference. The best answer depends on the effect the jurisdiction gives.
Permissive Inference
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1) states the effect of res ipsa loquitur as permission: when the foundation facts are shown, negligence “may be inferred.”3 Most jurisdictions read the verb literally. The plaintiff survives the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case, and the case ordinarily goes to the jury, which is permitted but not required to find the defendant negligent.4 The jury remains free to find for the defendant even when the defendant offers no evidence.5 The only clear procedural effect is that the plaintiff can rest, even without introducing expert testimony on causation, and the case still goes to the jury.6
Sullivan v. Crabtree shows the rule at work. On a clear, dry afternoon, just after another truck had passed it, the defendant’s truck swerved from the right side of a paved highway to the left, ran off the shoulder, overturned down a steep embankment, and killed a passenger named Sullivan.7 The driver could not say what had happened. He could offer only possibilities: loose gravel, a broken edge of pavement, brakes that might have grabbed, or a hose that might have come loose.8 The plaintiffs argued that an unexplained loss of control entitled them to a finding of negligence as a matter of law. The court agreed that the facts made a res ipsa case, because a vehicle that runs off the road without apparent cause ordinarily does so through the driver’s negligence, and the driver controlled the truck.9 It still held that the unexplained facts did not require an inference of negligence, and it affirmed the verdict for the driver.10
The court’s reasoning shows why the effect is permissive. It called res ipsa loquitur “a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence,” so the doctrine carries as much force as the circumstances give it.11 Courts had attached three different effects to the doctrine, and this court declined to fit it to any fixed formula, because the cogency of the inference runs from reasonable probability in one case to practical certainty in another.12 In the ordinary case, the court said, the doctrine merely permits the jury to prefer the inference of negligence over other reasonable inferences.13 In Sullivan the loss of control may have come from the driver’s negligence or from a no-fault failure such as brakes giving way or a control part breaking, so the choice belonged to the jury. A rule that compelled a finding whenever the foundation facts appeared would fit only the cases at the high end of that range.
Instructions carry the permissive effect to the jury. A typical instruction tells jurors that if they find the accident is of a kind that would not ordinarily happen unless someone was negligent, and that the thing that caused it was under the defendant’s exclusive control when the negligence, if any, must have occurred, they are permitted to infer from the accident and its circumstances that the defendant was negligent.14 States applying the traditional rule instruct on the three traditional requirements, and most jurisdictions give the instruction without naming the doctrine.15 Courts have consistently approved, and required where requested, instructions telling the jury that a finding of negligence is permissible.16 Such instructions can and should be given without the misnomer “presumption.”17
The bottler’s silence was a gamble, and most defendants decline it. Because the inference carries the plaintiff past the directed-verdict stage, the defendant must choose between defending on the merits and resting on the argument that the plaintiff’s circumstantial case is thin.18 A defendant who rests invites the jury to accept the inference unanswered. A defendant who offers credible evidence of precautions, yet cannot say what went wrong, may still win, because the jury may reject the inference even then.19 Sullivan is close to that situation: the driver’s list of possible no-fault causes left the jury free to choose. Silence loses the case only in the minority of states that treat the doctrine as a presumption of negligence with actual weight.20
The rule that res ipsa merely makes a jury case has one recognized exception. In an occasional case the inference is so strong that the jury cannot be permitted to reject it, and a verdict for the plaintiff must be directed unless the defendant produces evidence that explains the accident away.21 The standard examples are objects that fall from the defendant’s premises onto people below, such as the barrel of flour that dropped from a window of the defendant’s building in Byrne v. Boadle,22 and the head-on collision of two trains on the same track, both belonging to and operated by the defendant, which one decision treated as negligence in law.23 The difference from Sullivan lies in the innocent explanations the facts leave open. A truck’s loss of control can come from a brake that grabs or a part that breaks, so reasonable jurors could go either way. Two trains of one railroad meeting head-on on a single track leave no comparable no-fault account, so reasonable jurors could reach only one conclusion. On an exam, a stem in which the defendant offers no evidence therefore calls for the default answer, that the plaintiff survives a directed verdict and the jury may find either way, unless the stem describes an inference of this extraordinary strength. The Restatement gives the decision to the court, which determines whether the inference may reasonably be drawn or must necessarily be drawn; a later section takes up that function.24
Presumption and Burden Shifting
Two stronger effects exist, though only in a minority of jurisdictions. In a few, res ipsa creates a presumption of negligence that has actual weight.26 The two versions differ in which burden they move. The burden of production requires a party to come forward with enough evidence for a jury to find the fact in that party’s favor. The burden of persuasion requires the party to prove the fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and a party who carries it loses when the jury finds the matter evenly balanced. Under the middle approach, a defendant who faces the foundation facts must come forward with evidence rebutting negligence, or the jury must find negligence.27 In even fewer opinions, courts also shift the burden of persuasion, so that the defendant must prove by a preponderance that it did not breach the duty of care in order to prevail.28 Colorado illustrates the middle path: in Chapman v. Harner the court explained the difference between a rebuttable presumption and a shift in the burden of proof and chose the rebuttable presumption.29
The case for a stronger effect rests on information. The defendant who controlled the instrumentality usually knows more than the plaintiff about what happened, and a rule that makes silence costly pushes the defendant to say what it knows. Older decisions went so far as to call cases in which the defendant had superior access to the evidence particularly appropriate for res ipsa.30 A rule that also shifts persuasion goes further and assigns to the defendant whatever doubt survives the evidence.
The two scenes isolate the burdens. A silent defendant loses under both stronger rules, because each demands some showing of due care. A defendant who speaks and fights to a draw loses only where persuasion has also shifted. A majority court, by contrast, directs a verdict for the plaintiff on res ipsa only in the exceptional case in which reasonable jurors could reach no other conclusion.
Two settings draw the stronger effects in some courts. Some give the doctrine greater effect when an injured passenger sues a common carrier, and a few decisions, including Greyhound Corp. v. Brown in Alabama and Transcontinental Bus System v. Simons in Oklahoma, shift the burden of proof to the carrier. The practice apparently carries over from the original common law rule that a carrier, because of the special responsibility it undertook for its passengers, bore the burden of proof.31
The second setting is the Ybarra line, in which a few courts shifted the burden to the doctors, nurses, and anesthesiologist who treated a patient unconscious during surgery, and so unable to say which of them caused an injury that ordinarily would not happen without someone’s negligence.32 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy and Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hospital followed Ybarra, while Rhodes v. De Haan and Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves’ Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc. rejected it.33 The justification offered is that medical colleagues are notoriously reluctant to testify against one another, so the burden of explanation falls on those with sole knowledge of the true facts, and Anderson v. Somberg in New Jersey accords.34 The superior-knowledge rationale is shaky on its own terms: as it turned out, none of the co-defendants could identify a negligent party. A second justification treats the defendants as having “concurrent” control over the patient and therefore as jointly and severally liable.35
The vocabulary in this area misleads the careless reader. Burdens are among the most slippery subjects in procedure and evidence,36 and courts sometimes attach heavy labels to weak effects. One account says res ipsa shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to explain why it was not negligent, yet adds that, without a credible explanation, the jury may but need not infer negligence. That is the majority effect under a heavier name.37 Other courts say the doctrine establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case, so that the case goes to the jury on that basis.38 A presumption in the strict sense requires a finding unless it is rebutted,39 while a permissive inference is not tantamount to a presumption and leaves the jury free to accept or reject it.40 Courts that describe the doctrine accurately tell jurors that a finding of negligence is permissible and avoid the word “presumption.”41 The label settles nothing; read off what the court says happens when the defendant is silent.
Rebutting the Inference
A res ipsa showing defeats the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, which forces the defendant to defend on the merits instead of hiding behind the plaintiff’s difficulty in proving what happened.43 The defendant has three ways to answer, and they differ sharply in strength. Proof of the actual cause is strongest, an attack on a foundation fact comes next, and general evidence of due care is weakest. Each is measured against the majority rule: because the inference is permissive, a defendant who falls short of conclusive proof still has a jury to persuade.
Proof of the actual cause works best because res ipsa loquitur reasons about accidents whose cause is unknown. The doctrine lets a jury conclude that an unexplained accident more than likely happened through negligence, and proof of what really happened ends the mystery.44 A station platform that collapses because of tunneling underneath it presents no mystery, and the proof completely undermines the inference.45 A derailment works the same way. A passenger who proves one makes a prima facie case, because derailments ordinarily do not happen without negligence. But if the railroad proves by undisputed evidence that the track was sabotaged moments earlier, without warning or reason to expect it, the railroad would probably receive a directed verdict.46
To take the case from the jury, the explanation must be uncontradicted and corroborated. Once it is both, and nothing suggests that the witnesses are lying, no unexplained occurrence remains for the jury to estimate, and the judge may direct a verdict.47 A bare denial of fault has neither quality.
The two accounts divide on what they do to the inference. The first surgeon denies fault and explains nothing, so the expert testimony and the injury still stand: the jury may believe her and refuse the inference, or disbelieve her and draw it, and either way the jury decides.48 The second surgeon tells the jury what caused the injury, the account is corroborated, and the plaintiff has offered nothing to impeach it, so the court may conclude that no reasonable jury could infer negligence.49 That conclusion depends on the record. If the plaintiff had evidence from which the jury could disbelieve the hemorrhage account, the jury would be free to reject it and return to the inference.50
Short of proving the cause, a defendant can attack the foundation facts. Two of the Restatement’s premises are that the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence,51 and that other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.52 A defendant can contest either one. Evidence that this kind of accident has other common, nonnegligent causes undercuts the first. Evidence that the plaintiff or others mishandled the product undercuts the second. If the defendant’s proof on either point is strong enough, the judge may direct a verdict on the ground that the jury could not reasonably conclude that the proper foundation has been established.53
The control element offers a particular target. No matter how clearly the plaintiff shows that someone was negligent, a res ipsa case fails unless the plaintiff also shows that the defendant is most likely the party who was negligent, and exclusive control is the traditional proof that the injury probably was caused by the defendant.54 The better rule requires only that the jury be able to find that the negligence, if any, occurred while the instrumentality was within the defendant’s control.55 When the injury occurred after the instrumentality left the defendant’s hands, the plaintiff meets the requirement with evidence that tends to exclude other possible causes in the interval. In an exploding-bottle case, a showing of careful handling between the time the bottle left the bottler and the time of the explosion does so.56 A defendant who shows that others handled the product therefore tests whether the plaintiff can close that gap.
Nutting v. Northern Energy, Inc. shows the attack succeeding. Plaintiffs who blamed a gas company for a fire at a heater had to admit that they had been working around the heater, which weakened the inference that any negligence was the company’s, and weather records suggested a different explanation: an 80-mile-per-hour wind that may have caused a downdraft and blown the burner flame outward onto combustible materials stored in the closet.57 The court held that the plaintiffs had not made a case for the foundation fact that the negligence, if any, was likely attributable to the defendant, and it refused to give a res ipsa instruction.58 The company did not have to prove what caused the fire; two competing causes were enough to break the link between the accident and the defendant. Defense evidence that falls short of that result leaves the foundation in place, and the jury decides which side is stronger.59
The weakest response, open to a defendant with no evidence of the exact cause, is general proof of due care. A canner sued over glass in a can of spinach can describe its quality-control measures, and an airline sued over a vanished plane can describe its training, maintenance, and inspection procedures.60 Such evidence speaks to the standard of care the plaintiff must show was breached. Courts generally define that standard as reasonable, ordinary, or due care, sometimes comparing a product defendant to a manufacturer of ordinary prudence and sometimes applying the standard prevailing in the defendant’s industry.61 The evidence does not conclusively exclude negligence, but it can change the jury’s sense of the probabilities, and it carries a risk that grows with its rigor. The more careful the described procedures, the less likely any accident would be if they had been followed, and a jury may conclude that the accident happened only because they were not.62
The manager offered the testimony as proof of care, and the cross-examination converted it into proof of a lapse. A process that catches foreign objects, joined with the undisputed fact that an object got through, implies that the process failed somewhere. A defendant deciding how much safety testimony to offer therefore has to ask what that testimony implies if the accident happened anyway.
General care evidence still has value, because the plaintiff does not win merely by establishing the foundation facts. The jury may accept or reject the inference, so a defendant who testifies credibly to careful practice, and who does not know what caused the accident, may persuade the jury to find for the defense.63 Such testimony ordinarily cannot earn a directed verdict, because an accident that remains unexplained leaves the doctrine with work to do.64
The same sorting applies whenever the defendant’s evidence conflicts with the plaintiff’s foundation evidence. A plaintiff’s expert who says the injury does not occur without negligence and a defense expert who lists several causes, negligence among them, present a contest of credibility, and the jury resolves it wherever different conclusions may reasonably be reached.65 The court’s narrower task is to decide whether the inference may reasonably be drawn or must necessarily be drawn, and a directed verdict for the defendant means the court has concluded that no reasonable jury could draw it on the whole record.66 A corroborated, uncontradicted explanation produces that conclusion, while a denial or a general account of care does not. All of this assumes the majority view. Where the doctrine operates as a presumption, a silent defendant risks a finding against it, and where the burden of persuasion shifts, evidence that leaves the case evenly balanced still loses for the defendant. The next two sections take up the allocation of these decisions between court and jury.