591 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
In contemplation of divorce, I. B. Chapman II and Carol Cartwright Chapman entered into a separation and property settlement agreement that purported to divide their community property into two roughly equal shares.1 The husband was represented by counsel and aided by accountants during the negotiations.2 The wife was not represented by counsel.3 Shortly after the agreement was signed, the wife filed for divorce and was represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings. The divorce decree incorporated the property settlement agreement.4
Later, the husband sought a change in the child support provisions of the divorce decree. The wife hired a second lawyer to resist the attempt.5 During a review of the situation with the new lawyer, the wife discovered what she deemed to be misrepresentations by the husband made to induce her to enter into the property settlement agreement.6 By reason of those alleged misrepresentations, she instituted a bill of review proceeding to set aside the property settlement provisions of the divorce decree.7
In preparation for the bill of review suit, the wife sought to take depositions of persons and financial organizations. The trial court quashed the wife's notice of intent to take the depositions.8 The wife also moved for a continuance, which the trial court denied.9 The husband filed a motion for summary judgment. It was supported by sworn affidavits, including a certified copy of the divorce decree and a sworn statement by his certified public accountant attesting to the valuation of the property included in the settlement agreement.10
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband. The wife appealed from the summary judgment. She complained that the trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery and a continuance. She also complained that the husband had failed to satisfy the requirements for summary judgment under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A while her pleadings raised genuine issues of material fact.11 The wife moved to strike items from the transcript relating to a prior mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court. The husband moved to file a supplemental transcript with related materials.12
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the wife's notice of intent to take depositions?13
No. The established facts show that the wife sought to depose persons and financial organizations after hiring a second lawyer and discovering the alleged misrepresentations.16 Yet the trial court quashed the notices.17 Because the wife's bill of review allegations failed as a matter of law to establish extrinsic fraud, the denial of discovery did not constitute reversible error.18
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by quashing the depositions.19
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the wife's motion for continuance?20
No. The established facts establish that the wife moved for a continuance in connection with her discovery efforts, but the trial court denied the motion.23 Given that the summary judgment rested on the legal insufficiency of the intrinsic-fraud allegations rather than on any undeveloped factual record, the denial was not an abuse.24
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuance.25
Whether the husband satisfied the requirements for summary judgment under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A?26
Under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A, a movant must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The movant must also show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, supported by pleadings, affidavits, or other competent evidence.27
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the husband supported his motion with a certified copy of the divorce decree. A sworn statement from his certified public accountant attested to the valuation methods used in the property settlement agreement. These materials satisfied the rule's evidentiary requirements.28
The husband satisfied the requirements for summary judgment under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A.29
Whether the wife's pleadings raised genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment?30
Pleadings that raise a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of the claim preclude summary judgment.31
No. The established facts reveal that the wife alleged only that the husband made false representations about property values to induce her to sign the settlement agreement.32 She did so without identifying any specific undervalued asset or its correct value.33 Therefore she failed to create a fact issue on extrinsic fraud.34
The wife's pleadings did not raise genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.35
Whether the alleged misrepresentations by the husband constituted extrinsic fraud sufficient to support a bill of review setting aside the divorce decree?36
A bill of review may vacate a prior judgment only upon proof of extrinsic fraud.37 Extrinsic fraud is fraud that prevented the losing party from knowing about or fairly presenting her rights or defenses.38 Intrinsic fraud concerns the merits of issues already presented or that could have been presented at trial.39
No. The established facts establish that the wife discovered alleged misrepresentations concerning the value of ongoing business concerns managed by the husband and set forth in the sworn financial statement used during settlement negotiations.40 These matters bore directly on the property division litigated or litigable in the divorce proceeding and therefore amounted only to intrinsic fraud.41
The alleged misrepresentations constituted intrinsic fraud insufficient to support the bill of review.42