Concept
Physical Disability
Children, mental condition, and physical disability
Physical Disability
A physical disability changes the comparison group without lowering the level of care. An actor who is ill or otherwise physically disabled is held to the conduct of a reasonable person under like disability.1
That rule applies the general standard and does not depart from it. Unless the actor is a child, the standard is that of a reasonable person under like circumstances,2 and a physical condition is one of those circumstances. A mental deficiency is not: unless the actor is a child, insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct that falls below the reasonable person's standard.3
The three subsections that follow explain why the law bends for the body but not the mind, mark two limits on the allowance, and show why intoxication, which also impairs the body, earns nothing.
Reasonable Person With the Disability
Section 283C makes the actor's physical condition one of the circumstances of the case.4 A jury therefore does not compare a blind pedestrian or a deaf driver with an unimpaired adult. It compares the actor with an ordinarily prudent person who has the same impairment and asks whether the actor behaved as that person would have. The section speaks of 'the actor,' not 'the defendant,' so nothing in its wording confines the allowance to defendants.5
The justification is practical. Take Lear, a blind person who walks the streets and will occasionally bump into others. He is not negligent for being there, because the blind have to live in the same world as everyone else, and it is reasonable for them to impose the risk of occasional sidewalk collisions in order to do so.6 Whether he could go out without a cane would be a closer question. The important point is that his conduct is judged against other actors in the same circumstances, not against the population at large.7
Roberts v. State of Louisiana shows the rule at work in a real collision. William Roberts fell in the lobby of the U.S. Post Office Building in Alexandria, Louisiana, after Mike Burson, the blind operator of the concession stand there, bumped into him.8 The court of appeal held that Burson was not negligent because he acted as a reasonably prudent blind person would under the circumstances.9 The court measured Burson against a blind person's conduct, not a sighted person's, and the plaintiff could show no careless act. The evidence behind that finding, and what it teaches about precautions, is the subject of the next subsection.
Lear and Menlove frame a puzzle. The law makes allowance for Lear's blindness, but it makes none for the 'circumstance' that a person lacks good judgment or is hasty, awkward, or perennially oafish.10 Vaughan v. Menlove settled that point: Menlove argued that he had exercised his judgment to the best of his ability and should not be held liable just because his best was not very good, and the argument failed.11 The reasonable person is an objective figure who ignores differences in intellect, education, and temperament, so why does a physical disability alone bend the standard?12
Two reasons answer the question. A sighted person is unlikely to feign blindness successfully before a jury, and other people can usually detect an identifiable physical disability and adjust their own conduct to it.13 Both reasons point to the same requirement: the disability must be significant and ascertainable. A defendant who calls his tennis partner to testify to his total lack of coordination, hoping to lower the standard of care, will not succeed.14 Poor judgment and awkwardness meet neither test, and they stay outside the allowance.
Other physical conditions receive the same treatment. Courts have taken account of deafness, epilepsy, and paralysis, reasoning that a person with such a condition is expected to exercise reasonable care in the world and not to stay home.15 The text of § 283C also reaches illness, so an illness is likewise a circumstance.16
On an exam, sort the trait first. A physical limit that is significant and ascertainable, such as blindness, deafness, paralysis, epilepsy, or illness, is a circumstance, and the analysis asks what a reasonable person with that limit would have done. Awkwardness, haste, and poor judgment earn no allowance,17 and neither does mental deficiency.18
Precautions and Activity Choice
The allowance fixes the comparison group; it does not decide whether the actor behaved reasonably. Two limits keep it from becoming an excuse. The actor must take the precautions that a reasonable person with the same disability would take, and the actor must not undertake an activity that the disability makes unsafe.
In Roberts, the court stated the first limit directly: the conduct of a handicapped person must be reasonable in light of his knowledge of his infirmity, which is treated merely as one of the circumstances under which he acts.20 The person who lives with a limitation learns what it demands, and no one else can take the steps that compensate for it. An allowance that excused the impairment and also the duty to compensate for it would turn the test subjective, because whatever the actor did would count as what a person with that disability would do.
Burson's case shows the principle at work. He had worked in the building for three and a half years, had special mobility training, and had reports in the record showing good mobility skills. He explained that he relied on his facial sense instead of his cane for short trips, and the court found the explanation a reasoned one. Other witnesses testified that the decision was not unreasonable, and nothing in the record showed any careless act, such as walking too fast or not paying attention.21
The result runs against two tempting shortcuts. A blind person is not required to use a cane on every trip, and a blind person is not excused merely because the cane was left behind. The question is what a reasonable blind person would do in that setting. For the same reason, it is too simple to say that a blind person must exercise greater care than a sighted one. We would expect a blind person with a white cane and a guide dog to act differently on a sidewalk than a fully sighted person would,22 and the same reasonable person in a familiar building may rely on other cues instead.
Smith v. Sneller states the other side of the coin: a blind person may not rely wholly on the other senses to warn of danger and must use the devices usually employed to compensate for blindness.23 The two decisions apply one test. They differ in what a reasonable blind person ordinarily does in the setting, and on that question the evidence in Roberts favored the operator.
The allowance also colors what ordinary care requires of others. In Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, the court held that a city owes only ordinary care to a blind or otherwise handicapped pedestrian in keeping its walkways in condition, but that the effect of the affliction may be considered in deciding whether that care was exercised.24 A disability does not raise the duty others owe, but it can change what ordinary care looks like when they deal with a person who has it.
Choosing an activity can itself be negligent, and driving shows why. In Hammontree, a California appellate decision, the defendant was driving home from work when his car crashed without warning through the wall of a bicycle shop, struck the worker inside, and damaged the shop.25 The worker had no chance to guard against that risk. The allowance does not reach the choice to drive. A blind person who got behind the wheel of a Porsche would be acting unreasonably even after counting blindness among the circumstances,26 because a reasonable person who cannot see would not drive, and the allowance cannot rescue the decision to begin.
The second reason for the allowance suggests why the line falls there. Other pedestrians can see a white cane and adjust; other road users cannot see that the driver has no sight. The same logic reaches any activity that demands a capacity the disability removes.
The common error is to treat the identification of a disability as the end of the analysis. It names only the comparison group. The disability excuses what it makes impossible; an unreasonable choice of activity or an omitted precaution remains open to a finding of negligence.
Intoxication Is No Excuse
Courts refuse any allowance for voluntary or negligent intoxication, so the drinker is judged against a reasonable sober person.28 The defendant's argument for an allowance is easy to state: alcohol dulls sight, balance, and reaction time much as an illness does, and § 283C adjusts the standard for an actor who is ill.29 But the general standard asks what a reasonable person would do under like circumstances,30 and courts have declined to count self-induced intoxication among them.
The usual explanation is choice. A pedestrian does not choose blindness, but a drinker chooses to drink. An allowance that grew with the degree of intoxication would reward the very choice that creates the risk, because the more the defendant drank, the less care the law would demand.
An impairment the actor did not choose is treated differently. In Storjohn v. Fay, a Nebraska court took epilepsy into account as a condition bearing on the standard.31 The usual objection to an allowance does not arise, because the driver did not choose the disorder. The limits from the preceding subsection still bind him, since he must act reasonably in light of what he knows about his condition, but nothing in them converts a chosen impairment into a protected one.
The rule governs the intoxicated person's own conduct and leaves untouched what others owe that person. As Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co. put it: "A drunken man is as much entitled to a safe street as a sober one, and much more in need of it."32 On an exam, separate two questions: how much care the drinker must exercise, which is the care of a sober person, and how much care others owe the drinker, which is the usual amount.