3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng.Rep. 490
Two cottages in the county of Salop were in the respective occupations of tenants of the plaintiff.1 The defendant was possessed of a close and of wooden and thatched buildings near those cottages.2 The defendant had a rick or stack of hay in his close which was liable and likely to ignite and which was in a condition dangerous to the cottages, of which condition the defendant had notice.3
The rick had been made by the defendant near the boundary of his land.4 The hay, as stacked, gave rise to discussion about the probability of spontaneous combustion.5 During five weeks the defendant was repeatedly warned of the danger.6 His stock was insured.7 When advised on one occasion to take the rick down, he said "he would chance it."8 He had made an aperture or chimney through the rick, but despite that precaution the rick ultimately burst into flames from spontaneous heating.9
The flames communicated to the defendant's barn and stables and thence to the plaintiff's cottages, which were entirely destroyed.10 The trial judge, Patteson J., instructed the jury that the question for them was whether the fire had been occasioned by gross negligence on the part of the defendant, adding that the defendant was bound to proceed with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under the circumstances.11
A verdict was found for the plaintiff.12 A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained. The ground was that the jury should have been directed to consider not whether the defendant had been guilty of gross negligence with reference to the standard of ordinary prudence, but whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his own judgment.
Whether an action lies against a party for so negligently constructing a hay-rick on the extremity of his land that, in consequence of its spontaneous ignition, his neighbour's house is burnt down?13
One must so use his property as not to injure that of another, rendering a person liable for the consequences of neglect in the use of property even absent contract.14
Yes. The defendant maintained a hay-rick he knew was liable to ignite and dangerous to the adjacent cottages after receiving repeated warnings over five weeks and after stating he would chance it rather than remove the rick.15 The resulting spontaneous ignition spread through the defendant's buildings and destroyed the plaintiff's cottages.16 This conduct breached the duty to avoid injury to neighboring property through negligent stacking and continued maintenance of the rick.17
An action lies for the negligent construction and maintenance of the hay-rick.18
Whether the question for the jury was properly whether the defendant had been guilty of gross negligence, viewing his conduct with reference to the caution that a prudent man would have observed?19
Negligence is measured by the objective standard of the care a prudent man would exercise under the circumstances rather than by a subjective inquiry into whether the defendant acted honestly according to his own judgment.20
Yes. The trial judge directed the jury to decide whether gross negligence occurred by reference to the reasonable caution a prudent man would have observed.21 This formulation correctly rejected the proposed bona fide standard. That standard would have varied the measure of liability with each defendant's individual faculties.22 Instead it applied the established workable criterion of ordinary prudence that juries have long used to determine negligence.23
The jury was properly instructed under the prudent-man standard of ordinary prudence.24