Concept
Mental Condition
Children, mental condition, and physical disability
Mental Condition
The reasonable-person standard bends for a child's age and for an adult's physical disability, but it does not bend for an adult's mind. Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct is that of a reasonable person under like circumstances,1 and an adult's insanity or other mental deficiency is not one of the circumstances that adjust it.2 A child is measured against a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience, and an adult who is ill or physically disabled against a reasonable person under like disability.3 The Restatement stops at those two traits and extends no matching allowance to the mentally disabled.4
This unit takes the rule first and the exception second. The first subsection states the rule and the reasons courts give for it. The second takes up a narrow exception, recognized in several jurisdictions, for an institutionalized patient who injures the people employed to care for him.
No Allowance for Mental Deficiency
An adult's insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the adult of liability for conduct that falls below the standard of a reasonable person under like circumstances.5 Section 283B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule, and the Restatement (Third) agrees: “An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”6 The rule can seem harsh, because it holds some defendants to a standard they may be unable to meet, and the grounds courts offer for it explain why it persists.
The criminal law's insanity defense points the other way, and importing it is the commonest error on this topic. The policy of the criminal law is that an insane person should not be held guilty of a criminal act committed while insane.7 That policy concerns punishment. A tort judgment instead decides who bears the cost of an injury that is just as real whatever the defendant's state of mind, so the same defendant can be beyond the reach of the criminal law and still answer in tort. Cross v. Kent imposed tort liability for setting a barn on fire on a defendant whose insanity precluded criminal prosecution, and Kuhn v. Zabotsky judged a defendant who remembered nothing of the episode by the standard of a reasonable person.8
Berberian v. Lynn collects the grounds on which the rule has persisted. The first is the difficulty of drawing any satisfactory line between mental deficiency and the variations of temperament, intellect, and emotional balance that, as a practical matter, cannot be taken into account in imposing liability. People differ in how quick, calm, and attentive they are, and the objective standard already disregards nearly all of that variation, so an allowance for deficiency would force a court to choose the point where ordinary shortcoming ends and excusable deficiency begins. The opinion grants that this obstacle may matter less as medical and psychiatric science develops, but it remains a major obstacle at present.9
The second ground concerns who should bear the loss. Persons with a mental deficiency who live in the world, the reasoning runs, should pay for the damage they do, and it is better that their wealth, if they have any, compensate innocent victims than remain in their own hands.10 The victim did nothing to cause the harm and the defendant's conduct did, so an excuse would leave the whole loss with the one party who had no part in it.
The third ground works through other people. If those in charge of a person with a mental deficiency, or of that person's estate, know that liability may follow, they have reason to look after the person, keep the person in order, and see that no harm results.11 A guardian who knows that the ward's estate will answer for a collision has reason to keep the car keys, and a rule excusing the ward would remove that reason. None of the three grounds rests on moral fault. Each concerns what a court can administer, where a loss should fall, or what incentive supervisors have to prevent harm.
The grounds also help explain why the child's allowance does not extend to adults of limited capacity. Age gives the law a ready line, so a court can ask what a reasonable child of like age, intelligence, and experience would have done without first deciding where normal variation ends.12 Even the child's allowance has a limit. Some courts refuse it to a child engaged in an activity normally reserved for adults, because it would be unjust to let that child escape liability by pointing to the care that other children would have used.13
A minority of courts depart from the general rule. In Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., Wisconsin treated the sudden onset of an insane delusion as capable of excusing a driver whose car ended up on the wrong side of the highway and struck the plaintiff's truck, because the court accepted that the delusion directly impaired her driving and caused the accident. Most jurisdictions refuse an allowance even when the illness is sudden and unexpected.14
Courts have not always held the line cleanly where a defendant's limitation falls short of insanity. In Lynch v. Rosenthal, a Missouri court considered expert testimony about a farm hand's mental ability when it evaluated his contributory negligence.15 A careful answer states the general rule and flags decisions like this one as departures from it.
On an exam, do not treat a defendant's mental illness as a circumstance in the way a physical disability is, and do not reason from the criminal insanity defense. Where the facts stress that an illness struck suddenly and without warning, state the majority rule, apply it, and note the Wisconsin departure. Because the general rule is so uncompromising, some jurisdictions recognize a narrow exception for institutionalized patients who injure their paid caretakers, and the next subsection takes it up.
Caregiver Exception
Section 283B denies the adult defendant any allowance for insanity or other mental deficiency,17 yet several jurisdictions recognize a narrow exception for one setting. An institutionalized mentally disabled patient who cannot control or appreciate the consequences of his conduct cannot be held liable for injuries caused to those employed to care for him.18 The exception is a carve-out and not a general excuse, so a patient who injures a visitor, a neighbor, or a stranger is still measured against the ordinary reasonable person.
The decisions arise in both intentional torts and negligence. The negligence decisions reach their results by finding that the patient owes no duty to those hired to care for him.19 Gould v. Gant was an assault and battery claim against a twenty-three-year-old man with “irremediable mental difficulties” who could not keep himself from violence, and Berberian v. Lynn was a negligence action against an Alzheimer's patient who pushed a nurse down the stairs.20 Wisconsin's Gould v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co. and Indiana's Creasy v. Rusk, which also arose from injuries to caregivers of Alzheimer's patients, belong to the same line.
The duty framing leaves the general rule intact. The standard of conduct is not lowered for mentally disabled adults, because no duty runs from the patient to this particular kind of plaintiff. In Berberian, the patient urged a capacity-based standard and agreed with a concurring judge that the trial court should have dismissed the negligence claim on the “fireman's rule” rationale,21 the idea that a person hired to confront a danger is poorly placed to sue over harm the danger causes.
California extended the exception to an in-home caregiver hired through an agency in Gregory v. Cott, but it rested the extension on primary implied assumption of risk, which Chapter 12 discusses.22 That basis ties the exception to the caregiver's job and not to the patient's diagnosis. It also shows that jurisdictions do not all reach the result by the same route.
The grounds for the general rule make the exception easier to understand. The supervision ground hopes to stir to action those in charge of a person with a mental deficiency,23 and in an institution those people are often the caretakers who would be the plaintiffs. A caregiver who takes the job also takes on exposure to the patient's unpredictable behavior, which is the reasoning Gregory makes explicit.
The most common exam mistake is to treat this exception as proof that mental illness excuses negligence, and the second is to apply it without checking whether the plaintiff was a paid caretaker. A fact pattern that pairs an institutionalized patient with a paid nurse or aide invites the exception, so state it, note that jurisdictions differ, and apply it. A fact pattern in which the same patient hurts someone else belongs under § 283B.