Concept
Reason to Know and Should Know
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
Reason to Know and Should Know
Before a court asks whether a defendant was careful, it often has to ask what he knew. The reasonable person comes equipped with ordinary attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment,1 and with any superior measure of those faculties that the actor himself has.2 Yet most negligence disputes turn on facts peculiar to the occasion: that the brakes were failing, that the figure by the road was a child, that a tire was damaged. The Restatement defines three terms for an actor’s stance toward facts like these, and each asks more of him than the one before.
- Reasonable belief begins in the actor’s mind. He actually believes that a fact exists, and the circumstances he knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to believe it too.3
- Reason to know begins in the actor’s information. He holds facts from which a person of reasonable intelligence, or of his own superior intelligence, would infer that the fact exists or would act as though it did.4
- Should know begins in the actor’s duty. A person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performing a duty to another, or would act on the assumption that it exists, so this term alone reaches facts that never came into his hands.5
The law keeps these inquiries apart because each places the burden of knowing in a different spot. If liability depended on belief alone, a defendant could escape by saying he never drew the obvious inference. If it depended on everything he might have discovered, every actor would owe an unlimited investigation of the world around him. Three terms let a court decide, fact by fact, how much of the work of knowing the actor must carry.
The term closest to the actor’s own mind, reasonable belief, comes first.
Reasonable Belief
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 11 defines “reasonably believes” in two parts. The actor must believe that a given fact or combination of facts exists, and the circumstances that he knows, or should know, must be such as to cause a reasonable man so to believe.6 The first part looks into the actor’s own mind, and the second checks what it finds there against the reasonable person this chapter has been building. The term creates no duty of its own; it applies the objective test to a belief.
Each part has a job. The requirement of actual belief ties the term to the person being judged: a defendant who never held the belief did not act on it, and the surrounding circumstances cannot supply one for him afterward. The objective requirement does the screening. If sincere belief were enough, the test would collapse into the argument that failed in Vaughan v. Menlove, where the defendant argued that the jury should have been directed to ask only whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment.7 The court refused. Liability tied to each individual’s judgment would be as variable as the length of each individual’s foot, so it held instead to the caution that a man of ordinary prudence would observe.8 The reasonable-person check therefore excuses an honest mistake only when a careful person holding the same information could have made it. And because the second part counts circumstances the actor should know as well as those he does know, he cannot assemble a reasonable belief by overlooking facts that a prudent person in his position would have noticed.
In Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co., Judge Carlin introduced the problem as the ordinary man, “that problem child of the law,” placed “in a most bizarre setting.” A lonely chauffeur in the defendant’s employ had become “in a trice the protagonist in a breath-baiting drama,” one that began with a man’s being robbed at pistol point by two highwaymen in a Manhattan alley.9 The opening names the yardstick. A chauffeur’s claim that he believed himself in danger would be tested against the ordinary man in his position, and sincerity alone would not carry it. How a sudden emergency affects the choice of action is a separate question, taken up in its own section.
The cab driver and the intersection driver share sincerity, and sincerity explains neither result. What separates them is the second part of the definition. The cab driver’s known circumstances pointed toward his belief, while the intersection driver’s pointed away from hers. A defendant who claims to have thought something was true therefore owes two answers: whether he actually held the belief, and whether the facts he knew or should have known would have led a reasonable person to hold it.
Reason to Know
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12(1), an actor has “reason to know” a fact when he holds information from which a person of reasonable intelligence, or of his own superior intelligence, would infer that the fact exists or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that it exists.11 The definition starts one step earlier than reasonable belief. Section 11 asks first whether the actor actually held the belief, while § 12(1) is silent about what he in fact concluded.12 It asks only what his information would lead a reasonably intelligent person to infer. An actor who reads a warning and shrugs is treated as knowing what the warning shows.
Information the actor already has marks the outer edge of the term. Reason to know asks what the facts in his hands signal, and it does not require him to go looking for more. A fact that never reached him cannot have shaped his choice, and charging him with it takes a duty to look, which is the work of the next term.13
The inference belongs to a person of reasonable intelligence, not to the actor. If the actor’s own reading controlled, every defendant could say that he never connected the dots, and the best-judgment argument rejected in Vaughan v. Menlove would return in a new form.14 The measure rises when the actor really has superior intelligence, because the inference is then measured by his.15 The floor remains in place beneath that ratchet: a defendant who reads signals slowly is still measured by reasonable intelligence and not by his own.16
The final clause of the definition matters more than it first appears. Prudence often has to act on a probability short of certainty, so the term is satisfied when a reasonable person holding the information would conduct himself as though the fact existed, even if he could not say that it did. A defendant who answers that he could not be sure the danger would recur has not met the question, which is whether a reasonable person would have acted on the assumption that it might.
Pipher v. Parsell shows the term at work on a passenger who interfered with a driver. Pipher was injured in an accident, and the question was whether Parsell, the driver, had breached a duty to him by failing to anticipate that Beisel, a passenger, would repeat conduct that interfered with safe driving. The court reversed a judgment entered as a matter of law and held that Parsell’s alleged breach, the foreseeability of Beisel’s repeat conduct, and the proximate cause of Pipher’s injuries were all factual determinations for the jury.17
The rule the court stated runs in both directions. Where a passenger’s actions that cause an accident are not foreseeable, no negligence is attributable to the driver. Where a passenger’s actions that interfere with the driver’s safe operation are foreseeable, the driver’s failure to prevent them may breach his duty to other passengers or to the public, and he is expected to make a reasonable attempt to prevent a repetition. The court drew support from a Vermont decision about a drunken passenger known as a “playful fellow.” For fifteen minutes he had persisted in trying to shake hands with the driver before he seized the driver’s arm, and the vehicle struck a farm wagon. The driver’s knowledge of that persistence, the Vermont court held, “should have forecast the peril of an accident to an operator of reasonable prudence and vigilance.”18
In the vocabulary of this section, a passenger’s persistent interference is information in the driver’s hands. A person of reasonable intelligence who watched a passenger keep reaching for him would infer that more interference might follow, or would at least drive as though it might. Certainty is not required, because the last clause of § 12(1) is satisfied by conduct governed on the assumption that the fact exists. Take the earlier conduct away and the analysis reverses. A driver who has seen nothing from which to infer that a passenger will seize the wheel has no information for the definition to operate on, and the rule that unforeseeable passenger conduct creates no negligence applies. What the driver had learned, and when, decides the case.
Exam answers often blur this term with the next one, and the line between them is whether the actor held the information at all.
The first supervisor’s defense that he never believed the cable would actually break fails because the question is what his information signalled, not what he concluded. The second supervisor’s position changes the legal question entirely. Whether a prudent person in her place would have gone and looked is the inquiry that § 12(2) handles, and reason to know does not reach it.
Should Know
An actor “should know” a fact under § 12(2) when a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence, or of the actor’s own superior intelligence, would ascertain it in the performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct on the assumption that it exists.20 Reason to know starts from information already in the actor’s hands and adds no duty to look for more.21 Should know supplies that duty. It asks what a prudent person would have found out while carrying out an obligation to someone else, and so it reaches facts that never came into the actor’s hands at all. A defendant who says he had no idea has not answered the question if a prudent person in his position would have checked.
The phrase “in the performance of his duty to another” ties the obligation to inquire to a particular relationship, and that tie keeps the rule from growing without limit. A rule that required everyone to investigate everything within reach would make ordinary life impossible, because every purchase, every drive, and every visit would begin with an inquiry. Linking inquiry to duty asks a narrower question: who owed whom a look? The cost of discovering a hazard then falls on the person who creates the risk or controls the thing and is best placed to check it, and not on the person entitled to rely on that party. The measure also rises to the actor’s own intelligence when his is superior.22
The definition’s second alternative covers situations in which looking cannot settle the matter. A prudent person who cannot confirm that a danger exists, but sees that it may, governs his conduct as though it does.
Gobrecht v. Beckwith shows both the duty to find out and the way the law allocates it. The defendant landlord installed a heater, and the court held that it was unreasonable, and so negligent, for him not to inquire into the heater’s safety before installing it. It held that it was reasonable, and not negligent, for the plaintiff not to inquire and to rely on the landlord.23 Neither party investigated, yet the case came out opposite ways for them, and the difference lies in what each owed. The landlord chose to install the heater, and a prudent person in his place would have looked into its safety first, so he is charged with what that inquiry would have revealed. The plaintiff was entitled to rely on him. Requiring a tenant to test every fixture the landlord supplies would put the burden of checking on the person least able to carry it.
The same logic settles the second dock supervisor from the previous part. She held no information about her frayed cable, so reason to know gave no answer. Whether a prudent person responsible for that crane would have inspected the housing is the should-know question, and it turns on the duty she owed the workers below.
The duty to inquire also reaches the actor whose ignorance is innocent in itself. Being unfamiliar with something is no breach, but one must take notice of what one does not know, such as when walking in a strange dark hallway or using an unfamiliar product, and exercise caution commensurate with one’s ignorance.24
The hallway shows the second alternative in § 12(2) at work. The driver could not ascertain what lay ahead, so the law asks how a prudent person governs his conduct while the fact is unresolved, and the answer is to proceed on the safer assumption.
Delair v. McAdoo applies the same rule to vehicles. The court noted that no series of accidents is more destructive or more terrifying in the use of automobiles than those that come from blowouts. It stated that the law requires drivers and owners of motor vehicles to know the condition of those parts likely to become dangerous where a reasonable inspection would disclose the flaws or faults, and that it assumes they know the dangers such an examination would ascertain.25 A tire worn through to the cord is a defect an owner learns about by looking, and the owner who drives on it among other travelers is the person with both the duty and the means to look. The charge has a boundary built into it, however: it extends to what a reasonable inspection would disclose. The owner whose tire separated internally, where no inspection could reach, is not treated as knowing what no inquiry would have shown.
Seen against the whole group of terms, should know is the one that can convert ignorance into negligence. It does so only when someone owed a duty and a prudent performance of that duty would have uncovered the fact.