Concept
The Actor's Circumstances
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
The Actor's Circumstances
The baseline rule asks what a reasonably prudent person would have done “under the same circumstances,” so the imagined person must be set down where the defendant stood. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the consequence for the amount of care: the actor must exercise the care that a reasonable man in his position, with his information and competence, would recognize as necessary to keep the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.1 That instruction raises a sorting problem. A defendant's situation contains many facts, and some travel with the hypothetical person while others stay behind.
The law sorts by kind. The external circumstances in which the actor acted are always relevant, while her personal characteristics are relevant only sometimes.2 The asymmetry follows from what each kind of fact does to the test. A fact about the setting tells the jury what the actor faced, and without it the jury cannot judge whether the choice was sensible. A personal trait, admitted freely, would shift the inquiry from the defendant's conduct to the defendant himself. Courts refused that shift in Vaughan v. Menlove, and a later commentary explains why: the defendant's proposed test would have produced not one standard of care for negligence but a million, with each defendant's character and intelligence on trial.3 The two parts below take the kinds of fact in turn, beginning with the setting, which always counts, and ending with physical disability, the one personal trait the standard absorbs.
External Circumstances
External circumstances need no screening, because conduct is chosen in the middle of events. Decisions about conduct are made “in the hurly burly of everyday events, in the factory, on the road, in the operating room,” not in a classroom or an armchair, so the reasonableness of the defendant's choice is always judged in relation to the unique context in which she made it.4 Time, place, weather, traffic, and the danger of whatever the actor is handling all belong to that context, and a jury never told what the actor faced could not say whether she chose well.
Does a crowded highway call for a higher standard than an empty field? It does not. One standard, reasonable care under the circumstances, governs both, and what differs is how much care that standard requires. Driving a pickup truck in an empty field does not require the same care as driving it on a crowded highway.5 The circumstances supply the facts that the question about prudence is asked about: on the highway a lapse can reach many vehicles within moments, while in the field almost no lapse can hurt anyone. A court that says the crowded highway “raises the standard” has misdescribed the mechanism, because the question stays fixed and only its answer moves. And because the answer depends on the facts, a jury usually gives it.6
The care owed rises with the danger. As the risk grows, the actor must exercise caution commensurate with it, so a person who deals with things known to be dangerous, such as explosives or electricity, must be more careful than one merely walking down the street. Those who have accepted a special responsibility toward others, such as a common carrier responsible for the safety of passengers, must likewise take more care in line with the duty undertaken.7
Courts have described that scaling in two ways. Some decisions apply a heightened duty, often phrased as the highest degree of care, to those who carry passengers or run dangerous enterprises, as in cases about a ski-lift operator (Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc.), a taxicab (Peck v. Fanion), and a steam railroad (Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy).8 Others have retired the heightened duty. Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority held that a common carrier owes the same duty as any other potential tortfeasor, namely reasonable care under all the circumstances of the particular case, and Nunez v. Professional Transit Management of Tucson moved Arizona from a duty of the highest degree of care practicable to the ordinary negligence standard and applied the change retroactively.9 California's decision in Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center states the underlying objection most sharply: degrees of care are a matter of fact, not law, so the law knows only different amounts of care.10
Both lines of authority agree that greater danger demands greater care, and they quarrel only over the label. The retreat to ordinary negligence keeps the substance, since the single standard of reasonable care still requires more care as the danger grows. An answer on an exam should therefore describe heightened risk as a circumstance that calls for more care under one standard, and may add that some jurisdictions keep the highest-degree wording for carriers and dangerous activities.
The benchmark for those circumstances is ordinary conditions, not the worst event imaginable. In Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, the court said that a reasonable person acts with reference to the average circumstances of temperature in ordinary years. The defendants had provided against such frosts as experience would lead prudent people to expect, and the frost of 1855 penetrated deeper than any that ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions. That frost was a contingency against which no reasonable person can provide, so the defendants were not negligent.11 The reason for anchoring the test to ordinary conditions is that every disaster, viewed afterward, has some precaution that would have stopped it. If conduct were measured against the worst event imaginable, hindsight would supply that precaution in every case, and liability would become insurance against freak occurrences. Asking what experience would have led a prudent person to expect asks instead what the actor could reasonably have planned for when the choice was made.
Experience belongs to a place. In Eli Investments, LLC v. Silver Slipper Casino Venture, LLC, a casino barge broke loose during Hurricane Katrina, traveled roughly a mile, and came to rest on top of the Biloxi Beachfront Hotel, and an expert testified that the storm surge was foreseeable in light of the Gulf's prior storm history.12 Foreseeability was thus measured against that coast's own record. The same source asks when changes in averages caused by climate change begin to affect the standard of care, and leaves the question open. On the logic of the benchmark, if the average moves, the line between ordinary and extraordinary conditions moves with it.
Both owners face the same question, and they differ only in the weather history that experience gave each of them.
Custom is a circumstance as well. That the defendant acted as others customarily do in like circumstances is relevant, because conduct generally engaged in within a trade or profession at least suggests that the conduct is acceptable. If a roofer is injured in a fall from the roof of a two-story building, it matters on the question of his negligence whether roofers ordinarily wear safety harnesses when reshingling such buildings (or whether they ordinarily do not).13 A later section takes up law and custom.
A harmful result does not decide the question the jury answers. In Hammontree, a driver on his way home from work crashed without warning through the wall of a bicycle shop and injured Maxine Hammontree, who was working there, and the jury nonetheless returned a verdict for the driver.14
Physical Characteristics
A physical disability is the one personal trait the standard absorbs. Blindness is counted among the circumstances, so a blind actor is compared with a reasonable person who is also blind: the law expects a blind person with a white cane and a guide dog to act differently on a sidewalk than a fully sighted person would.16 The allowance rests on two practical features of such a disability. A sighted person is unlikely to persuade a jury that he is blind, and other people can usually detect an identifiable disability and modify their own behavior accordingly.17 The disability must also be significant and ascertainable. Those features keep the allowance from reopening the problem of a separate yardstick for every defendant. The same objective determination applies whether the actor is a defendant or a plaintiff whose own negligence contributed to the accident, with very few exceptions, so the allowance also governs a blind pedestrian's own carelessness.18
Roberts v. State of Louisiana shows the allowance at work. Mike Burson, a blind concession operator, walked from his stand to the men's bathroom without using the cane he had with him in the stand, and the plaintiff's theory was that this failure made his passage negligent.19 Asking whether a sighted person would have avoided the collision would be useless, since a sighted person has an ability Burson lacks. The question is whether a reasonably prudent blind person in his position would have used the cane. Evidence of how blind people in comparable settings customarily move bears on the answer, because acting as others do in like circumstances is relevant.20
Counting the disability does not excuse every choice, because a disability is a circumstance and a circumstance cuts both ways. A blind person who decides to get behind the wheel of a car is acting unreasonably even when all the circumstances, including his blindness, are taken into account.21 The decision to take that risk is itself the negligence. The rule also binds everyone else. Conduct is judged in light of what the actor actually knows and observes, so a driver who sees a white cane at a crossing must adjust, and the detectability of the disability is what makes that adjustment fair to demand.22
Mental and intellectual shortcomings do not enter the circumstances, and the difference follows from the reasons above. In Vaughan v. Menlove, the defendant argued that the jury should have been asked only whether he acted in good faith to the best of his judgment, since he ought not to answer for failing to possess the highest order of intelligence.23 The court refused a rule that would make liability as variable as the length of each person's foot and held instead to the caution that a person of ordinary prudence would observe.24 A shortcoming of judgment cannot be seen by others, is easy to claim and hard to disprove, and would put the defendant's character and intelligence on trial in place of his conduct. The perennially careless would then enjoy the right to endanger their neighbors with impunity.25 Later sections take up how the law treats minimum and superior mental capacities.