Concept
An Idealized Reasonable Person
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
An Idealized Reasonable Person
The reasonable person of negligence law is not anyone who actually lives in the community. He or she is an idealized image: a composite of the community’s judgment about how the typical member ought to behave in each of the endless activities that carry some risk of harm to the actor or to others.1 Three consequences follow. The figure is built from what people ought to do, not from what they do. It is prudent and human rather than anxious or infallible. And the defendant is measured against it on the one occasion in dispute.
Ought, Not Average
Reasonable care is also called due care or ordinary care, and the word ordinary invites a mistake: it can sound like average care, however risky average care may be. Strictly speaking, reasonable care is not necessarily average care. The question is not what average people actually do, but what they reasonably ought to do.2
The test therefore is not what the typical respectable citizen in fact does, nor what the majority of the community does. Jaywalking shows why: the behavior is common, and it falls below the community’s standards of safety.3 A pedestrian who steps from mid-block into moving traffic cannot answer a negligence claim by pointing to the crowd that crosses the same way. The jury asks what a prudent person ought to have done, and a widespread habit does not settle that question.
The standard definition describes a temperate character, not a statistical one. The reasonable person’s notions and standards of behaviour and responsibility correspond with those generally obtained among ordinary people in our society at the present time. He or she seldom lets emotion overbear reason and has moderate habits and an equable disposition. Such a person is not necessarily the same as the average person, a term that implies “an amalgamation of counter-balancing extremes.”4
Prudent, Not Preoccupied
The idealized figure is human, and the law does not ask her to be perfect or infallible. She may err in judgment, misperceive a situation, and even be momentarily distracted, provided the error was reasonable or excusable under the circumstances, that is, consistent with the exercise of ordinary care.5
The qualifier carries the weight, because sincerity alone excuses nothing. In Vaughan v. Menlove the defendant argued that the jury should have been asked only whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment, since he ought not answer for lacking the highest order of intelligence. The court refused. Liability coextensive with each individual’s judgment would be as variable as the length of each individual’s foot, and the rule instead requires the caution that a person of ordinary prudence would observe.6
Nor does the law demand constant vigilance against every conceivable danger. Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co. reads ordinary as not requiring the conduct of an extraordinarily careful person: the ordinary prudent person is not a supercautious individual, free of human frailties, who is constantly preoccupied with the idea that danger lurks in every direction. Requiring constant apprehension of danger from every possible source would go beyond normal conduct and set an exacting standard. If prudence demanded that much, every injury would show that some further precaution had been skipped, and negligence would follow outcomes rather than conduct.
The cost of precautions marks the same limit. Suppose a railroad declines to build a $12 million overpass that would avert about six accidents over thirty years. If the accidents would average $500,000 apiece, the expected injury cost is $3 million, and the decision may well be reasonable: the investment may be more than society, through tort law, is willing to require.7 Reasonable care is therefore not the most care that money could buy.
Emergencies get their own section below. The point to carry forward is that an emergency does not lower the standard. It does not excuse the actor from complying with the standard of the reasonable person, and the conduct may still be found unreasonable in light of the emergency.8
This Occasion Only
Negligence is judged on the occasion in question, so a defendant’s record on other occasions does not answer the claim. The rule keeps the trial from becoming a verdict on the defendant’s character and from wandering into conduct on occasions other than the one in dispute.9
The same limit lets a jury insist on reasonable conduct every time. If reasonable care on a particular road requires driving no faster than 30 miles per hour, the jury may find negligent a driver who went 40, even if the driver proves a lifetime of driving that road without once exceeding the limit. Juries are not expressly required to apply this perfect compliance requirement, but they are clearly permitted to, and the option keeps the trial from asking whether the defendant is generally a reasonable person.10
What the defendant may offer is evidence about the occasion itself: what was known, what was done, and what the conditions were. Those facts are the circumstances in which the idealized figure is placed, and the next sections take them up.