Concept
The Objective Standard
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
The Reasonable Person Standard
The Objective Standard
A person is negligent when he fails to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances.1 The measuring figure is imagined, and a defendant on trial is compared with that figure rather than with his own sense of what was good enough. Vaughan v. Menlove, decided by the English Court of Common Pleas in 1837, shows why the law chose that yardstick over the defendant's own judgment.2
Menlove built a hay rick, a large outdoor stack of hay, near the boundary of his own land. The hay was packed in a condition that prompted discussion of whether it would catch fire, and although opinions conflicted, he was warned of the danger repeatedly over five weeks. His stock was insured, and when someone advised him to take the rick down to avoid all danger, he said he would "chance it." He cut an opening, a kind of chimney, through the rick, but the hay heated spontaneously and burst into flames. The fire spread to his barn and stables and then to the plaintiff's cottages, which were entirely destroyed.3
The jury found for the plaintiff. Menlove then sought a new trial on the ground that the jury should have been asked something different. He argued that the question was not whether he had been grossly negligent by the standard of ordinary prudence, which he called too uncertain to serve as any criterion, but whether he had acted bona fide, in good faith, to the best of his own judgment. If he had, he contended, he should not answer for lacking the highest order of intelligence.4
The court refused a new trial. Making liability depend on each individual's judgment, it reasoned, would produce a standard "as variable as the length of the foot of each individual." The court preferred the rule that requires in all cases the caution a man of ordinary prudence would observe, and it found that this rule was in substance what the jury had been told.5
Two consequences follow from that holding. First, good faith is no defense, and neither is the fact that the defendant did his best. The question is how a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances, so evidence of the defendant's benevolent state of mind is ordinarily irrelevant and often inadmissible.6 Second, personal limits do not lower the bar. The clumsy, the rash, the timid, the forgetful, the slow reactor, and the person of low intelligence are all held to the general standard of reasonable care, whether or not they can meet it. A risky act is no less dangerous because the actor lacked the capacity to do better, and when an innocent victim and a substandard actor must divide the burden, the law places it on the actor.7
The law refuses a best-judgment test for three connected reasons. Such a test would put the defendant's character and intelligence on trial in place of his conduct. It would let the perennially careless endanger their neighbors with impunity. And the objective test the courts use instead permits impartial application, avoids subjective judgments about individual character, and lets people predict the consequences of their conduct.8
A uniform standard also helps everyone who deals with the actor. Members of society can interact without constantly sizing up the intelligence of every driver or neighbor they meet, and a person who cannot reach the standard is expected to curtail his activity or exercise extra self-restraint rather than to be excused.9
The visitor's ignorance fails as an excuse because the objective test makes no allowance for differences in intelligence, education, or temperament. It charges the actor with what an ordinary member of the community knows.10 A defendant who protests that he meant well or did all he could has offered nothing the standard recognizes, so the analysis moves directly to what a prudent person would have done in his circumstances.
Those circumstances are real, and the standard keeps them. The hypothetical person is placed in the actor's actual situation, which includes the external facts bearing on the choice and whatever the actor actually knows or observes, because the reasonable person always takes those into account.11 Menlove's five weeks of warnings were part of his circumstances, so the prudent person measured against him was someone who had been told repeatedly that the stack might ignite. Reasonable care also shifts with the setting, since driving a pickup truck across an empty field calls for less care than driving it on a crowded highway.12 Which personal traits count as circumstances, such as a physical disability, a child's age, or a professional's training, is taken up in the sections that follow. The baseline is that a shortage of judgment or intelligence is not among them.
The objective standard also protects a defendant whose reasonable precautions were overwhelmed by an extraordinary event. In Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, the water company had provided against the frosts that experience would lead prudent people to expect, but its precautions proved insufficient against the extreme frost of 1855, which penetrated deeper than any that ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions. The court held the company not liable. A reasonable person acts with reference to the average circumstances of ordinary years, and a frost of that severity was a contingency against which no reasonable person can provide.13 Blyth and Menlove ask the same question, what a prudent person would have done, and they diverge because the circumstances differ. Menlove had specific warnings for five weeks that his hay might ignite and chose to chance it, while the water company had guarded against everything experience suggested. Harm occurred in both cases, but only Menlove's conduct fell below the yardstick.
Courts and commentators name the yardstick in several ways: the reasonably prudent person, the ordinary prudent person, or ordinary rather than reasonable care.14 The labels express the same idea, but whatever the label, the figure must stay hypothetical. In Freeman v. Adams, a California court found reversible error in an instruction inviting jurors to ask whether they themselves would have done what the defendants did, because each panel's own habits would then set the standard. A finding of negligence is therefore a legal evaluation of conduct against a neutral yardstick, not a moral condemnation. Morally, we could hardly fault a defendant for a judgment that was the best he could do, but for legal purposes we need a test that defines fault in a predictable, universal way.15
Within a negligence claim, the standard measures breach of the duty to use reasonable care. Whether a duty is owed is a question of law for the court, whereas whether the defendant's conduct breached it is usually a question for the jury. The judge can still take that question from the jury when no reasonable jury could find a breach.16 Most courts still define negligence as doing something the ordinary, reasonably prudent person would not do, or failing to do something that person would do, under all the circumstances. The Restatement (Third) of Torts instead defines negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances and then uses an economic, cost-benefit analysis to decide whether reasonable care was exercised. Either formulation anchors the inquiry in reasonable conduct under all the circumstances rather than in the defendant's own sense of what was enough.17