Concept
Manufacturers of Chattels
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Manufacturers of Chattels
A manufacturer holds three positions that no other party in the chain of supply holds together. It chooses the design, it controls production, and it is the last party to examine the finished chattel before the chattel passes to dealers and users who have little practical chance to inspect it. Each position is a point at which care can be taken or omitted. A retailer that resells a sealed product often never opens it, and the user can do less still, so the maker alone can choose a safer design, correct a faulty assembly step, or test a finished unit before it leaves the plant. The law accordingly asks more of the manufacturer than of suppliers who merely pass a product along.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 394 through 398 state those obligations, one for each stage at which negligence can enter:
- Section 394 subjects a manufacturer who knows or has reason to know that a chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for use to the liability of a supplier with that knowledge.1
- Section 395 imposes liability on a manufacturer that fails to use reasonable care in making a chattel which, unless carefully made, involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm.2
- Section 396 holds the manufacturer liable under §§ 394 and 395 even though the danger is discoverable by an inspection that a seller or another person owes the injured person a duty to make.3
- Section 397 requires reasonable care from a manufacturer whose chattel is compounded under a secret formula, or under a disclosed formula that users are unlikely to understand, both in adopting the formula and in conveying directions that make the chattel reasonably safe.4
- Section 398 requires reasonable care in adopting a safe plan or design for a chattel whose design makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured.5
The five sections divide along a line familiar from the business-supplier rules. Section 394 turns on what the maker knew or had reason to know, as § 391 does for a business supplier.6 Sections 395, 397, and 398 ask what a careful maker would have done in making the chattel, choosing its formula, and adopting its design, so a maker that never learned of the danger can still be liable if reasonable care would have exposed or prevented it.7 Section 396 removes an excuse and creates no ground of liability of its own: it forecloses the argument that another person’s duty to inspect relieves the maker of its own.8 All five apply ordinary negligence principles, so the plaintiff must still prove the maker’s knowledge or its failure of reasonable care. Strict liability under § 402A is a separate claim, because a manufacturer generally answers for production defects even when it exercised due care.9 The automobile maker in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., whose omitted inspection would have revealed a defective wheel, is the model for this group, and the subsections below take the five rules in order.
Manufacturers With Knowledge
Section 394 states the first manufacturer rule in one sentence: a manufacturer who knows or has reason to know that a chattel is, or is likely to be, dangerous for use is subject to the liability of a supplier of chattels with that knowledge.10 The section is a cross-reference. It sets a trigger, the maker’s knowledge, and borrows its consequences from the general supplier rules: the duty under § 388 to inform users who will not realize the danger, the continuing liability under § 389 of a supplier who knows the chattel is unlikely to be made safe even though the person receiving it was told, and the duty under § 390 not to supply a chattel to a recipient likely to use it dangerously.11 A manufacturer that meets the trigger answers under whichever of those sections fits the facts, and the plaintiff must still prove that section’s own conditions.
Section 394 mainly denies the manufacturer an exemption that its position might seem to offer. A maker could argue that the supplier rules govern the parties downstream, who pass along what others built, and that its own obligations end with care in making the thing. But a manufacturer also puts the chattel into other hands, directly or through wholesalers and retailers, and that is what § 388 means by supplying a chattel for another to use.12 A manufacturer with knowledge is therefore a supplier with knowledge. The sections that follow add duties for what the maker does in making the chattel; they do not remove the duties it owes as a supplier. Duty is the front door of a negligence claim, and a manufacturer’s general duty runs to foreseeable victims of foreseeable risks of harm.13 For a danger the maker knows of, § 394 specifies that the duty includes the supplier’s duties of disclosure, while breach, causation, and damages remain for the plaintiff to prove.
The duty falls on makers because information collects in their hands. A manufacturer designs the product, tests it, and receives the complaints and field reports about every unit it sells, so it can see patterns that no single retailer or user sees. The information gap that § 388 exists to close is widest there, and the maker also has the cheapest line to users, since a label or instruction sheet travels with the product. A rule that excused the party holding the most information would leave users to find the danger by being hurt by it.
The trigger has the meaning it has in § 388(a). Either the manufacturer has concluded that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous, or it has reason to know, which means it holds information from which a reasonable person would infer the danger.14 The second route matters especially for makers, because test results, complaint files, and adverse-event reports accumulate in the manufacturer’s own records, and a maker that holds the pieces cannot avoid the duty by declining to assemble them. As under § 388(a), what counts is the information the maker has when it supplies the chattel, and nothing in § 394 directs the maker to look for danger. A maker holding no information that points to danger therefore falls outside § 394. Whether it should have found the danger through better testing or a better design is a question for the sections that follow, beginning with § 395, which asks whether the maker used reasonable care in making the chattel.15
The danger a manufacturer must know about is danger in use, and courts read use broadly. Working from § 388, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Moran v. Faberge, Inc. noted that language tying liability to use “in the manner for which” the chattel is supplied can suggest responsibility only for intended uses. It called that impression misleading and agreed with most courts that a manufacturer’s duty to warn of latent dangers extends to all reasonably foreseeable uses.16 A maker that knows, or is under a duty to discover, that a substantial percentage of the population is allergic or otherwise sensitive to an ingredient must take reasonable precautions, by warning or otherwise, for those users.17 For § 394, the consequence is that knowledge of a danger to a substantial group of sensitive users is knowledge of danger for use, and the maker cannot answer that the group was not its intended market. The reference to a duty to discover belongs to the negligent-making analysis of § 395 and gives no reason to read § 394 itself as requiring a search.
Does a manufacturer that made its product carefully escape § 394? The answer depends on what the maker’s own records show.
The two makers sold the same cream, and the only difference between them is the information in their hands. Careful manufacture matters under § 395 and answers nothing under § 394 for the second maker, because a well-made product can still be dangerous in a hidden way, and a maker who knows of that danger must disclose it. A manufacturer that argues it did everything right in the plant has answered a question § 394 does not ask.
Once the trigger is met, the analysis moves into the incorporated section, and the conditions taught earlier apply to the maker as they apply to any supplier. The users must have lacked reason to realize the danger under § 388(b), and the maker must have failed to use reasonable care to inform them under § 388(c).18 Where the maker sells through dealers, the intermediary factors decide whether telling the dealer was a reasonable way to reach users, and a maker that knows its chattel is unlikely to be made safe before use remains liable under § 389 even though it informed the dealer.19 On an exam, a failure-to-warn question about a manufacturer starts with what the maker knew or held information about, and turns to the care taken in making the chattel only if that knowledge is missing.
Negligent Manufacture
Section 395 turns from what the manufacturer knew to what it did in the plant. A manufacturer that fails to use reasonable care in making a chattel which, unless carefully made, it should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm is liable for physical harm caused by lawful use in the manner and for the purpose for which the chattel is supplied. The duty runs to those who use the chattel for a purpose for which the maker should expect it to be used and to those the maker should expect to be endangered by its probable use.21 Section 394 asks what the maker knew or had reason to know when it supplied the chattel, so a maker holding no information that pointed to danger falls outside it. Section 395 supplies the other route to liability. It asks what a careful maker would have done in making the chattel, and it reaches a maker that fell short even though it never learned of the flaw. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. applied that principle when it held an automobile maker answerable for a defective wheel it had bought from another maker and put on the car without the inspection that would have revealed the defect.22
The conduct § 395 examines is the whole process of making. It begins with the selection, inspection, and testing of raw materials and component parts and continues through construction, assembly, and preparation of the product for distribution, and the maker owes reasonable care at each stage.23 Because even a careful production line occasionally turns out a flawed unit, reasonable care also reaches the period after production, when the maker must use quality-control systems suited to the risk, often by sampling and testing units taken off the assembly line.24 The duty falls on the maker because of the way the product travels. The finished chattel typically reaches its user sealed and packaged, after passing through dealers who had no occasion to open it, and the user cannot test it. The maker built the product, knows its parts, and can examine it before it ships, so the maker’s testing is the safeguard positioned to catch a flaw before the flaw reaches a person.
The duty to examine component parts is the central teaching of MacPherson. The wheel that collapsed had been made by someone else; the defendant had bought it from a reputable maker and built it into a car. Judge Cardozo held that the defendant was not relieved of a duty of inspection on that account. It was a manufacturer of automobiles, not merely a dealer in them, and it was responsible for the finished product.25 It was not at liberty to put the car on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests, and the trial judge’s charge had required nothing more of it.26 The reason lies in what the maker controls. It chose the supplier, designed the assembly into which the part fits, and was the last party able to test the assembled whole. If a maker could rest on its supplier’s reputation, each party in the chain would rely on another to have looked, and the person hurt by the wheel would find that nobody had.
Cardozo marked the edge of the rule by contrast with Carlson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., where the defendant had bought a tool for a servant’s use. Making tools was not the business in which that defendant was engaged, so reliance on the tool maker’s skill was proper and almost inevitable. The car maker, by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business, was charged with a stricter duty.27 A mere seller of another’s product stands closer to the buyer of the tool than to the car maker: a seller that neither knows nor has reason to know of a danger owes no negligence duty to discover it by inspection or test before selling.28 The opinion decided what the maker of the finished product owed. The wheel’s own maker was not a defendant, so the case leaves open what a component maker owes to the person who finally uses the assembled product.
How much testing counts as reasonable depends on what a flaw would cost. Cardozo said that the obligation to inspect varies with the nature of the thing inspected and that the more probable the danger, the greater the need of caution.29 Comment g to § 395 turns that idea into a proportion: the care a maker owes rises with the extent of the risk created if the article is made without the precautions. Where an automobile, high-speed machinery, or a high-voltage device could cause death or serious bodily harm unless it is substantially perfect, nearly meticulous precautions are reasonable, and it would be ridiculous to demand the same of a maker whose article, however imperfect, is unlikely to do more than trivial harm.30 The mechanism is the ordinary balance of negligence. The expected harm from an occasional flaw grows with both its probability and its gravity, so a costlier inspection is justified when more is at stake. A flaw that risks a scratch justifies only minimal quality control, while a flaw in a punch press or a car’s braking system calls for substantial resources devoted to catching errors during production.
Proving which step of the process went wrong is usually the plaintiff’s hardest task, because the mistake is buried in a production run the plaintiff never saw. Courts respond by commonly allowing a jury to infer negligence from proof that a manufacturing flaw caused the accident, since a flaw of that kind is likely the product of the maker’s lack of care. Courts using this approach are in effect applying res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine that lets a jury infer negligence from an accident of a kind that ordinarily does not happen without it, though they often do so without naming it.31 Jenkins v. General Motors Corp. shows the claim at work: the flaw was an improperly tightened nut on a bolt in the car’s rear suspension system.32 The inference is one a jury may draw and is not compelled. The plaintiff must still show that the flaw was in the chattel when it left the maker’s control, and evidence of rigorous quality-control procedures can defeat that proof.33
Section 395 limits liability by foreseeability at three points. The risk must be one the maker should recognize as unreasonable, the use must be one for which the maker should expect the chattel to be used, and the plaintiff must belong to the class that the maker’s carelessness foreseeably placed at risk.34 The maker of a chair, for example, may have to anticipate that it will be stood on as well as sat on.35 On the other side of the line, a maker is entitled, absent special reason to expect otherwise, to assume that its product will be put to normal use for which it is intended or appropriate. It is not liable when the product is safe for all such uses and harm results only because it is mishandled in a way the maker has no reason to expect.36 A shoemaker therefore owes nothing to an obstinate customer who insists on wearing a size too small, and the maker of cleaning fluid owes nothing to a purchaser who splashes it into his own eye.37 The working test asks whether the use falls within the range a careful maker would anticipate, whether or not the maker intended it.
Foreseeability marks the outer boundary of the duty without creating liability by itself, because the risk the maker created must also have been unreasonable. The maker need not have foreseen the precise way the accident would happen; it is enough that it should have foreseen the general type of risk that caused the accident.38 In one exploding-bottle decision the plaintiff was hurt not by the glass but by a fall as he cleaned up the spill, and the court held that the maker of a defective bottle of liquid under pressure should foresee not only broken glass and a spill but also normal efforts to clean it up.39 The plaintiff must still prove that the maker’s care fell short. Strict liability under § 402A, which reaches production defects even when the maker exercised due care, is a separate claim.40 Because negligence is harder to prove than strict liability, negligent-manufacture claims are less common than they once were, but they remain a viable basis of recovery in almost every state.41 Section 396, taken up next, confirms that the maker answers even when a seller or another person owed the injured plaintiff a duty to inspect the chattel.42
Inspection by Others
A manufacturer sued over a flawed product can be expected to argue that someone else stood between the factory and the injured person and was supposed to look the chattel over. Section 396 closes off that argument. It makes a manufacturer subject to liability under the rules stated in §§ 394 and 395 “although the dangerous character or condition of the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which the seller or any other person is under a duty to the person injured to make.”44 The inspector the section has in mind is usually the dealer who resold the chattel, but it covers any person who owes the injured person an inspection duty. Whatever the source of that duty, it does not affect the manufacturer’s own liability, so the manufacturer cannot treat the other party’s obligation as having been performed in its place. Section 396 is the manufacturer’s counterpart to § 393, which does the same work for a business supplier that furnishes a chattel through a third person.45
Section 396 removes a defense and creates no ground of liability of its own. It speaks of liability “under the rules stated in §§ 394 and 395,” and those rules carry their own elements.46 The plaintiff must therefore still show either that the manufacturer knew or had reason to know the chattel was, or was likely to be, dangerous for use, or that the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care in making a chattel that, unless carefully made, involved an unreasonable risk of physical harm.47 Neither element asks what a dealer or anyone else did or could have done. When the plaintiff proves one of them, § 396 tells the court to put aside the argument that another person’s duty to inspect excused the maker. When the plaintiff proves neither, § 396 supplies no substitute.
The reason for the rule begins with the manufacturer’s place in the chain, which MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. makes visible. The automobile maker there sold a car to a retail dealer, who resold it to the plaintiff. A wheel made of defective wood collapsed, and the evidence was that reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect and that the inspection was omitted.48 Cardozo observed that the dealer was the one person of whom it could be said with some approach to certainty that he would not use the car, yet the maker would have the court hold that he was the one person it was under a legal duty to protect. The law, he said, does not lead to so inconsequent a conclusion.49 Precedents from the days of stage-coach travel do not fit the conditions of travel today: the principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to it do change, and they are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.50 The case concerned the maker’s own omitted inspection and involved no inspection duty owed by a dealer, so it does not decide the question § 396 answers. Its reasoning explains the answer, however, because it ties the maker’s duty to the people the maker supplies, and a party in the middle of the chain who passes the product along has done nothing to take that duty over.
A second reason concerns incentives. An injured user cannot police the distribution chain, since the user meets only the finished chattel and has no way to learn who handled it or what each handler checked. If a manufacturer could escape by pointing to a dealer’s chance to catch the flaw, each party would rely on the other, and the user would be left with a defect that nobody looked for. Keeping the manufacturer’s duty independent preserves the pressure to test where testing is cheapest, at the plant that built the chattel and knows its parts, and it leaves any inspection duty on a dealer as an added safeguard that stands beside the maker’s care. That added safeguard is weaker than it appears. A retailer that resells a packaged product usually has no occasion to open it or prepare it for use, so it is hard to fault for a defect inside.51 A seller of another’s product who neither knows nor has reason to know of a danger owes no negligence duty to discover it by inspection or test.52 A rule that let the maker lean on that safeguard would rest on something that often does not exist, and § 396 applies where a particular seller or other person does owe the injured person such a duty.
The exam form of this issue is a stem in which the injured buyer sues the maker and the maker answers that a dealer was supposed to check the chattel. The answer turns on the maker’s own conduct under § 395 or § 394, and the dealer’s duty to inspect does not enter the analysis.
The section can also be misread in the opposite direction, by treating a dealer’s omission as though it were evidence against the maker. Section 396 takes an excuse away from the maker and leaves the plaintiff’s burden under §§ 394 and 395 exactly where it was.
Two further limits follow from the text. The section speaks only to the maker’s liability to the person injured, so whether the maker and the dealer share the loss between themselves is a separate question that § 396 does not answer.53 And because §§ 394 and 395 are negligence rules, § 396 leaves strict liability under § 402A, which dispenses with proof of fault, as a separate claim.
Secret and Obscure Formulas
Section 397 governs a manufacturer whose chattel is compounded under a secret formula, or under a formula that, although disclosed, should be recognized as unlikely to be understood by those the manufacturer should expect to use it lawfully. Such a manufacturer is liable for physical harm to those users, and to persons it should expect to be endangered by the chattel’s probable use, if it fails to use reasonable care to adopt such a formula and to bring to the users’ knowledge directions that will make the chattel reasonably safe for the use for which it is supplied.55 The duty has two parts, a choice made inside the plant and a message sent outside it. Each part exists because the user has no means of judging what the product contains.
Most of the supplier rules in this chapter assume that users can contribute to their own safety. Under § 388(b) a supplier owes no duty to inform where it has reason to believe that users will realize the danger, and that assumption holds for a chair, a ladder, or a tool whose condition and risks a user can see.56 A compound defeats it. What a cleaning agent, a solvent, or a cosmetic contains is invisible, and what it will do when mixed, heated, stored, or applied to skin depends on chemistry that the typical user cannot reconstruct. A disclosed formula can leave the user in the same position, because a list of chemical names is information only for a reader who can interpret it. The section therefore asks whether the expected lawful users are unlikely to understand the formula, and a printed ingredient list does not end that inquiry.
Each half of the duty has its own reason. The formula half places responsibility at the one point where the hazard can be removed cheaply. Only the maker chooses what goes into the compound, so only the maker can select a composition that will not, for example, release a poisonous gas when it meets a common household product, and a person who buys the product cannot test that choice. The directions half covers the hazards that remain after the best available formula is chosen. The user cannot work out safe handling from the product itself, so the maker’s directions are the only channel through which its knowledge of the contents reaches the person at risk. The section leaves the maker free to keep the composition private, and it conditions that freedom on the care taken in adopting the formula and in telling users how to handle the product.
The word directions is chosen with care, because instructions for safe use and warnings of danger do different work, and a product can need both. A warning tells the user that a hazard exists. Directions tell the user what to do about it: how to assemble the product, how much to use, what never to combine with it. In Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., a telescope that was safe if properly assembled injured the plaintiff’s eye because its sun filter was not properly installed, and the court held the telescope defective without proper instructions for installing the filter.57 The telescope was not a compound, so the case does not apply § 397, but it shows why directions carry independent weight. A product can be safe when used correctly and unreasonably dangerous when users are left to guess what correct use is. For a product whose contents are hidden, the guesswork is harder still, because the user lacks even the knowledge of what the product is made of that might guide a sensible guess.
Hidden contents also bear on users who are unusually sensitive to an ingredient. In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that a manufacturer may know, or be under a duty to discover, that some possible users are especially susceptible to harm from an ingredient to which a substantial percentage of the population is allergic or otherwise sensitive, and it said that the maker must then take reasonable precautions, by warning or otherwise.58 A person allergic to an ingredient can avoid it only by knowing it is present, and a secret or unintelligible formula withholds that knowledge, so the protective step has to come from the maker.
An exam stem that mentions a printed ingredient list invites the conclusion that § 397 does not apply. The question under the section is whether the expected lawful users would understand the formula. A list of chemical names that a household user cannot interpret leaves the section in play, while a plain statement of a familiar substance takes the product outside it.
Section 397 is a negligence rule, so the plaintiff must still prove that the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care in adopting the formula or in conveying directions, and strict liability under § 402A remains a separate claim. The usual exam error is to apply the section to every chemical product, when its trigger is a composition that the expected lawful users cannot assess for themselves. Where that feature is missing, the analysis returns to the knowledge, manufacture, and design rules taught in the neighboring sections.
Negligent Design
Section 398 makes the manufacturer of a chattel built under a plan or design that makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured liable for physical harm to those the manufacturer should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, when the harm results from a failure to exercise reasonable care in adopting a safe plan or design.60 The section looks at a decision made before any unit exists, the choice of what the product will be. It sits beside the two manufacturer rules taught above. Section 394 asks what the maker knew about danger when it supplied the chattel, and § 395 asks whether the maker took care in producing it.61 Section 398 reaches a failure that neither rule catches, one in which every unit comes off the line exactly as intended and the intended product is itself the problem. A maker can therefore answer a § 395 claim by showing careful production and still face § 398, because careful execution of a careless design leaves the design careless.
The law places this duty on the maker because of what a design decision is. A design is chosen once and then reproduced in every unit, so a single choice fixes the risk for the whole product line, and a precaution adopted at the drawing stage protects every later user at the price of one decision. A product’s design predetermines the extent to which its use will result in human injury, and modern products liability law rests on the premise that manufacturers are fairly held to answer in the courts for the basic safety of their designs, although judicial oversight of design choices is a relatively new phenomenon.62 Downstream parties have no comparable power. A user cannot redesign a punch press, and a dealer who resells the finished product has no say in how it was configured. The § 398 claim remains one in negligence, so the plaintiff must show that the maker’s choice of design fell short of reasonable care. Strict liability under § 402A, which defines liability by the product’s defective condition, is a separate claim outside § 398.
Reasonable care in design is measured as it is elsewhere in negligence, by weighing the burden of the precaution the maker failed to adopt against the safety benefit it would have produced, with the type, likelihood, and gravity of the harm setting how much precaution is called for.63 In a design case the precaution is a safer alternative, so the weighing compares the product as built with a feasible alternative: how much the alternative would have reduced the risk, what it would have cost, and what it would have done to the product’s usefulness. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability states the modern test in comparative terms. A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design and the omission of that design renders the product not reasonably safe, and the comparison between the alternative and the design that caused the injury is made from the viewpoint of a reasonable person.64 An alternative that would cripple what the product is for, or cost far more than the injuries it would prevent, says little about the maker’s care, while a cheap change that would have prevented grave injury says a good deal. A label about the danger answers the § 388 question about information but leaves the § 398 question untouched, since § 398 asks whether the design itself reflected reasonable care.
The foreseeability limits that bound negligent manufacture bound the design duty as well. Where it is reasonably foreseeable that a product will be used for some purpose other than the one for which it is sold, the manufacturer must use due care to make it reasonably safe for that purpose, and where misuse is reasonably foreseeable the maker generally must reduce the risk consistent with principles of reasonable foreseeability and reasonable care.65 Foreseeability only marks which uses and plaintiffs count, because the risk must be unreasonable as well as foreseeable before liability follows. The persons covered are those the maker should expect to use the chattel and those it should expect to be endangered by its probable use, so a bystander beside the machine stands where its operator stands.
The design duty also has to reckon with dangers that are plain to see. The logic of § 388(b), which asks whether users will realize a danger on their own, points the same way: a user who sees a risk can guard against it, and an obvious danger seems to leave little for the maker to correct.66 Some jurisdictions go further and, by statute or doctrine, take patent or obvious risks outside the manufacturer’s duty.
Olson v. U.S. Industries shows the design claim failing under such a statute. The plaintiff had copied, modified, and built a plunger machine for the company he later sued, had run it successfully for more than four years, and was hurt when he started it with his hands beneath the plunger. The federal district court held that, under the Kansas Product Liability Act, the defendant owed him no duty to guard or warn against the patent, open, and obvious danger of activating the machine with his hands in that position.67 The Act provides that a manufacturer’s duties do not include warning or safeguarding against patent, open, or obvious risks that a reasonable user should have realized, and it measures the duty against the training, experience, and special knowledge of the user.68 Because the plaintiff had built the machine himself, there was nothing the maker needed to tell him, and the information gap that gives a duty its purpose had closed.
The rule shows its weakness when it is stretched beyond facts like those. Visibility answers whether a user could see the danger; it does not answer whether the maker could have removed the danger at modest cost, and a danger can be obvious and still unnecessary. A rule that ends the duty whenever the risk is plain lets the maker skip the weighing of a cheap fix altogether, and a user who sees the danger may be unable to act on that knowledge because the user cannot change the product. Under a risk-utility approach, obviousness takes its place inside the balance. An obvious danger is one that users can often avoid by their own care, which lowers the likelihood of the harm a safer design would prevent, and the user’s appreciation of the risk may bear on the user’s own fault. It does not remove the question whether a reasonable alternative design existed.
The earth mover and the Kansas plunger machine sit on opposite sides of the line for reasons the facts reveal. In Olson the person hurt had built the machine and understood it thoroughly, and the statute removed the risk from the maker’s duty. The ground worker is a stranger to the design who can do nothing about it, and nothing in those facts suggests a statute excluding obvious risks, so whether the maker adopted a reasonable plan goes to the balance. Where a jurisdiction has enacted a provision like Kansas’s, the provision controls the scope of the duty, so an answer must say which rule governs before it weighs anything.
The usual exam error is to stop at the observation that the danger was obvious and conclude that the maker owed nothing, when the question under § 398 is whether a reasonable maker would have adopted a safer plan. The opposite error treats every injury from a dangerous product as proof of a bad design, which skips step four. A design that carries a risk satisfies § 398 if the burden of the safer alternative outweighed the risk it would have removed.