Concept
Entrusting Chattels to Incompetents
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Entrusting Chattels to Incompetents
Section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts shifts the inquiry from the chattel to the person who will use it. A supplier who furnishes a chattel, directly or through a third person, for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely, because of youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and to others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use is subject to liability for the physical harm that results.1 Section 388 and its neighbors ask what the supplier knows about the chattel. Section 390 asks what the supplier knows about the user, and the chattel itself may be perfectly sound. A student who combs the facts for a product defect has misread the problem. The danger sits in the recipient, and liability depends on whether the supplier knew it or had reason to know it.
Because the danger sits in the recipient, a warning about the chattel cannot cure it. The comment to § 390 explains why: a supplier who hands a chattel to someone who knows its exact character and condition may not assume that the person will use it safely if the supplier knows or has reason to know that the person is likely to use it dangerously, as where the person has a propensity or fixed purpose to misuse it.2 The only precaution that protects anyone is declining to hand the chattel over. Courts look to § 390 for the tort of negligent entrustment as it applies to incompetent or inexperienced recipients.3
The word negligent carries weight. Liability under § 390 rests on the supplier's act of supplying, with the knowledge the section requires, and not on the user's carelessness alone. That sets the tort apart from product-defect liability. Section 402A, as Prosser drafted it, imposed liability on the manufacturers and distributors of a defective product for the harm the defect caused, regardless of fault or privity.4 Entrustment liability turns instead on the supplier's fault in choosing the recipient, and the plaintiff must prove what the supplier knew or had reason to know about that person. Three questions follow: who counts as an unfit recipient, who may recover, and how much the supplier must know.
Youth, Inexperience, or Otherwise
The text names youth and inexperience and then adds “or otherwise,” which turns a list into a standard. Any recipient whom the supplier has reason to see as likely to use the chattel unsafely falls within the section, whatever the cause. The reported decisions, several of them gathered in Casebolt v. Cowan, sort into the same three groups, and the Restatement's own illustration of the third group shows how far the phrase reaches. A father sells or gives a car to his adult son, knowing that the son is an epileptic who intends to drive it. The son suffers a seizure at the wheel, loses control, and injures a third person, and the father is subject to liability to that person.5 The son is neither young nor inexperienced. His unfitness is a medical condition that the father knew about.
Youth is the plain case. In Axelson v. Williamson, a car was entrusted to a fifteen-year-old girl who lost control and crashed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that the tort of negligent entrustment “as it applies to the entrustment of a chattel to an incompetent or inexperienced person is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390.”6 A 1980 decision found a cause of action under § 390 where a fourteen-year-old girl was loaned a car, and another court held that a supplier of cigarettes to minors could be liable under the section.7
Inexperience works the same way when the supplier can see it. In Johnson v. Casetta, the seller of an automobile was liable to a third party whom the purchaser injured, because the seller knew that the purchaser was inexperienced and incompetent to operate the car.8
The residual group is the widest. In Allen v. Toledo, a father who had entrusted a truck to his adult son, knowing or having reason to know that the son was a reckless driver, was liable for the death of a woman the son killed with it.9 In Arkansas Bank & Trust Co. v. Erwin, the court applied § 390 where the plaintiff alleged that the driver was incompetent by reason of insanity caused by a schizophrenic reaction.10 Sanders v. Walden adds another automobile case to the line.
What joins the groups is the supplier's reason to expect unsafe use. Youth, inexperience, and the other conditions matter only as reasons for that likelihood, and none of them creates liability by itself. Sellers, lenders, and donors all count as suppliers.11 Entrustment by loan is a bailment, the bailor-bailee relationship that the weight of authority also finds when a bank customer rents a safe deposit box.12
Who May Recover
The section protects two groups: the recipient, and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by the use of the chattel.13 The first phrase reaches those who join the use, such as a passenger riding with the recipient, and the second reaches bystanders. The injured third person in each Restatement illustration belongs to this class. The recipient is protected as well. A supplier who knows that the recipient's condition leaves the recipient incapable of exercising the care reasonably expected of a normal sober adult may be liable for the harm the recipient suffers.14 The knowledge that makes the risk to others foreseeable makes the risk to the recipient foreseeable too. A supplier who knows the recipient lacks capacity cannot treat the recipient's own caution as a safeguard, since that caution is exactly what the supplier has reason to think is missing.
Both claims in that scene rest on a single finding: the supplier had reason to know that the recipient was likely to use the chattel unsafely. The harm must also result from that unsafe use, as the epileptic's seizure did in the Restatement illustration.
The Knowledge Requirement
Knowledge is the limiting element, because the supplier's fault lies in the choice to hand over the chattel, and a choice can be faulted only on the information the chooser had. Section 388(a) frames the same inquiry about the chattel: the supplier must know or have reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.15 Section 390 asks the question about the person, and it offers the same two routes: actual knowledge of the recipient's unfitness, or information from which the supplier should have recognized it.16 The fact that usually relieves a supplier under § 388, that users understand the chattel, does nothing here, since the comment forbids the supplier to assume safe use by a recipient the supplier has reason to see as likely to misuse it.17
Visible impairment supplies the second route. In Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., the Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc. court treated § 390 as the best summary of the claim where the recipient of a gun was visibly intoxicated.18 The failing cases show the other side. In Mele v. Turner, the Washington Supreme Court held a § 390 theory improper because the actor had no obvious physical or mental impairments.19 In Wise, a wife who merely co-owned a gun as community property faced a negligent entrustment claim after her estranged husband used it in a sniper attack on passing motorists, and the court found no facts suggesting that she knew or should have known he was a danger to others.20
The knowledge must also attach to the person who receives the chattel, because the text speaks of “another” whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely to misuse it.21 The handgun litigation shows the consequence. In Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply negligent entrustment to a claim that handgun manufacturers marketed their products negligently so as to facilitate illegal use, because the manufacturers had not entrusted guns to specific individuals known to be dangerous but only to a class of persons who were perhaps dangerous as a class. General awareness that some buyers misuse a product is a fact about a market, and a supplier cannot act on it by refusing anyone in particular. Awareness about the person at the counter is a fact the supplier can act on. A rule that treated the first kind of awareness as enough would turn every sale of a product that some buyers misuse into an entrustment.
Step two does for the recipient what § 388(a) does for the chattel, and no step asks whether the chattel was defective.