Concept
Relationship to the Endangered Person
Duty to control the conduct of third persons
Relationship to the Endangered Person
Section 315 offers a plaintiff two routes to a duty, and the second runs through the victim instead of the wrongdoer. Under § 315(b), a defendant must protect against a third person's conduct when a special relation between the defendant and the endangered person gives that person a right to protection.1 The first route, § 315(a), asks about the defendant's tie to the person who will cause the harm; the previous section took it up.2 A dissent in Doe v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center states the division plainly: either the defendant's relationship with the third person requires the defendant to control that person, or the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff requires the defendant to protect the plaintiff from that person's conduct.3 One route is enough, so a claim that fails under (a) is not finished until its facts have been tested under (b).
The second route dispenses with power over the wrongdoer. A claim under § 315(b) can succeed against a defendant who has no authority over the attacker, has never met the attacker, and could not have named the attacker beforehand. What it needs is a relationship with the victim of a kind that entitles the victim to expect protection from the defendant. That requirement does the stopping-point work that custody did under § 315(a), from the opposite end: § 315(a) singles out the one defendant positioned to restrain the dangerous person, and § 315(b) singles out the people to whom a defendant's protective duty runs. A defendant answers to those in the relationship, and not to everyone who might be hurt.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the relationship, and because each special relation is an exception to the no-duty default, courts construe it narrowly.4 They accordingly hesitate to recognize protective relationships outside the established categories. In Hurn v. Greenway, the Alaska Supreme Court found no special relationship between a property owner and either the victim or the attacker, and added that the attack was unrelated to possession of the land and was unforeseeable. In Ouch v. Khea, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a driver owed no duty to protect passengers who belonged to the same street gang from criminal acts by rival gang members.5 In each case the court looked for a recognized kind of relationship and found none.
Three groups of cases show the relationship at work: businesses and their patrons, landlords and tenants, and the settings in which schools, employers, and custodians take charge of others. In each group the questions are why the relationship supports a duty and how far the duty reaches.
Businesses and Their Patrons
A business open to the public stands in the § 315(b) relation to its patrons, because the relationship gives them a right to protection.6 Patron claims against a business take two forms. In one, the patron says the business failed to take reasonable measures to reduce the likelihood of dangerous criminal activity on its premises. In the other, the patron says the business's own actions, or an employee's, in the face of a crime negligently endangered the patron.7 Most of the doctrine concerns the first form, so it comes first here; the second closes the section as a preview of a theory developed later in the chapter.
The cases suggest three points at which a business's duty of care may operate: discovering the dangerous person, becoming aware of that person's dangerous character, and warning those at risk.8 The shopkeeper noticed the man and said nothing, so the missing warning is the plain gap.
Control and dependence help explain why the law asks this of a business. A business decides how its premises are arranged and staffed, while a patron, a short-term visitor, can neither hire a guard nor repair a lock. The same feature limits the duty: where a business lacks control, as the drug store in Williams (below) did, a court may decline to impose it.
Courts divide over how foreseeable a third party's misconduct must be before the duty arises. In Marshall v. Burger King Corp., a customer was killed when a car crashed through the wall of a fast-food restaurant. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the duty extended to protecting customers from the negligent acts of third persons even though the restaurant had no notice of prior similar incidents. It overruled precedents requiring particularized notice of the type of harm and adopted a broad foreseeability test, reading comment f to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 to call for an inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances of the accident. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 40(b)(3) (2012) supports the same general duty of care.9
Each approach has its own logic. A prior-incidents requirement gives a business a concrete trigger and gives a court a simple question, since before any similar crime the business has nothing specific to guard against. Its cost is that the first victim recovers nothing and a business has little reason to examine its own risks. An all-circumstances inquiry reaches the first occurrence by looking at the location, the nature of the business, and the layout of the premises, but it makes outcomes harder to predict. A restaurant that has never had a car through its wall faces no duty on the first approach and may still owe care on the second. Labels do not always predict results, either: in Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, the Texas Supreme Court, while purporting to apply a general foreseeability test, noted that the defendant actually knew the harm to the plaintiff was imminent.10 On an exam, name the jurisdiction's test and apply it to what the facts say about the business's knowledge and surroundings.
Whether the risk was foreseeable and what precautions the duty demands are separate questions, and two decisions show the second most clearly. In Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co., a customer was raped in her parked car in a parking ramp, and the Minnesota Supreme Court imposed a duty of care on the operator or owner of the facility. The court expressed the duty as reasonable care to deter and left the jury to weigh “the likelihood of the risk with the financial and practical feasibility of the means to meet that risk.” In Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., the Michigan Supreme Court found that the proprietor of a drug store in a high-crime area owed no duty to hire armed guards to deter robberies and associated violence; the defendant lacked sufficient control, and any such duty would have been difficult to apply.11
The decisions are consistent because neither makes the business a guarantor. Erickson leaves the choice of measures to be judged by likelihood against feasibility, and Williams rejects one particular precaution. The two reasons Williams gave suggest a way to reconcile the results. A ramp is a bounded structure its operator controls, so modest measures can plausibly reduce the risk and a jury can weigh them. The drug store's risk came from a neighborhood it did not control, and the demanded precaution was expensive and hard to define: how many guards, armed in what circumstances, at what hours?
The second kind of claim asks nothing about missing precautions. It asks only what the business did.
That claim rests on the business's own affirmative act. The no-duty default discussed earlier in this chapter does not govern it, because the business added a danger instead of failing to remove one. The governing theory is § 303: an act is negligent if the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.12 Later parts of this chapter develop that rule. For now, label each patron claim as a missing-measures claim, which depends on the relationship and the balance described above, or a conduct claim, which rests on what the business did.
Landlords and Tenants
Landlord and tenant is one relationship courts have placed under § 315(b)'s right-to-protection language.15 In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp. and several later cases involving residential leases, courts held that a landlord must take reasonable steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third parties.16 The Nebraska Supreme Court reached the same classification through the Third Restatement: it counts the landlord and its tenants among the special relationships it has adopted, each of which puts the actor in a position to exercise some degree of control.17
The control that matters is control over the building, not over the criminal. A landlord has no authority over an intruder, so § 315(a) cannot carry the claim, and the tenant's case rests on the landlord's relationship to the endangered person. What the landlord does control are the entrances, locks, and common hallways, which a tenant cannot alter and must accept as the landlord maintains them. The duty therefore falls on the party able to maintain those conditions and runs to the people who depend on them. Because it rests on control of the premises, it reaches only as far as the measures the landlord could reasonably take, the same limit that applied to businesses.
Courts have offered three recurring justifications for the duty, each resting on a different feature of the landlord's position:
- An express or implied contractual duty, the basis in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc. and Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp.18
- A duty arising from the landlord-tenant relationship itself, which Kline analogized to the innkeeper-guest relationship.19
- A duty based on the landlord's retention of control of the common areas, the basis in Scott v. Watson and Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc.20
The theories ask the plaintiff to show different things. A contract theory looks to what the lease promised or implied, the innkeeper analogy looks to the status of the relationship, and the common-area theory looks to what the landlord retained control of, so it fits a lobby or hallway more naturally than a problem inside a single unit. An answer should name the theory the facts support.
Kline and its progeny emphasize several factors in deciding whether to impose liability.21 Four recur, and each ties the duty to something the landlord could have done.
The first is degeneration of security arrangements after the letting, meaning after the tenant took possession. In Kline the court was significantly influenced by the fact that the security at the apartment complex had substantially degenerated between the time the tenant moved in and the time she was assaulted in the hallway of her building. The court stressed the tenant's reasonable and justified expectation that the landlord's security measures would not be reduced during the term, and it held that a landlord has an implied obligation to take protective measures within the landlord's reasonable capacity.22 Degradation matters because the tenant relied on a level of protection that the landlord then took away. The limit to reasonable capacity keeps the obligation from becoming a guarantee of safety.
The second is a link between the defect and the crime. In Sherman, a case involving a defective door lock, it was important that the tenant, attacked in a hallway just after entering the building, had actually closed the door behind her, and that the criminal then opened the door behind her and attacked.23 Those facts tie the lock to the attack. Had the tenant left the door standing open, the lock would have explained nothing about how the attacker got in, and the tenant would be asking the landlord to answer for every crime in the building whether or not the repair would have prevented it.
Notice is the third. When the dangerous condition is in a common area, the landlord may be held to have constructive notice of it because the landlord has a duty to inspect the common areas.24 Constructive notice is knowledge the law attributes because a reasonable inspection would have revealed the problem. A landlord can repair only what it knows of or should have found, and the rule keeps a landlord from escaping the duty by not looking at the parts of the building it controls.
Foreseeability is the fourth, and the tenant must establish it, as by showing that crimes of the same or similar character were a frequent occurrence in the area and that the landlord knew or should have known of the situation.25 Because this formulation looks to a pattern of earlier crime, it resembles the prior-incidents approach described for businesses. A landlord who has seen nothing like the attack in the building or its surroundings has nothing specific to guard against. A later section returns to how courts divide over what a plaintiff must show.
Each missing fact corresponds to a factor the cases emphasize. Kline's tenant lived in a complex whose security had degenerated since move-in, and in Sherman the tenant had closed the door and the attacker opened it behind her. An answer on landlord liability should look for the fact that carries each factor before concluding that the landlord breached any duty.
Some courts place the landlord's security duty in the implied warranty of habitability, the promise the law reads into a residential lease that the premises will be fit to live in. Trentacost v. Brussel belongs to this line, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals in Martin v. Rankin Circle Apartments acknowledged that some states analyze a landlord's liability for third-party crime against tenants as part of the warranty of habitability.26 On that theory the security duty is a term the law implies into the lease.
Most of the cases involve a landlord's failure to repair or install locks on the doors to common entryways or to the leased premises, situations in which the burden of acting is minimal and the foreseeability of harm from doing nothing is reasonably clear.27 What remains unclear, whichever theory a court uses, is the breadth of circumstances in which it will impose liability on the landlord.28 A tenant who points to a missing or broken lock therefore stands on firm ground, while a tenant who says the landlord should have hired patrols or installed cameras is asking for something the cases do not clearly resolve.
Schools, Employers, and Custodians
Section 315(b) lists no relationships, and the Restatement (Third) is candid about what its own label means: “special relationship” has no independent significance and merely signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship where otherwise no duty would exist under § 37.31 The phrase therefore proves nothing by itself; the work lies in showing why a particular relationship supports a duty. Nebraska's highest court, in Bell v. Grow With Me Childcare, lists the relationships it has adopted from the Third Restatement: school and students, employer and employees, landlord and tenants, and custodian and those in custody. All share the characteristic that the actor is in a position to exercise some degree of control over the other person.32 Landlords have been treated above, so this subsection takes the other three.
In each of these relationships the defendant is not the source of the harm, yet because of the defendant's relationship to the victim, courts impose a duty to take affirmative steps to minimize or avert it.33 The reasons differ by relationship, and they are what a court weighs when asked to recognize a new one.
An employer owes protection to its employees because the employer is uniquely situated to mitigate the harm and the employee is on the premises for the employer's benefit.34 The first reason concerns capacity: the employer controls the premises and the means of rescue, and a worker in trouble has few alternatives. The second concerns fairness: the employer collects the benefit of the employee's presence and can fairly bear the cost of reasonable protection. Bell counts the employer-employee relationship among those it has adopted.35 The employer appeared earlier in this chapter on the other side of the triangle, where the question was what an employer must do about a dangerous employee. Here the employee is the endangered person, and an answer should say which of the two questions the facts raise.
A school stands in a comparable position toward its students. The duty rests on the fact that school officials take charge of children with knowledge of their need for protection.36 Parents place a child in the school's charge for the day, and a child cannot be expected to arrange protection for herself. Bell likewise lists the school and its students among the recognized relationships.37 Because § 315(b) protects the endangered person from a third person's conduct, the relationship also supports a claim that a school failed to protect a child from other people. Foreseeability and the content of reasonable care still limit that duty, as the next two sections show.
A custodian owes protection to a person held in custody, and the duty is premised on the custodian's having taken charge of the person and deprived him of the ability to act for his own protection.38 The prisoner cannot summon a physician, leave the cell, or insist on being seen, which leaves the institution that controls those things as the only source of help. Custody appeared earlier in this chapter from the other direction, where taking charge of a dangerous person brought a duty to control that person. Here the person in custody is the one in danger, and Bell lists the custodian and those in its custody among the relationships that support an affirmative duty.39 Because the duty rests on the custodial relationship itself, the first question in a custody case is whether the defendant had actually taken charge of the person who was harmed.40
The two scenes involve the same inaction in front of the same kind of assault, so the relationship carries the whole difference. Control takes a different form in each recognized relationship: the employer controls the premises and the means of rescue, and the school and the custodian control the daily circumstances of someone placed in their charge. Dependence reinforces control in the school and custody cases, where officials take charge of children with knowledge of their need for protection and a custodian deprives the prisoner of the ability to act for his own protection.41 Benefit adds a further reason in the employer case.42 The pedestrian has none of these: no control over the victim's circumstances, no one placed in the pedestrian's charge, and no benefit from the victim's presence. Every onlooker shares the ability to help, so a duty resting on it would run from everyone able to intervene and would give a court no way to say which onlooker should have acted. That is the stopping-point problem behind the default rule.
The list of recognized relationships is open at the edges. The Third Restatement cautions that its list is not exclusive, and courts may recognize other areas for affirmative duties for reasons of policy or principle.43 In practice courts move cautiously, as Hurn and Ouch show. A party who wants a court to add a relationship must therefore show the features that run through the recognized ones, meaning the defendant's control over the endangered person's circumstances and that person's dependence on the defendant for protection. A defendant's ability to have helped describes every bystander and supplies neither. Recognizing the relationship settles only that a duty exists; whether the harm was foreseeable and what reasonable care demanded are the questions that follow.