Concept
Plaintiff Versus Harm Foreseeability
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
Plaintiff Versus Harm Foreseeability
Negligence law asks two foreseeability questions and answers them in opposite ways. The first concerns people: was this plaintiff within the risk? Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281(b) frames it as a requirement that the actor's conduct be negligent with respect to the plaintiff, or to a class of persons within which the plaintiff is included.1 A plaintiff inside the endangered class passes and a plaintiff outside it fails, which is the contrast between MacPherson and Palsgraf. The second question concerns the injury, and § 435(1) answers it in the plaintiff's favor: when the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen "the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred" does not prevent liability.2
The two rules coexist because they operate at different stages. Whether the plaintiff was within the risk is a threshold, and the plaintiff clears it or does not. Once the plaintiff clears it, the extent of the injury and the route it took no longer decide liability. A defendant can therefore win by showing that the plaintiff stood outside the danger, but not by showing that the injury was larger or stranger than anyone expected. The type of harm is a separate and harder question, taken up at the end of this unit.
Extent of harm shows the contrast most sharply. A plaintiff inside the endangered class who suffers far more than anyone would have predicted can still recover, because § 435(1) lists "the extent of the harm" among the things the defendant need not have foreseen.3 The best-known application is the eggshell-skull rule: the defendant takes the plaintiff as the defendant finds her.
Palsgraf shows why the plaintiff question works as a threshold. The railroad owed Mrs. Palsgraf, who stood on its platform, a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid subjecting people to foreseeable risks of harm.4 Cardozo may be read as holding that the railroad did not breach that duty, because harm to her was not a foreseeable risk of what its guards did, so the railroad was not negligent in relation to her.5 The risk the guards created was injury to the passenger or his package. They would not have anticipated injury to her, and she was an "unforeseeable plaintiff" to whom no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated.6
A court may call the failure one of duty, breach, or proximate cause, but the basis for the majority's result is the same: Mrs. Palsgraf was an unforeseeable plaintiff as a matter of law.7 Cardozo did not think reasonable people could disagree that injury to her was not even remotely foreseeable, so he left nothing for a jury. Andrews thought such injury was remotely foreseeable and, because other factors such as her closeness in time and space mattered, treated proximate cause as a jury question.8 The reasoning turns on the plaintiff's position relative to the risk, not on the severity of her injury. A student who writes only that the injury was unforeseeable, and so no duty arose, skips the step that matters, which is to say what was unforeseeable: the plaintiff's presence in the danger area, the plaintiff's vulnerability, or the way the accident unfolded.
Defendants also argue that the accident unfolded in too freakish a way to have been anticipated, and § 435(1) answers that argument. One court described the section as designed to keep defendants from escaping liability merely by showing that an accident of the particular kind, in the specific manner, could not have been expected from conduct that was both negligent and a substantial factor in the harm. The same court conceded that the question grows difficult when injuries are unusual in nature or extent or arrive in some bizarre and unexpected way.9
The working question is whether the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye, not whether the defendant could have predicted the particular sequence. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., the cologne case, made the point with Cardozo's own words from Palsgraf: "It was not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye."10 The manner rule and the unforeseeable-plaintiff rule thus come from the same opinion, and they do not conflict.
The general-danger test has an outer edge, and it concerns the type of harm. In the Wagon Mound, the Privy Council held that the plaintiff could recover only for the injuries the defendant should have anticipated when it released oil into the water. The oil fouled the slips of the plaintiff's dock, a foreseeable consequence for which the defendant was liable; the unforeseeable fire that destroyed the dock was not.11 The dock owner's position was not the problem. The kind of harm was. Telling a different type of harm from a larger amount of the same harm, or from the same harm by an odd route, is the difficult part, and this unit only flags it.