Concept
Duty to Foreseeable Plaintiffs
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
Duty to Foreseeable Plaintiffs
MacPherson lifted the privity bar and left a harder question: how far past the buyer does a careless manufacturer's duty run? Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 states the general framework for liability for an invasion of another's interest.1 One of its requirements, § 281(b), is that the actor's conduct be negligent with respect to the other person, or a class of persons within which the other is included.2
That clause is the foreseeable-plaintiff limit, and it makes negligence relational. Conduct is careless toward the people it endangers; carelessness toward them does not make it careless toward everyone. Products cases apply the same logic. Lack of privity is no defense to a negligence claim, because a manufacturer owes due care to any foreseeable plaintiff, whether user, consumer, or bystander, and not only to the immediate purchaser.3 Buick's failure to inspect its wheel was negligent toward the people who would drive its cars, a class that included MacPherson although Buick could not have named him. Stated generally, manufacturers must use reasonable care in designing, making, and marketing products to protect foreseeable victims from foreseeable risks of harm.4
The risk defines the class. In Dillon v. Legg, a bystander emotional-distress case, the California Supreme Court explained that a defendant owes a duty only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and hence negligent, in the first instance.5 Whoever sits inside that risk is owed the duty. The zone of risk is not a matter of distance alone: a plaintiff to whom danger is extended through acts of third persons, forces of nature, or the plaintiff's own responses is inside it, so long as those things were foreseeable.6
A plaintiff who was a stranger to the defendant, unknown and unknowable when the carelessness occurred, is not outside the duty for that reason. The word "class" in § 281(b) says so, and it matters as much as the word "foreseeable."
The same reasoning reaches people who never took part in the sale. In Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., children injured by blasting caps sued the manufacturers, who answered that the children were neither purchasers nor intended users and that their injuries were therefore unforeseeable as a matter of law.7 The court recast the argument as a question of duty, finally one of law and public policy, and analyzed foreseeability in terms of the likelihood of harm if reasonable care was not used and the manufacturer's knowledge of the risk.8 Neither inquiry turns on whether the child bought the product or could have been identified in advance. Both turn on the danger the product carries and what the maker knew of it, so a child standing outside the chain of sale can still belong to the endangered class.
The mirror image is the plaintiff who falls outside the class. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., which a later section covers in full, is the classic example. There a push to a passenger carrying an ordinary-looking package set off fireworks inside it, and the blast toppled scales onto a woman standing far down the platform. Cardozo wrote that "the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty."9 A later court quoted that line while stating the test of negligence as whether the wrongdoer could have anticipated and foreseen the likelihood of harm to the injured person from his act.10 A plaintiff outside that orbit has no claim for the defendant's carelessness, however real the injury.
Foreseeability in this section attaches to the plaintiff or the class, and it does not require the defendant to have foreseen the exact way the injury would happen. As the Hall court put it, the fact that the conduct might not reasonably be foreseen to result in the particular harm, or to cause harm in the particular manner that occurred, does not preclude liability.11 A later section on plaintiff versus harm foreseeability develops that distinction. Students err on either side of it. Some deny a duty because the defendant could not have named the plaintiff, and others confuse the question whether this plaintiff was in the danger zone with the question whether the specific mechanism of injury was predictable.
Section 281 has other requirements, taught elsewhere. Subsection (c) asks whether the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, which belongs to the causation reading, and subsection (d) asks whether the plaintiff has so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing the action, which belongs with defenses.12