Concept
Limits on the Manufacturer's Duty
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
Limits on the Manufacturer's Duty
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. made privity irrelevant in negligence: a manufacturer owes due care to any foreseeable plaintiff, whether user, consumer, or bystander, and not only to the immediate purchaser.1 The duty still has edges. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281(b), liability requires that the actor's conduct be negligent with respect to the plaintiff or to a class of persons within which the plaintiff is included.2
Two limits follow, and each asks a different question. The first asks who in the chain of production owes the duty. Buick answered for the finished car even though it had bought the wheel from an outside manufacturer, and Cardozo left open whether the wheel maker owes the same duty to the ultimate user. The second asks what kind of danger caused the injury. The MacPherson duty guards against hidden defects, and it does not require a manufacturer to make a product safer against a danger that is open and obvious to everyone.
Component-Part Makers
Cardozo tied his holding to a particular defendant. The court was "dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers," and if that maker is negligent where danger is to be foreseen, liability follows.3 Buick had bought its wheels from a reputable manufacturer, so the first question was whether that purchase relieved it of any duty to inspect. Cardozo said no. Buick was not merely a dealer in automobiles; it was a manufacturer responsible for the finished product, and it could not put the car on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests.4
The reason is practical. Buick sold the car to be used without inspection by its customers,5 so the assembler held the last realistic chance to test the parts that went into it. Cardozo sharpened the point by contrasting Carlson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., where the defendant had bought a tool for a servant's use. Making tools was not that defendant's business, so reliance on the toolmaker's skill was proper and almost inevitable. Buick's position was different, because both by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business it was charged with a stricter duty.6 A supplier's good name may reassure a buyer outside the trade. It does not replace the tests an assembler must run itself.
Cardozo then marked the edge of what he was deciding. The court was not required "at this time" to say that it is legitimate to go back of the finished-product maker and hold the makers of component parts. He saw a difficulty: for a component maker's negligence to cause imminent danger, an independent cause must often intervene, because the finished-product maker must also fail in its own duty of inspection. In those circumstances, he suggested, the earlier maker's negligence might be too remote to be an actionable wrong as to the ultimate user.7 That difficulty did not arise in MacPherson, where there was no break in the chain of cause and effect.8 The holding therefore reaches Buick, whose own omitted inspection left the defect in the car, and it says nothing either way about the wheel maker.
The reservation did not last. In Smith v. Peerless Glass Co. (N.Y. 1932), the court allowed a direct negligence action against the manufacturer of a component part, the position the wheel maker occupied in MacPherson. Later cases extended MacPherson incrementally, and today every American jurisdiction follows it.9 The class test in § 281(b) points the same way: a driver of a car fitted with the defective wheel belongs to the class of persons that the wheel maker's carelessness puts at risk.10 The assembler's inspection is a second safeguard that may fail, and it does not excuse the first maker's own negligence.
A student who stops reading at the MacPherson opinion may conclude that component makers escape liability. The reservation recorded an open question, and the answer that followed imposes a direct duty. That answer also leaves the assembler's duty untouched, because Buick's responsibility for the finished product never depended on whether its supplier could be sued. Both makers can be defendants on the same injury, and each answers on the ordinary showing that its own work was negligent and caused the harm.
Obvious Dangers
Campo v. Scofield, decided by New York's Court of Appeals in 1950, marks where the MacPherson duty stops. A manufacturer has satisfied the law when it does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for its designed purpose, the machine has no latent defect, and its functioning creates no danger or peril unknown to the user.12 The law has not reached the point of requiring a manufacturer to make a machine accident proof or foolproof, and a manufacturer owes no duty to render an article "more" safe as long as the danger to be avoided is "obvious and patent to all."13 A latent defect is a flaw that cannot be seen by looking at the product. A patent danger is open and apparent to anyone who meets it.
The court's illustrations show the limit at work. A manufacturer that makes an axe, a buzz saw, or an airplane with an exposed propeller properly and free of defects is not liable when a user is cut by the axe or the saw, or when someone working around the airplane touches the propeller. The maker may expect such persons to do everything necessary to avoid contact, because the very nature of the article gives notice and warning of the injuries to be expected.14
The limit tracks who can prevent the harm. A user cannot see a latent defect and so cannot guard against it, and the cases accordingly stress the duty of guarding against hidden defects and giving notice of concealed dangers. Campo gave as examples improperly packed electric transformers, the defective automobile wheel in MacPherson, an imperfectly made coffee urn, a defective aerated-water bottle, and an imperfectly built scaffold.15 It added that several of the cases declare a duty owed only if the defect or danger is not "known" or "patent" or discoverable "by a reasonable inspection."16 For the English treatment of the same hidden-defect limit, compare Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills.
The limit also reflects who should decide how safe a product must be. Campo called an accident-proof product a "desirable aim" but held that no such obligation has been, or may be, imposed by judicial decision.17 In Evans v. General Motors Corp., the court relied on Campo to hold that a manufacturer need not make its automobile accident-proof or fool-proof, nor render it "more" safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all. Requiring cars in which it would be safe to collide might be desirable, the court said, but that would be a legislative function and not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.18
Compare the claim against Buick with a claim against the maker of a properly built buzz saw whose blade cuts its user. Campo counts the defective wheel among its hidden-defect cases, where the maker's care in manufacture and inspection is the only protection the user has. An exposed blade announces its own danger, and the user can keep clear of it, so the maker has nothing further to guard against. The first question in any problem built on these cases is whether the plaintiff met a concealed danger or an open one.
Two mistakes recur on exams. The first treats a dangerous-looking product as a complete defense, when the conditions in Campo are cumulative: the product must be free of latent defects, and its functioning must create no peril unknown to the user. The hypothetical shows that an obviously dangerous product can still carry a hidden flaw, and the hidden flaw is what MacPherson reaches. The second mistake treats foreseeable injury as enough to require a redesign. The user of an exposed saw is the most foreseeable plaintiff imaginable, and the class test of § 281(b) is easily met.19 The claim fails anyway, because the maker made no careless defect and the danger was open.