Concept
Negligent Acts and Omissions
Duty and negligent conduct framework
Negligent Acts and Omissions
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sorts negligent conduct into two forms. The first is an act that the actor, as a reasonable person, should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of another's interest.1 The second is a failure to do an act that is necessary for the protection or assistance of another and that the actor is under a duty to do.2 The first clause asks what the actor should have seen. The second asks what the actor was bound to do. Every problem in this area therefore begins with a sorting question: did the defendant do something that created a danger, or fail to do something that would have averted one? A driver who runs a red light acts, and a sunbather who watches a child struggle in the surf does nothing. The first belongs under the act clause and the second under the omission clause.
Form alone does not settle the sorting question, because the Restatement uses the word “tortious” for conduct, “whether of act or omission,” that is of such a character as to subject the actor to liability under tort law.3 A defendant who did nothing therefore stays exposed whenever the law required action, but only then.
The dictionary definitions follow the same split. A negligent act is an act that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another. Its counterpart, the negative act or act of omission, is the failure to do something the law requires: a nonoccurrence that involves the breach of a legal duty to take positive action, in the form of either a forbearance or an omission.4 The phrase “legal duty” does the work that “under a duty to do” does in the omission clause, and it dictates the order of attack. For acts, the question is the risk the actor created. For omissions, the question is where a duty to act could come from. The next two subsections follow that order.
Negligent Acts
The act clause turns on the word recognize. An act is negligent when the actor, as a reasonable person, should recognize that it involves an unreasonable risk of invading another's interest.5 In the usual formulation, negligence is the doing of an act, without wrongful intent, in circumstances where a reasonably prudent person would foresee that the act endangers another.6 A negligent act, in short, is an act that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another.7
Because the test asks what a reasonable person would recognize, the actor's own awareness does not control it. An actor who never noticed the danger answers for it if a reasonable person in the same position would have noticed, and wrongful intent plays no part in the inquiry.8 What the actor knew still matters, because it supplies the circumstances that the reasonable person is taken to share.
Kubert v. Best shows knowledge doing that work. A New Jersey appellate court held that a person sending text messages has a duty not to text someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to know, that the recipient will view the text while driving.9 The knowledge condition is where recognition enters. A texter who knows the recipient is behind the wheel can see that the message invites a look at a screen while the recipient operates a vehicle, so sending it carries a danger the texter should recognize. A texter with neither knowledge nor special reason to know recognizes no such danger, and the identical message to a recipient who happens to be driving is not a negligent act.
Notice works the same way as knowledge. In Vaughan v. Menlove, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant built a hay rick near the boundary of his land, not far from the plaintiff's cottages; that the rick was likely to ignite and endanger the cottages; that the defendant had notice of that danger; and that he was negligent in maintaining the rick in so dangerous a condition.10 The pleading ties negligence to what the defendant knew: a hazard likely to ignite, a neighbor's property in its path, and a defendant on notice of the danger.
Ignorance is the usual reply to a charge of failing to recognize a danger, and it succeeds only when a reasonable person in the actor's position would have been ignorant too. The facts of Gobrecht v. Beckwith test that limit. A landlord installed a gas heater in a closed, almost unventilated bathroom without knowing it would fill the room with carbon monoxide and without inquiring into its safety. His ignorance did not excuse the installation, because a reasonable person would have inquired first, while the tenant, who simply used the bathroom, could reasonably rely on the landlord.
A reasonable person also takes account of what other people will do. Where a danger is quite obvious, the reasonable person may properly expect others to avoid it on their own, and may expect a third person, such as a parent protecting her child from a particular hazard, to guard another against the risk. These are questions of fact, better left to the arguments of counsel than to specific legal rules.11 One court has likewise treated as a jury question whether a reasonable person would have realized that a large, unknown dog roaming free in a small bar with drunken patrons involved an unreasonable risk of harm.12
The setting of the activity can also shape which risks a participant may fairly be charged with. Courts that limit the duty owed among sports participants ground the limit in consent, which makes the participants' reasonable expectations central. Professional football players must expect some rather serious misbehavior, but ping pong players do not expect to be blinded by a thrown paddle, and hunters, though aware of danger from other hunters, are not viewed as consenting to be shot by negligent gunners.13
The act clause covers conduct that creates a danger, which separates it from the omission clause taken up next. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., a radio station's on-air giveaway contest sent listeners racing across public streets, and the court treated the claim as one for creating an unreasonable risk of harm, not for failing to intervene. A driver, a texter, or a broadcaster who creates the danger falls under the act clause, where the question is what the actor should have recognized. The sunbather who only watches falls under the omission clause, where the question is whether the law required the actor to step in.
Negligent Omissions
A negligent omission is a failure to do an act that is necessary for another's protection or assistance and that the actor is under a duty to do.15 The general formula for negligence says the same thing in a parenthesis: negligence is the doing of an act, or the omitting to do an act that some duty requires, without wrongful intent.16 A plaintiff must therefore establish two things: that the act left undone was necessary to protect or help, and that this actor was under a duty to do it. The second requirement carries the case. In most negligence disputes the duty element is a formality, but in classes of cases where the existence of a duty to take action is precisely the issue, duty language is not redundant but essential, and omission cases belong to those classes.17
The law's starting point is that failing to act creates no liability. Courts generally refuse to impose liability for doing nothing, so a person who spends the day inert on a sofa is in an excellent position to avoid tort liability.18 The classic illustration is the callous bystander who watches a blind man walk into a busy street and fails to call out a warning. Our moral sense is repulsed, yet in most states the bystander has no legal duty to protect the blind man and is not liable for failing to do so. A sunbather who watches a child going under the waves likewise has no duty to dive in, throw a life ring, or even notify a nearby lifeguard.19
The rule is not universal, and it is not absolute. Most European countries impose a limited duty to aid, as does Vermont. Most American courts have not rejected the no-duty-to-act rule outright, however; they have nibbled away at it by carving out exceptions.20 An analysis of an omission therefore starts by hunting for the duty. If the facts supply none, the claim fails there, however easy the rescue would have been, and the sunbather's inaction is not negligent conduct at all.
The exception that best illustrates the omission clause arises when the defendant, without negligence, creates the risk that injures the plaintiff. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321, an actor who does an act and later realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.21 The Restatement's illustration is a driver whose truck suddenly becomes disabled on the road and who fails to warn oncoming traffic. The driver, though not negligent, is the author of the risk and owes an affirmative duty to warn other drivers.22 The breakdown gives the act clause nothing to condemn. The failure to warn is the negligent omission, because the warning was necessary to protect approaching motorists and the law placed the duty on the driver.
Section 322 carries the same idea to an injury already inflicted. An actor who has injured another, even without negligence, has an affirmative duty to render assistance to prevent further harm to the injured party. A driver who hits a pedestrian and knocks him into the street must therefore take reasonable steps to protect him from further injury.23 What separates the truck driver and the sunbather is not fault but authorship. The sunbather leaves the sea as he found it, while the driver put the truck in the lane.
The duty in § 321 is a duty of reasonable care, not a guarantee against harm, so breach turns on what the driver did once the risk existed.24
Creating the risk is not the only source of a duty to act, because a special relationship can supply one as well. The Restatement recognizes a duty of care arising from either a special relation between the actor and a third person that imposes a duty to control the third person's conduct, or a special relation between the actor and the other that gives the other a right of protection.25 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California rests on this principle: the court concluded that a psychiatrist's relationship to a dangerous patient gave rise to a duty to warn the patient's intended victim that the patient had threatened to kill her.26 The application has been controversial. Because of the burden the duty imposes, some courts refuse to extend it beyond situations involving a threat to a particular victim, and one has held that a psychiatrist owes no duty to members of the general public in discharging a patient.27
Recognizing a negligent failure does not settle who may recover. One court abrogated a water company's immunity for losses caused by the negligent failure to maintain adequate water pressure for fire fighting, but only to the extent of uninsured or underinsured claims, and it held the insurers' subrogation claims unenforceable against the company.28
A fact pattern that ends with a person doing nothing while another is hurt asks one question: where did this actor's duty come from? The sunbather and the stalled truck driver both fail to act, and the difference is who put the danger there. A sound analysis names the source of the duty first and evaluates the omission only afterward.