Concept
Duty to Retreat
Self-defense and defense of others
Duty to Retreat
A person threatened with a battery sometimes has a safe way out. She can walk away, hand over what the attacker demands, or abandon the spot where she stands. The question is whether the existence of that exit weakens her claim to use force, and the answer depends on three variables: how dangerous her force is, which jurisdiction's rule governs, and where the encounter takes place.
Retreat belongs in a chapter on necessity because it applies the last-resort principle. Except as Restatement (Second) of Torts § 63(2) provides, an actor may use force in his own defense “only as a last resort,” and not while there is a reasonable likelihood that the other will abandon his aggressive purpose or that the actor will have a later opportunity to protect himself.1 A safe exit is one more way a claim of necessity can fail. The common law drew that conclusion for deadly force in the rule of “retreat to the wall,” which ordinarily forbade deadly force by anyone to whom an avenue of safe retreat was open. The rule applied strict necessity to the taking of human life and was designed to insure that the necessity existed.2
Two policies pull against each other. The law has a strong policy against taking human life unnecessarily and a somewhat weaker one against causing unnecessary bodily injury. It also has a policy against forcing an innocent person into a cowardly and humiliating role.3 The weights shift with the stakes. Against mild force, the aggressor risks little and the defender's lost ground counts for more. Against deadly force, the aggressor's loss cannot be undone, and the case for requiring a safe exit strengthens.
The authorities sort themselves along that line. It seems everywhere agreed that one who can retreat safely need not do so before using nondeadly force, so the retreat question becomes a problem only when deadly force is used.4 For deadly force, the Restatement withdraws the privilege from a defender who could have retreated with complete safety. Most American jurisdictions, contrary to the common law rule, instead let a person stand his ground and use deadly force whenever it seems reasonably necessary to save himself.5 The home carries its own exceptions, and stand-your-ground statutes have extended the no-retreat position further. The three subsections below take the nondeadly rule, the deadly rule, and the exceptions in that order.
Retreat and Nondeadly Force
Section 63(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts privileges reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, against an unprivileged harmful or offensive contact that the actor reasonably believes another is about to inflict intentionally.6 Section 63(2) then shuts off an argument that the last-resort principle invites. A person who could walk away, or hand over what the attacker demands, might seem to have no need for force. The subsection answers that the privilege survives although the actor correctly or reasonably believes he can avoid the necessity of defending himself in either of two ways: by retreating or otherwise giving up a right or privilege, or by complying with a command that he is under no duty to obey or that the other is not privileged to enforce by the means threatened.7
Nothing else in the analysis changes. The threat must still be imminent and reasonably believed, and the response must still be reasonable. One consideration drops out: whether the defender could have avoided the encounter.
Policy explains the rule. A duty to retreat would require the victim of threatened violence to relinquish her right to walk the streets, and our culture places a high premium on personal choice and independence, so a “duty to run” has not won public or judicial acceptance.8 Criminal-law authorities report the same agreement: one who can safely retreat need not do so before using nondeadly force.9 The costs fall unevenly. Retreat hands the place to the person who made the threat and lets a wrongful threat decide where the defender may stand. The aggressor, by contrast, risks only a limited harm, since the force in question is by definition not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, and he can avoid it altogether by not attacking.
The same reasoning covers commands. Suppose an attacker threatens to punch the defender unless she hands over a bicycle that she owns. She is under no duty to comply, so § 63(2) preserves her privilege to meet the punch with reasonable force even though surrender would end the quarrel.10 The text asks whether she is bound to obey, and an attacker's honest belief that the bicycle is his does not answer that question.
The converse follows from § 63(1), which protects only against unprivileged contact.11 If a command binds the actor and the other may enforce it by the means he threatens, the threatened contact is privileged, and Subsection (2) gives the actor nothing to stand on. The text marks the two ways a command can fail to bind in this sense: the actor is under no duty to comply, or the other is not privileged to enforce the command by the means threatened.12
Two limits keep the rule to its text. First, it concerns nondeadly force. The retreat question is a problem only when deadly force is used, and the next subsection takes that up.13 Second, the comment's last-resort statement excepts Subsection (2) and nothing else, so a defender still may not use force while there is a reasonable likelihood that the other will abandon his aggressive purpose or that the defender will have a later opportunity to protect himself.14 Subsection (2) excuses retreat and surrender. It does not excuse impatience.
Two errors recur. A student who asks whether the refusing seller could have left has applied the question the rule makes irrelevant, when the question is whether the other's force was privileged. The opposite error treats every refused demand as a free pass, forgetting that the privilege survives only where the demand did not bind or the means threatened exceeded what the other could use.
Retreat and Deadly Force
Section 65(1) of the Restatement privileges force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, but only “subject to the statement in Subsection (3).”16 Subsection (3) withdraws the privilege when the actor correctly or reasonably believes that he can with complete safety avoid the necessity of defending himself in either of two ways.17 He may retreat, if he is attacked anywhere other than his own dwelling or in a place that is also the other's dwelling.18 Or he may relinquish the exercise of any right or privilege other than his privilege to prevent intrusion upon or dispossession of his dwelling or to effect a lawful arrest.19 A defender can therefore satisfy every belief requirement of § 65(1) and still lose the privilege.
The trigger is the degree of force. Section 63(2) lets an actor stand his ground against nondeadly force even when retreat would be perfectly safe.20 Once the defender's force becomes deadly, the same safe exit defeats the privilege.
The limit rests on necessity. The privilege to kill or maim exists only for a peril that cannot safely be met any other way, and a completely safe exit is another way. A defender who can leave without risk gains nothing from injuring the aggressor that walking away would not have gained, so the force protects no one and works only as a fresh injury. The Restatement's stated rationale adds a social interest: society's interest in the life and efficiency of its members and in preventing the serious breaches of the peace that bloody affrays involve requires one attacked with a deadly weapon, except within his own dwelling, to retreat unless he reasonably believes there is any chance that retreat cannot be safely made.21 The criminal-law version is shorter: it is not reasonably necessary to kill when a person can avoid the danger by running away.22
The opposing view looks at what retreat costs the person who did nothing wrong. The “no retreat” position holds that a person should not have to resort to what some would deem cowardice in order to spare the life of the one who precipitated the difficulty, and critics call the retreat rule the “coward's” rule.23 The Restatement reconciles the two interests by demanding retreat only when it is clearly safe.24
The two clauses of the limit govern different things. The retreat clause depends on where the attack occurs. An assault on a street, in a store, or in a parking lot triggers it, and so does an assault in a dwelling the attacker also occupies, where the attacker's claim to be present is as good as the defender's. The next subsection takes up the home exception and the co-occupant problem. The second clause carries the logic beyond location: if the actor can with complete safety avoid the need for deadly force by giving up the exercise of some other right or privilege, he must do so. The two carve-outs, preventing dispossession of the dwelling and effecting a lawful arrest, protect the very things a surrender would forfeit, since leaving the home is dispossession and walking away from a suspect is abandoning the arrest. The Model Penal Code states a parallel limit: deadly force is impermissible if the actor knows he can avoid the necessity by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right to it, or by complying with a demand that he abstain from action he has no duty to take.25
The phrase complete safety does most of the work, and it is demanding. The retreat that defeats the privilege must be one the actor correctly or reasonably believes can be made with complete safety, so an exit that carries a real risk of being caught and hurt does not count. A victim need not retreat unless it is clearly safe to do so, and one who has any doubt, as most will, may use deadly force against deadly force.26 The inquiry looks at what the defender reasonably believed, and the privilege protects a reasonable mistake about necessity.27 One court applying the common-law rule said that the retreat doctrine was never intended to enhance the risk to the innocent and never required a faultless victim to increase his assailant's safety at the expense of his own, so the defender could stand his ground if the alternative were perilous or reasonably appeared so.28
The exit alone can decide whether force is privileged. In a casebook hypothetical, Kong attacks Zilla with deadly force while she sits in her car, and she answers with a baseball bat. If she could have closed the car door and driven away, § 65 denies her the privilege, her blow is a battery, and she is liable for Kong's injury. A threat of deadly force does not itself authorize deadly force in reply. It authorizes the force she reasonably believes necessary, and closing the door would have prevented the battery.29
Zilla's exit cost her nothing and Hal's ran through the knife. That one fact decides whether the limit applies, and the reasonable-doubt rule resolves the close cases in the defender's favor.
Most American courts do not follow the Restatement on this point. A majority of jurisdictions let a non-aggressor stand his ground and use deadly force whenever it seems reasonably necessary to save himself, even though retreat is open.30 The District of Columbia's law was described as not entirely clear but allied with the strong minority adhering to the common law.31 Because the facts of a problem rarely say which rule governs, state the Restatement rule first, then the majority rule, and apply whichever the jurisdiction follows. The majority rule removes the duty to flee. The requirement that the force seem reasonably necessary stays in place.
Step four is the usual point of failure. A student who sees that an exit existed has found half of the rule, because the exit must also be one the defender reasonably believed to be completely safe.
Home Exception and Stand Your Ground
The retreat limit has exceptions, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 65(2) lists them. The privilege to use deadly force exists although the actor reasonably believes he could safely avoid the confrontation in any of three ways: by retreating, when he is attacked within his dwelling and that dwelling is not also the other's; by permitting the other to intrude upon or dispossess him of his dwelling; or by abandoning an attempt to effect a lawful arrest.33 In each, the safe alternative would cost the defender the very thing he is entitled to keep or to do. Leaving the house gives up the house, yielding to an intruder gives it up as well, and breaking off an arrest gives up the arrest.
The common law tied retreat to location from the start. In Sir Michael Foster's classic analysis, a defender was in one situation entitled to stand his ground and use deadly force if it reasonably seemed necessary; in another required to retreat rather than use deadly force if a reasonably safe retreat was available, unless he was in his “castle”; and in a third required to “withdraw” before resorting to deadly force.34 A later section takes up withdrawal.
The home exception rests on a simple fact: one's home has always been thought of as a person's ultimate bastion of security, and there is no place to retreat once a person has been forced out of it.35 Most jurisdictions that employ the retreat rule make the exception. Even the Restatement recognizes that a person threatened with deadly force in her home need not retreat, which reflects the widely shared view that the home, if not quite a castle, ought at least to be an inviolable place of refuge.36
The exception relieves the duty to retreat and nothing more. Section 65(2) preserves the privilege stated in Subsection (1), so the defender must still reasonably believe the conditions for deadly force are met.37
The text of the exception reaches only a dwelling that is not also the other's. That limit follows the reason for the exception. The home exception protects a defender from being driven out of a place that is his by someone with no claim to it. When the attacker lives there too, the attacker has an equal claim, leaving no longer hands the home to a trespasser, and the ordinary retreat clause applies to an attack in a dwelling that is also the other's.38
Courts do not uniformly follow the co-occupant limit. Some courts, like the Restatement, still require retreat from a co-occupant; see Cooper v. United States. The prevailing view, however, is that retreat is not required even when both parties live on the premises, in part to avoid worsening the difficulty that battered spouses face in making their defense; see Weiand v. State.39 Where the co-occupant is an abusive partner, evidence that the defendant suffered from battered-woman syndrome may be considered by the jury in deciding whether she acted in self-defense.40 An answer should therefore state the Restatement limit and note that many courts decline to apply it.
The meaning of “dwelling” also divides courts. Decisions about offices and automobiles conflict.41 Several jurisdictions have extended the castle doctrine to vehicles and places of business, and courts disagree whether the duty to retreat applies in the yard, some treating the curtilage as an extension of the metaphorical castle and others holding the opposite.42 A court asked to extend the exception must decide whether its reasoning, that no refuge lies beyond the home, fits the new setting.
The other two exceptions apply the same logic to things other than the defender's own body. A defender need not permit an intruder to dispossess him of his dwelling in order to escape the need for deadly force, since yielding the house hands the attacker what he came for. A person making a lawful arrest need not abandon it, since walking away would let the offender go. Neither clause is a license for deadly force by itself, because each relaxes only the retreat inquiry.
Stand-your-ground legislation carries the no-retreat idea beyond the home. A majority of American courts already rejected the common-law retreat rule, and the classic statement of that position is Erwin v. State. In roughly 30 states, statutes now confer a right to meet force with force, including deadly force, in public spaces even when a safe avenue of retreat is readily available, and many of them simply codify a no-retreat rule long embedded in the state's self-defense law.43 In these jurisdictions the defender may use deadly force in any lawfully occupied location so long as he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of death, serious bodily harm, or sexual assault.44
The statutes apply uniformly to attacks inside the home and often extend to any place where a person has a lawful right to be.45 Florida's statute provides that a person who reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another “does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground” if he is “not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place he or she has a right to be.”46 The statute removes only the retreat question, so the defender must still hold the reasonable belief of imminent danger. Its conditions also tie the no-retreat right to the defender's own lawful position. A later section addresses what happens when the defender started the encounter.
Some statutes add an immunity. Florida's § 776.032 creates an immunity against both criminal prosecution and civil action for anyone who uses force in defense of person or property against anyone except a police officer.47 An ordinary privilege is a reason the defendant is not liable, while an immunity is aimed at the proceeding itself. Florida shows the difference in the criminal setting: a prosecution against someone who claims justified self-defense cannot go forward until a special pretrial immunity hearing, at which the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the force was unjustified.48 In a state with a comparable civil immunity, a defendant may invoke the statute as a threshold bar, and the statute's own conditions become the contested ground.
The home and the statute answer the retreat question and no other. A defender who has no duty to retreat from his home must still reasonably believe that deadly force is needed against a deadly peril, because the exception never supplied that belief. The fourth step is where an answer should name the split among courts and avoid stating one rule as settled.