732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999)
In 1994, Kathleen Weiand was charged with first-degree murder for the shooting death of her husband Todd Weiand during a violent argument in the apartment where the couple lived together with their seven-week-old daughter.1 Weiand testified that her husband had beaten and choked her throughout their three-year relationship and had threatened further violence if she left him.2
Two experts, including Dr. Lenore Walker, testified that Weiand suffered from battered woman's syndrome and that she believed her husband was going to seriously hurt or kill her when she shot him.3 Dr. Walker explained that Weiand did not leave the apartment during the argument because she had given birth seven weeks earlier, had been choked unconscious, was paralyzed with terror, and knew from experience that threats of leaving only made her husband more violent.4
At the charge conference following the close of the evidence, defense counsel requested the standard jury instruction on the privilege of nonretreat from the home.5 The trial court refused the request to give this defense of home instruction and instead gave only the standard instruction on the duty to retreat applicable in all self-defense cases.6
During closing arguments the prosecutor emphasized that Weiand had failed to exhaust every reasonable means of escape, pointing out that she did not use the phone that was two feet away, go out the door where her baby was sitting next to, or get in the car that she had driven all over town drinking and boozing it up all day.7 The jury found Weiand guilty of second-degree murder and the trial court sentenced her to eighteen years' imprisonment.8 The Second District affirmed her conviction and sentence but on rehearing certified the question of whether this Court should recede from Bobbitt.9
As the Second District correctly acknowledged, the trial court improperly excluded three defense witnesses, all of whom would have provided eyewitness testimony to corroborate Weiand's assertion of prior acts of abuse by her husband.10 After briefing and oral argument, Weiand filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in this Court because she was granted executive clemency on December 23, 1998.11 The Court retained jurisdiction because the issue is of great public importance.12
Whether the Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to review a certified question of great public importance when the district court did not explicitly analyze the question in its opinion?13
Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution vests the Supreme Court with discretionary jurisdiction to review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance.14 A district court's affirmance after the defendant raised the dispositive issue necessarily rules upon the certified question even without explicit analysis.15
Yes. The Second District necessarily ruled upon the certified question concerning the castle doctrine instruction because Weiand raised the trial court's refusal to give the nonretreat instruction on appeal.16 The district court affirmed the conviction after examining the entire trial transcript.17 The district court was bound by Bobbitt precedent but certified the question on rehearing to permit this Court to consider overruling it, satisfying the constitutional requirement for jurisdiction.18
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the certified question despite the absence of explicit district court analysis.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Shaw, J.
Justice Wells dissents as to jurisdiction.20 The Florida Constitution confers jurisdiction only when the district court passes upon a question certified to be of great public importance.21 It is patent that the district court did not pass upon the question certified in this case.22
The generalized affirmance statement does not satisfy the constitutional requirement.23 This is exactly what this Court rejected in Gee as not meeting constitutional muster.24 The majority's exercise of jurisdiction therefore lacks any basis in the plain language of Article V, section 3(b)(4).25
Whether the law imposes a duty to retreat from the residence before a defendant may justifiably resort to deadly force in self-defense against a co-occupant?26
A person may use deadly force in self-defense if reasonably necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.27 The common-law duty to retreat does not apply when the defendant is attacked in her own residence even by a co-occupant.28 The home is the ultimate sanctuary, and imposing a duty to retreat would adversely affect domestic violence victims who face increased danger upon separation.29
No. In Weiand's case the law imposes no duty to retreat from the apartment before she could justifiably resort to deadly force against her co-occupant husband.30 The court recedes from Bobbitt.31 The court recognizes that the privilege of nonretreat stems from the sanctity of the home rather than possessory rights.32 The court adopts the middle-ground instruction allowing retreat within the residence only to the extent reasonably possible without increasing danger.33
The law does not impose a duty to retreat from the residence before a defendant may justifiably resort to deadly force in self-defense against a co-occupant.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Shaw, J.
Justice Wells concurs in adopting the middle-ground instruction on an interim basis.35 He recognizes the devastating toll of domestic violence upon women.36 He applauds legislative and executive initiatives addressing this very real problem.37
He is concerned, however, about the potential for the majority's jury instruction to be read as sanctioning retaliatory violence in domestic disputes.38 He would subject the instruction to publication, request for comment, and consideration with a direct focus on the question of retaliatory violence.39
Whether the trial court committed reversible error by excluding three defense witnesses who would have provided eyewitness testimony corroborating the defendant's history of abuse?40
Exclusion of eyewitness testimony that would provide the only direct corroboration of a defendant's claims of prior abuse and the basis for expert battered spouse syndrome opinions constitutes reversible error when it enables the prosecutor to discredit the defense by arguing that no one witnessed injuries.41
Yes. The trial court committed reversible error by excluding the three defense witnesses in Weiand's case because those witnesses supplied the only eyewitness testimony corroborating her claims of prior abuse by her husband.42 None of the other trial witnesses provided such direct testimony.43 The exclusion allowed the prosecutor to argue repeatedly that nobody saw injuries on Weiand, which was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt despite the experts' testimony.44
The trial court committed reversible error by excluding the three defense witnesses.45