Concept
Manifesting Consent
Consent
Manifesting Consent
A defendant who pleads consent must first show that it exists, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892 offers two ways to do so. Subsection (1) defines consent as willingness in fact for conduct to occur, and it allows that willingness to be manifested by action or inaction without ever being communicated to the actor.1 Subsection (2) provides that words or conduct reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent constitute apparent consent, which is as effective as consent in fact.2 The first test looks into the plaintiff's mind; the second asks what the plaintiff's behavior would tell a reasonable observer.
Two tests are needed because an actor cannot see inside the plaintiff. Willingness in fact controls when it can be proven, but people must rely on the overt words and acts of others rather than on their undisclosed thoughts, so the law also protects an actor who reasonably reads those words and acts as consent.3 Many encounters involve no words at all. In them, custom and usage, prior dealings, and the parties' relationship tell an observer what conduct means and how far it reaches.4 The subsections below follow that order: the plaintiff's actual willingness, the visible signs of it, and the setting that gives those signs their meaning.
Actual Consent: Willingness in Fact
A plaintiff consents in fact when he is, in truth, willing for the conduct to occur, and he may show that willingness by action or inaction without communicating it to the actor.5 The test is subjective: it asks about the plaintiff's state of mind, and a secret consent is as valid as an announced one if it can be proven.6 The proof requirement matters. A court cannot read minds, so a defendant who relies on undisclosed willingness must establish it by evidence, such as what the plaintiff told others or how he behaved.
Because consent is a fact about willingness, it needs no contract and no words. Assertive conduct suffices, as when a landowner beckons someone onto her land or a patient holds up an arm to be vaccinated without protest.7 Smith may accept Torres's kiss with a look or a blush, and she could refuse it just as silently.8
Inaction can manifest consent, but silence is not consent automatically. It counts when people would ordinarily read it that way, as where a reasonable person would be expected to speak or move if he objected.9 Mulloy v. Hop Sang shows where the line falls. The patient there told the surgeon to repair his injured hand but not to amputate it. The surgeon replied that he would do whatever was necessary, the patient said nothing, and the surgeon amputated. The Alberta appellate court held that the patient had not consented to the amputation, because the only consent he had given was limited and did not include it. Smith's blush and the patient's silence point in opposite directions. Her expression accompanied a kiss she welcomed and signaled willingness; his silence followed a limit he had set himself and gave no sign that he was giving it up. In each case the question is what the silence reasonably signals in its setting.
Willingness lives in the plaintiff's head, and a defendant can rarely see what the plaintiff privately decided. That gap between inner choice and outward appearance is why the law cannot stop at actual consent: the plaintiff's visible words and conduct may tell the defendant one thing while the plaintiff's mind holds another.
Apparent Consent: What the Plaintiff Shows
Apparent consent protects an actor who reads the plaintiff's behavior sensibly. Under § 892(2), words or conduct that another reasonably understands as intended to be consent are as effective as consent in fact, and the Restatement carries the rule over to intentional invasions of interests of personality.11 A plaintiff's words or conduct manifesting consent create a privilege for the actor to proceed, even if the plaintiff's actual but undisclosed state of mind was to the contrary.12 Actual consent asks what was in the plaintiff's mind; apparent consent asks what the plaintiff's behavior would tell a sensible observer. Proof of either one bars the claim.
The rule exists because people must rely on the overt words and acts of others, not on their undisclosed thoughts.13 If a plaintiff could nod, offer a hand, and then testify to a secret reluctance, no gesture of assent would be safe to act on. The test is therefore objective: it asks whether the actor reasonably understood the plaintiff's words or conduct as consent.
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co. is the standard illustration. A steerage passenger on the defendant's steamship sued for assault and for negligent vaccination after she was vaccinated aboard ship, and the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant.14 She had stood in line with the other passengers awaiting vaccination and held out her arm, and she later complained that she had been unwilling. The court held that the doctor was “justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been,” because in deciding whether she consented he “could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings.”15 Her silence counted as consent because a reasonable person in her position would have been expected to speak or move if she objected.16
The actor's reliance has limits. A physician may treat a patient's conduct as consent only if the physician reasonably understands that the conduct signifies consent and acts in good faith in concluding that it reflects the patient's willingness to undergo the treatment.17 A medical record indicating that the patient wants no extraordinary measures, for instance, undercuts any claim that the patient's conduct reasonably signified willingness to receive them.18 Mulloy fits the same test. The patient there had expressed a limit in advance, so the limit was the manifestation, and his later silence did not withdraw it. The passenger on the ship had expressed no limit, and every visible act pointed toward acceptance.
The manifestation must come from the plaintiff. The rule looks to the plaintiff's own words or conduct, so an actor's private belief that consent exists supplies nothing if the plaintiff did nothing to produce it.19 Land law reaches the same result: an entrant who acts under a mistaken belief that the owner has consented is still a trespasser, and even a reasonable mistake is unlikely to protect him.20
Conduct counts as apparent consent only if it is reasonably understood as intended to be consent, so behavior that fits as well with refusal does not qualify. Suppose Franken tells Stein to leave or be punched, Stein stays where he is without a word, and Franken punches him. A reasonable observer would read Stein's staying put as refusing to be pushed around, not as willingness to be struck, so Franken cannot claim apparent consent. Stein's silence resembles the passenger's in O'Brien but signals something different. Standing in line and holding out an arm fit only with acceptance, while standing one's ground against a threat fits at least as well with defiance.
A silent plaintiff therefore raises two questions on an exam: what the silence, together with the plaintiff's other conduct and the setting, would reasonably signal to the actor, and whether the signal came from the plaintiff.
Consent From Context: Custom, History, and Relationship
Consent may rest on the setting as much as on anything the plaintiff says. Because consent can be manifested by action or inaction without communication,22 a court may infer it from custom and usage, from prior dealings between the parties, or from some relationship between them.23 The inference yields presumed consent: the actor is justified under prevailing social norms in acting even without actual or apparent consent, and has no reason to believe the plaintiff would have refused if asked first.24 Where friends customarily embrace on meeting, for example, one may assume that the other welcomes an embrace, at least until given notice to the contrary.25
Ordinary life would stall if every contact required a fresh yes. Jostling on a rush-hour subway is an accepted fact of city life, and Smith may reasonably expect that a tap on the shoulder to return a dropped glove is acceptable to the person tapped.26 Contact between people with a relationship is judged the same way: where it is reasonable and customary given the time, place, and circumstances and the parties' relationship, a privilege ordinarily exists, unless and until the plaintiff gives notice to the contrary.27 Presumed consent rests on an assumption about what the plaintiff would accept, so it fails when the contact lies outside the custom, when the parties have no shared history, or when the plaintiff has said no.
Prior dealings change what a contact means. Suppose Burgess and Munoz routinely engage in horseplay at work, including backslapping, arm locks, and bear hugs. Given those dealings, Burgess is justified in inferring that Munoz will not find such contacts offensive, although the same contacts would offend the reasonable sense of personal dignity of a new employee.28 The history supplies the justification only for the pair that built it.
A manifested refusal overrides the presumption. The privilege to go ahead with treatment rests on the logic that most people would accept it, so going ahead probably implements the patient's choice.29 But when Carella wears a bracelet that rejects transfusions, it refuses the touching just as clearly as if he had sat up on the table and said, “Hey, no transfusions!” Dr. Langone must honor that choice even if she disagrees with it and expects it may prove fatal to him. If she does not, she is liable for battery.30
A relationship can carry consent in the same way. A passenger who buys an airline ticket enters a relationship in which reasonable procedures incident to the flight, such as staying seated with the seat belt fastened during turbulence, are customary and expected, so enforcing them is not false imprisonment.31 The word reasonable limits the rule: a restriction with no connection to safe travel lies outside what the relationship supplied. Duress ends the inference altogether. A store customer who goes to the security office only after guards confiscate her purse has not truly consented to the detention, because she acted under compulsion, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 40A treats submission under duress as ineffective to bar a false imprisonment claim.32
Sports show consent drawn from custom most clearly. Participants consent to the physical contacts consistent with the understood rules of the game, and perhaps even to contacts that result from rule violations in the course of play.33 That consent ordinarily does not extend to intentional harm not incidental to the play, such as a blow struck when the game is not in progress, after the whistle has blown.34
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. tested that limit. The defendant, Charles Clark, admitted that the blow he struck was intentional and not accidental. The trial court nevertheless ruled, as a matter of law, that professional football is basically a violent business whose available sanctions are penalties and expulsion from the game. It observed that many fouls are overlooked, that the game is played in an emotional and noisy environment, and that incidents like this one are not unusual.35 That reasoning treats what commonly happens in the game as what the players accept. The consent rule asks a narrower question: whether the contact was incidental to the play.
Because context supplies consent only for what the setting covers, the limits on consent apply here too. Consent restricted as to time, area, or in other respects is effective only within those limits,36 and if the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.37 The later sections on scope develop both points.