154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266
O’Brien, a passenger on a Cunard steamship sailing from Queenstown to Boston, found herself among approximately two hundred women assembled below deck as the vessel approached its destination.1
She understood from conversations with the other passengers that they were to be vaccinated. Standing about fifteen feet from the surgeon employed by the defendant, she watched as the women formed a line and passed before him one by one.2
The surgeon examined their arms and vaccinated those without marks indicating prior protection from smallpox. Each woman who was passed by or vaccinated received a card and went on deck. When O’Brien’s turn came, she showed her arm, and the surgeon looked at it and said there was no mark and that she should be vaccinated.3
O’Brien told the surgeon she had been vaccinated before and that it had left no mark. He responded that he should vaccinate her again. She held up her arm to be vaccinated, and the surgeon performed the procedure without anyone touching her. She did not tell him that she did not want to be vaccinated and accepted the ticket he gave her certifying the vaccination, which she later used at quarantine.4
Boston maintained strict quarantine regulations requiring immigrants to demonstrate protection from smallpox by vaccination, with only those holding a certificate from the ship’s medical officer permitted to land without detention or further vaccination by the port physician. The defendant customarily had its surgeons vaccinate immigrants desiring the service who lacked prior protection, and notices of the quarantine rules and the surgeon’s willingness to vaccinate were posted about the ship in several languages.5
Whether there was any evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant, by any of its servants or agents, committed an assault on the plaintiff?6
In determining whether the act was lawful or unlawful, the surgeon’s conduct must be considered in connection with the circumstances. If the plaintiff’s behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part, he was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been. In determining whether she consented, he could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings.7
No. O’Brien stood about fifteen feet from the surgeon among approximately two hundred women, formed a line, showed her arm when her turn came, held up her arm to be vaccinated after the surgeon stated she should be vaccinated again, remained silent when he performed the procedure, and accepted the certificate she later used at quarantine.8 These overt acts manifested consent under the circumstances of posted notices and quarantine requirements, so the surgeon was justified in vaccinating her.9
There was no evidence that the surgeon committed an assault because the vaccination was lawful under the rule of consent indicated by conduct.10
Whether there was evidence on which the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty of negligence towards the plaintiff?11
Under the act of Congress of August 2, 1882, § 5, ship-owners must carry a competent surgeon and supply necessary instruments and medicines, but the surgeon is not their servant engaged in their business and subject to their control when treating passengers.12 The business of treating sick passengers belongs to the passengers themselves, who may choose the surgeon, determine the extent of treatment, and decide whether to submit to operations.13
No. The defendant fulfilled its duty by employing a competent surgeon as required by statute, and the surgeon’s performance of the vaccination occurred outside the defendant’s control in the mode of treatment.14 No inquiry into whether the surgeon was negligent is required because the defendant cannot be held liable for his actions in attending to passengers.15
The defendant is not liable for any negligence by the surgeon in performing the vaccination.16