Concept
Liability for Resulting Harm
Trespass to land
Liability for Resulting Harm
A trespasser answers for the physical harm his presence sets in motion, and the possessor need not show that he was careless. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 162 makes a trespasser liable for physical harm to the possessor of the land at the time of the trespass, to the land or the possessor's things, and to members of the possessor's household or their things, when the harm results from an act the trespasser did, an activity he carried on, or a condition he created. The liability attaches "irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to liability were he not a trespasser."1
The earlier sections asked whether a trespass occurred and who may sue for it. This section asks what the trespasser owes for the damage that follows. Negligence law would require a breach of the duty of reasonable care and harm that the breach made foreseeable. Section 162 drops the first requirement, because the trespass itself supplies the wrong, and the damages rules drop the second: recovery covers all harm directly resulting from the trespass and a broad range of consequential damage, even harm that was neither intended nor foreseeable. The trespasser will usually answer for any physical harm on the land caused by or during the entry, however carefully he acted while there. One who builds a fire, digs a hole, or merely leaves a door or gate ajar may be liable for the resulting harm to the premises, to the possessor and household, and to their property, with no showing of negligence. Physical harm in this setting includes emotional distress.2
The three triggers in § 162, an act done, an activity carried on, and a condition created, cover the two ways a trespasser sets harm in motion. He can start something, as with a fire, or leave something behind, as with an open door. The harm need not occur while he is still present; it is enough that his act, activity, or condition caused it.3
The rule belongs with the broader scope-of-liability rules for intentional torts, under which one who intentionally causes physical harm is liable for all its consequences, even if they were unintended, unlikely, or unforeseeable.4 Section 162 echoes that approach. The trespasser chose to enter land the possessor had not opened to him, and when the entry leads to physical harm, the loss falls on him.
The possessor at the time of the trespass holds the claim. A cause of action in trespass belongs to the party with the right of possession, so a tenant, not the landlord, sues for trespass to leased land. An owner out of possession has at most a claim on the case, and it requires proof of actual damage to his reversionary interest: a permanent injury that would still affect him when the property reverts.5
Four decisions mark the range of the rule, from the simplest act to a death.
Wyant v. Crouse shows the act trigger at its simplest. A trespasser built a fire in a blacksmith's forge and left. The shop later burned, and he was held liable for the loss although no negligence was shown. The fire was his act, and the burning came after he had gone.
Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co. shows the condition trigger. A delivery employee entered a house through a side door, left it open, and crossed a sun porch to knock at an inner door. A child of the household, whom he had not seen, fell through the open door and was hurt. The court let the jury decide whether he was a trespasser, and the verdict ran against his employer. The child belonged to the possessor's household, a protected class under § 162, and the open door was a condition the trespasser created, so the harm fell within the section though he never saw the child.6
Baker v. Shymkiv removes foreseeability from the analysis. The defendants dug a trench across the plaintiffs' driveway and quarreled with the couple over it, and the husband was found dead of a heart attack as the defendants drove away. The court held that damages caused by a trespasser need not be foreseeable to be compensable. A negligence defendant could argue that a fatal heart attack does not foreseeably follow from digging a trench, but that argument fails once the trespass and the physical harm it caused are shown.7
Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners, 30 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. 1948), reaches the gravest result. The road commissioners had a farmer's permission to put a fence on his land for the winter, but they did not remove the anchor pipe in the spring, and that failure was a trespass under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160. The farmer's survivors sued for wrongful death on negligence and trespass theories, and the court held that the complaint stated a claim for trespass.8 A death is physical harm to the possessor, the first interest § 162 names, and the trespass theory, unlike the negligence theory, did not depend on proving that leaving the pipe was careless.9
Status, not conduct, decides which rule applies, as two flooded kitchens show. A lawfully present actor remains under ordinary negligence rules; only the trespasser faces § 162.
The two kitchens flood in the same way; only the actor's right to be in the house differs. An exam stem that dwells on how carefully the actor behaved points toward the wrong question once the actor is a trespasser, since care earns him nothing under § 162.
Two qualifications limit the rule. The extended liability may not apply when the trespasser reasonably believes he has a right to be on the land, or to damages that are unrelated to the security of the premises.11 The first limit favors the entrant who honestly and reasonably thought he was entitled to be there. His reasonable mistake does not stop the entry from being a trespass, as the earlier discussion of mistake explained, but it may keep the harm that follows from being charged to him without fault. The second limit confines the rule to harm that bears on the security of the premises. An exam answer should present both as qualifications and keep them apart from the principle that a reasonable mistake is no defense to the trespass itself.
Section 162 speaks of physical harm, but aggravated trespass reaches further. When a trespass is deliberate and accompanied by aggravating circumstances, emotional distress damages are recoverable even without physical injury. In Johnson v. Marcel, a landlord who wanted tenants to leave entered their townhouse without consent, changed the locks on the garage, blocked the driveway, and repeatedly threatened and harassed them.12 Punitive damages answer a different question. A plaintiff can recover them when the trespass is deliberate or malicious, even if the trespass earns only nominal damages.13 The three remedies therefore turn on different facts. Section 162 compensates physical harm the trespass caused, whatever the trespasser's state of mind; distress damages require a deliberate trespass with aggravating circumstances; and punitive damages require a deliberate or malicious trespass.