6 Ohio St. 3d 151, 451 N.E.2d 811 (1983)
Appellants, the Shymkivs, entered upon land in the possession of the Bakers without permission.1 This action by the Shymkivs constituted an intentional trespass upon the Bakers' property.2
The intentional trespass amounted to an unlawful interference with the Bakers' protected property rights.3 As a direct result of this intrusion, Mr. Baker experienced serious emotional distress that manifested itself physically and could be objectively ascertained.4
Unfortunately, Mr. Baker died.5 The trial court instructed the jury that only foreseeable damages could result in liability.6 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.7
Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that only foreseeable damages could result in liability?8
Damages caused by an intentional trespasser need not be foreseeable to be compensable.9
Yes. The Shymkivs intentionally trespassed upon land in the possession of the Bakers by entering the property without permission.10 This intentional intrusion caused emotional distress to Mr. Baker that manifested itself physically and was objectively ascertainable.11
Intentional conduct is an element of trespass.12 A trespass on land subjects the trespasser to liability for physical harm to the possessor of the land at the time of the trespass caused by any act done, irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to liability were he not a trespasser.13 Accordingly, damages caused by an intentional trespasser need not be foreseeable to be compensable.14
The trial court erred by instructing the jury that only foreseeable damages could result in liability.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Holmes concurred in the syllabus and the opinion in most respects.16 He continued to adhere to his dissent in Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co.17 The facts show that the appellants' trespass to the land was an intentional intrusion upon this land.18 Such conduct is an unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights for which recovery for resulting damage could have been granted even prior to Schultz.19
Holmes believed that where there was an intentional interference with a protected right such as the right to maintain one's home and property inviolate, recovery has been allowed for all attendant rights violated.20 In none of these intentional assaults upon a protected personal right would the element of foreseeability of the injury have been required.21 The emotional stress which was reasonably occasioned by the intentional trespass of the appellants clearly manifested itself, not only physically in nature, but was objectively ascertainable.22