Concept
Intent Required
Trespass to land
Intent Required
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 makes a person liable for trespass, “irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other,” if he intentionally enters land in another’s possession or causes a thing or third person to do so, remains on the land, or fails to remove a thing he has a duty to remove.1 The adverb carries the element, and its meaning is narrower than it first appears. The actor must intend the entry. He must act for the purpose of putting himself, a thing, or another person on the land, or know that the entry is substantially certain to follow. He need not intend a trespass in the larger sense of knowing the land belongs to someone else and meaning to infringe the owner’s rights. Trespass to land can impose liability without any intent to cause harm, so long as the defendant intended the act that produced the invasion.2
The law aims intent at the entry because the entry is the choice the actor controls. A person always knows whether he is deciding to walk, throw, or send something across a line, even when he has no idea who owns the land or whether the owner would object. Were the possessor required to prove ill will or knowledge of ownership, the sincere, the indifferent, and the careless entrant would all escape, though the possessor’s control of the land had been disturbed just the same. The same focus leaves out true accidents. Apart from abnormally dangerous activities, an entry that is neither intended nor negligent brings no liability, a point developed with the unintentional entries.3
Two questions remain, and the subsections below take them in turn. The first is what counts as intent to enter, including whether an actor who did not aim at the entry but knew it would happen has the intent the tort requires. The second is how intent travels: when an actor intends one of the closely related intentional torts and the result is a trespass, the law may treat that intent as carrying over. A mistaken belief about possession, consent, or privilege raises a further matter, handled in its own section. It does not disturb the analysis here, because the mistaken entrant still meant to enter.4
Intent to Enter
The word intentionally in § 158 modifies all three forms of trespass, so it fixes the mental state for entering, remaining, and failing to remove alike.5 What the actor must have meant is the entry itself. A person intends a consequence by acting for the purpose of producing it, or by acting while knowing that it is substantially certain to result.6 Applied to land, that definition asks whether the actor wanted to be on the land, wanted to put a thing or a third person there, or knew that one of those results would follow. It does not ask whether the actor knew the ground belonged to someone else, thought the conduct wrong, or hoped to cause harm, because the actor need only intend to enter or to cause the entry.7
Eli goes onto Farmer Dell’s land to get his hat back. He has no quarrel with Dell and wants nothing from the field except the hat, yet liability attached the moment he stepped onto the land, because he meant to be there.8 Now suppose George enters Tom’s land without any thought of violating Tom’s property rights, perhaps believing the land is his own. He is liable too, because neither knowledge that the defendant is violating another’s property rights nor any intent to violate them is required.9 A mistaken belief about possession, consent, or privilege, even a reasonable one that the possessor did nothing to induce, does not turn an intended entry into an innocent one, a rule the next section develops.10 Each result follows from what the actor controls. Eli and George chose to go where they went, and that choice is the one the tort holds them to.
Purpose is the easy route to intent, and Eli had it. The second route reaches an actor who does not want the entry but knows it will occur. A smelter that knows its operation emits chemicals that must come to earth on someone’s property has intent to cause the intrusion in this sense, though it may not know whose farm will receive them.11 Its argument fails for the same reason Romeo’s does when he heaves his sneakers into a crowded grandstand and then protests that he did not know who would be hit. He knew someone would be hit, and the smelter knew that some owner’s land would take its pollutants. Whether airborne particles can ever be a trespass is contested, and a growing number of courts say they cannot and send such claims to nuisance; the point here is only that the knowledge standard is met.12 Substantial certainty counts as much as purpose because an actor who knows an entry will result has the same power to refrain as one who wants it, and hoping it will not happen does not undo the choice to act.
A mere risk of entry is a different matter, and the unintended entries show where the line falls. Danica’s car ends up on William’s land, but she did not intend for either herself or the car to be where it ended up, so she is not liable in trespass. In that sense trespass to land is an intentional tort, whatever label its history has earned.13 Dean deliberately speeds down the street, loses control, and veers onto Genet’s property. He meant to speed, and he could foresee that he might lose control and leave the road, yet he did not act with the purpose of entering Genet’s land or with substantial certainty that he would. Genet must sue him in negligence rather than trespass, so long as Dean does not linger on the property once his car stops.14 Both drivers intended an act, whether driving or speeding, but neither intended the entry that followed. Intent to do an act is not intent to bring about its consequence, and knowing that one’s conduct merely risks a consequence does not establish intent, though it may be negligence when the risk is unreasonable.15
Set Danica beside George. Neither meant to violate anyone’s rights, and neither meant any harm, yet George is liable and Danica is not. George chose the movement that took him onto Tom’s land, while Danica’s car reached William’s land without any choice of hers about that. Where the actor chose the entry, he could have refrained, and the law can fairly place the loss on the one who decided. Where the entry was only a risk of the actor’s conduct, the sensible question is whether he was careless in running that risk, and that question belongs to negligence, where the plaintiff must show harm to the land, the possessor, or something in which the possessor has a protected interest.16 The line falls where a known danger stops being a foreseeable risk that a reasonable person would avoid and becomes, in the actor’s own mind, a substantial certainty.17
The intent must also attach to a movement that is the actor’s own. A person carried onto land by force, as in Smith v. Stone, has made no entry of his own and is not liable, although those who carried him may be.18 In Gilbert v. Stone, twelve armed men compelled the defendant to enter the plaintiff’s land and steal a horse. The entry counted as intentional, with an excuse of duress left open.19 A threat therefore leaves the intent intact, since the defendant still chose the movement, and it raises a separate question of excuse that arises after the intent analysis.
Motive plays no part in the intent inquiry. Revenge, protest, theft, or a wish to be of help may aggravate, mitigate, or excuse the wrong, since malice may support punitive damages and self-defense may be a complete defense. The prima facie case, however, needs only the defendant’s conduct, the invasion of a legally protected interest, and the requisite intent.20 Nor does the harmlessness of the invasion bear on the element. A pipe that runs beneath a corner of Zarvas’s lot, doing no damage and perhaps even keeping the lot dry, is on Zarvas’s property all the same.21
Trespass is sometimes called a strict liability tort, and its history explains the label. The old action of trespass lay for direct and forcible injuries and case for the rest, so a person struck by a log thrown into the highway could sue the thrower in trespass, while a traveler who stumbled over the stationary log later had only an action on the case.22 The question was how the injury came about, not what the defendant had in mind. With the shift to fault as the principal basis of tort liability, almost all jurisdictions now require that the entry be intentional, reckless, or negligent, except where strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities applies.23 A minority still hold an actor liable for any interference with possession, even one that was completely unintentional, whether it was accidental, in good faith, or by mistake.24 Under the majority rule the strict label survives only in the narrow sense that the actor need not know the land is another’s.25
Throughout, the actor’s ignorance of who owns the land, a harmless motive, and the absence of damage are irrelevant, because none of them bears on whether the entry was intended. A threat does not defeat the second or third step; it raises the separate question whether the entry is excused.
Transferred Intent
Intent to enter, as developed above, comes from the actor’s purpose or knowledge about the entry itself. A second source applies when an act aimed at one person or one kind of invasion produces a different result, and the aim then carries over to what actually happened. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 16 states the principle for bodily contact: an actor who means to affect one person and instead touches another is liable to the other as fully as if the other had been the target.27 The same principle governs trespass to land, so the question shifts from whether the actor meant to enter to whether the actor meant to commit a wrong of the right kind.28 The doctrine is called transferred intent, and it explains how an actor can be liable for an entry that was never part of any plan.
Transferred intent operates among five torts that descend from the old action of trespass: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels.29 If the actor intends any one of the five and brings about any one of the five, he is liable even though the plaintiff was not the intended target. Connors, angry at Lugo, hurls a rock meaning to batter him, and the rock misses and rolls onto Parvi’s land. Connors intended a battery and accomplished an unauthorized entry on land in Parvi’s possession. Both torts are among the five, so his intent to batter stands in for the intent to enter, and he is liable to Parvi for trespass.30 Parvi need not show that Connors aimed at the land, knew it was there, or wished it harm.
The doctrine bridges three kinds of gap between plan and result. The victim may differ, as when a blow aimed at one person lands on another. The tort may differ, as in Brown v. Martinez, where a landowner fired a shot to frighten intruders off his watermelon patch and was held liable for battery when the shot struck the plaintiff; an intended assault had become a battery.31 Or both may differ, as with Connors, whose rock was meant for Lugo’s body and came to rest on Parvi’s land. Most courses begin the intentional torts with harms to the person, and the prototype there is a punch in the nose or, as in Vosburg v. Putney, a twelve-year-old’s kick to a fourteen-year-old’s leg just below the knee.32 Trespass to land borrows the same logic for a different kind of result.
The reason for transfer lies in what an intentional tort punishes. An actor who hurls a rock at another has chosen a direct physical invasion of someone’s protected interest and could have refrained, and that choice is as culpable when the rock misses as when it hits. If liability required the intent to match the actual victim and the actual tort, poor aim would become a defense, and Parvi, whose control of the land was disturbed just as fully, would be left to prove negligence and harm instead. The law attaches greater blame to intentional misconduct and answers it with a broader scope of liability, so the intent behind the first choice follows the actor to wherever the consequence lands.33
Two limits keep the doctrine from reaching too far. The first is the list itself. The five torts share an origin in the old trespass action, and each involves a direct and immediate physical interference with a person or with tangible property.34 Because they guard against the same kind of deliberate physical invasion, intent to commit one is a fair measure of the actor’s willingness to commit another. A tort built differently offers no such guarantee, and intent neither transfers to it nor from it. In Clark v. Gay, the defendant committed a murder in the plaintiff’s house, and the plaintiff sought the value of the house because his family refused to live in it afterward. The doctrine did not apply, because that loss is not one of the direct physical invasions the group covers. In McGee v. Vanover, the defendant beat a third person and a bystander sued for the mental distress the beating caused. The beating was a battery, but the bystander’s injury was distress, a tort outside the group, and the doctrine again did not apply.35 Dean, from the first part of this section, shows the limit from the other side. He did enter Genet’s property, but the act he intended, speeding, is not a tort on the list, so there is nothing to transfer, and the entry remains at most a matter of negligence.36
The second limit concerns the result side of the transfer. Transferred intent fills the mental element of the resulting tort and leaves the physical element for the plaintiff to prove, so an entry must actually have occurred. Section 158 imposes liability on one who “enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so,” and an intent to trespass that never produces an entry is therefore not a trespass; the law recognizes no tort of attempted trespass.37 Marlow sneaks out at night to cut down Hendry’s trees, but he misreads the boundary and fells two trees that stand on his own land. His intent to commit a trespass was real, yet nothing entered Hendry’s land. Connors’s rock and Marlow’s saw differ in one fact: the rock came to rest on Parvi’s land, and nothing Marlow did reached Hendry’s. That fact separates a completed trespass from an unrealized intention.