Concept
Intentional Versus Negligent Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Intentional Versus Negligent Distress
The defendant's state of mind decides which emotional-distress tort a plaintiff must sue under. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) imposes liability when extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress, so a defendant who was merely careless falls outside it.1 A plaintiff upset by carelessness may still have a claim, but it belongs to negligent infliction of emotional distress, which asks for different showings. The Third Restatement keeps the two in adjacent sections. Section 46 covers extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm. Section 47 covers negligent conduct that causes serious emotional harm, but only when the conduct places the plaintiff in danger of immediate bodily harm or occurs in specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligence is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.2 The earlier units of this chapter assumed the first path. This unit sets the two side by side, so you can sort a fact pattern by mental state and then apply only the rules that belong to the path you chose.
Both torts must answer the same worry: distress is invisible, and a claim for it is cheap to assert. In the intentional tort, the defendant's mental state does much of the work. Courts allowed recovery for severe distress first where the harm was caused intentionally or recklessly. A defendant who meant to shock, frighten, or severely upset the plaintiff, or who knew that result was highly probable, gives some objective assurance that the injury is real, and society has an interest in deterring such conduct.3 A merely negligent defendant offers no comparable assurance. The circumstantial probability that the plaintiff was severely distressed is lower, and liability for the fright may be out of proportion to the defendant's fault.4 Negligence law answers with limits on who may recover and what must be proved. Those limits serve the policy of requiring objective assurance that claims are genuine and of keeping liability proportionate to the risk, and that policy explains rules that otherwise look arbitrary.5
Negligence law admits recovery by four routes:
- A plaintiff whom the defendant's negligence physically injures recovers for the distress as “parasitic” damages. Courts have found enough impact in a slight blow, jolt, or jar, a trifling burn or electric shock, or dust in the eye.6
- A plaintiff in the zone of danger, within reach of a risk the defendant's negligence created and legitimately fearing injury from it, recovers on satisfactory proof in most jurisdictions even without impact.7
- A direct victim is the target of negligence in a setting such as a funeral home's mishandling or misidentification of a corpse or a physician's negligent diagnosis of a dreaded or serious disease. The Third Restatement's comment to § 47 lists these as “direct victim” cases.8
- A bystander who watches someone else be hurt proceeds under a category of its own, the territory of Dillon v. Legg.9
Each route ties the claim to something outside the plaintiff's own account of feeling upset: a touch, a danger, or a recognized category of case. The intentional tort needs none of them. Section 46(1) asks about the defendant's conduct and mental state and the plaintiff's severe distress, and it does not ask whether the plaintiff was touched, endangered, or related to anyone.10
A driver who runs a red light and narrowly misses a pedestrian shows the other pole.11 The driver neither wanted nor consciously risked the pedestrian's distress, so the intentional tort is unavailable however frightened the pedestrian was. The pedestrian is not necessarily without a remedy, because a narrow miss is the standard zone-of-danger case, and most jurisdictions now allow recovery for fright there on satisfactory proof.12 One case turns on what the defendant meant, and the other on where the plaintiff stood and whether the fear of injury was legitimate.
Both torts demand serious distress, so severity does not separate them. What separates them is how courts have required it to be proved. The intentional tort rejects the plaintiff who merely becomes unhappy, humiliated, or mildly despondent for a short time and loses a night or two of sleep. When the anguish is great, and especially when it is prolonged, most courts and the Third Restatement allow the claim whether or not it comes with physical manifestation or bodily harm, although a few jurisdictions still require resulting bodily harm.13 Negligence is where the manifestation requirement has lived. Many courts hold that negligent conduct must have produced some physical manifestation, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or cardiac arrest, and that requirement might be eliminated if the conduct is proved intentional.14 Even in negligence the requirement is eroding. A large number of cases have dropped it or hold it inapplicable when the facts show the reality of the harm, it has been dropped for bystander and direct-harm categories, and the Third Restatement disavows it in favor of “serious emotional disturbance.”15 Most states have likewise modified or rejected the older limits, although many still want some evidence that the distress is severe.16
The intentional tort measures the plaintiff's reaction against ordinary sensitivity. The defendant is not liable to the extent the plaintiff's response falls outside the range of normal human reactions, so the conduct must be such that a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity would experience severe distress. As a corollary, a defendant who intended only severe distress does not answer for greater harm, such as illness or other bodily harm, unless the conduct created a foreseeable risk of it.17 Under the modern view, a plaintiff whose stimulus would cause a reasonable person serious distress recovers for all the harm caused, even harm made worse by predisposition or special vulnerability.18
Third-party claims show the sharpest difference in what each tort asks of the defendant. Under § 46(2), when extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a third person, the defendant is liable only if the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress in one of two kinds of plaintiff. The first is a member of the third person's immediate family who is present, and she recovers whether or not the distress results in bodily harm. The second is any other person who is present, and he recovers only if the distress results in bodily harm.19 In either case the mental state must reach the plaintiff's own distress. Negligence law reaches a plaintiff who watches another person be hurt through its separate bystander category, which by definition does not depend on proof that the defendant intended or consciously risked the watcher's distress.
The Second Restatement's illness provisions draw the same line between intentional and unintentional fault. Section 312 makes an actor who intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to distress that the actor should recognize as likely to cause illness or other bodily harm liable for the illness or harm of which the distress is a legal cause. That liability holds although the actor has no intention of inflicting the harm, and irrespective of whether the act is directed against the plaintiff or a third person.20 Section 313 is the unintentional counterpart. It imposes liability for resulting illness or bodily harm on an actor who unintentionally causes distress, if the actor should have realized that the conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress and, from facts known, should have realized that the distress might result in illness or bodily harm. It does not apply to illness caused by distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the actor's negligence otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.21 The reach to third persons is where intent changes the result. One way to understand the difference is that an actor who set out to distress someone chose the target and the method, while a careless actor chose no one. By their terms, both sections compensate illness or other bodily harm, whereas the Third Restatement does not require any evidence of illness or other bodily manifestation of severe distress.22
The intentional tort also carries constitutional exposure. When the outrage consists of publication, the First Amendment limits a State's authority to protect its citizens from intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the ad-parody litigation behind the Hustler rule, a jury found that the parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff, so the libel claim failed. The jury nonetheless ruled for the plaintiff on the emotional-distress claim and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages from each petitioner.23 The Supreme Court framed the question as whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by an ad parody that is offensive to him and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.24 The split verdict shows that the distress claim is scored on its own elements, and § 46(1) contains no falsity element.