Concept
Damages and Employer Liability
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Damages and Employer Liability
Proving the elements of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) settles liability, and the same provision defines what that liability covers. The defendant answers for the severe emotional distress that the extreme and outrageous conduct caused and, if bodily harm results from the distress, for the bodily harm as well.1 The bodily-harm rules covered earlier therefore affect the size of a recovery as well as its availability. Section 312 adds a second route to compensation for illness or other bodily harm that follows intentionally and unreasonably inflicted distress.2
Two questions remain once liability is established. The first concerns money: what a plaintiff must prove to be compensated, and when a defendant can be made to pay more than the plaintiff lost. The second concerns who pays. The defendants in these cases are often supervisors, collectors, and managers whose roles give them power over the plaintiff, so the plaintiff will want to reach the employer too. Whether that is possible depends on how closely the conduct was tied to the job.
Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Section 46(1) states the remedy in the same sentence that states the wrong. A defendant who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress is liable for that distress and for any bodily harm that results from it.3 Compensatory damages are the money measure of those two losses.
Severity of distress does double work. It bears on the amount of recovery, and it is also a necessary element of any recovery at all.4 Courts are unwilling to redress minor psychic harm. A plaintiff who becomes unhappy, humiliated, or mildly despondent for a short time and spends a sleepless night or two cannot recover.5 Suppose a jury finds that a landlord's conduct was outrageous but that the tenant suffered only brief, passing upset. The tenant has failed an element, and a request for nominal damages as a token acknowledgment of the wrong cannot repair that failure.
The plaintiff does not have to show physical injury. If the anguish is great, and especially if it is prolonged, most courts will allow the action whether or not the suffering has any physical manifestation and whether or not bodily harm results. A few jurisdictions still require resulting bodily harm as a condition of liability.6 Bodily harm that does follow is added compensable loss under the last clause of § 46(1). A plaintiff's pre-existing susceptibility to distress does not necessarily defeat liability, so long as the conduct intensified the existing psychological stress.7
Punitive damages answer a different question. Compensatory damages ask what the plaintiff lost, and punitive damages ask what the defendant should pay for the way the defendant behaved. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania law and defined punitive damages through Restatement of Torts § 908(1) as damages other than compensatory or nominal, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. The court predicted that Pennsylvania courts would sanction them in appropriate cases of this tort.8
Emotional harm shows why a plaintiff may need such an award. In Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., a jury awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages against a hotel for an infestation in its rooms. The hotel argued that punitive damages could not exceed four times the compensatory award, or $20,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the verdict. The hotel's behavior was outrageous, the compensable harm was slight and hard to quantify because much of it was emotional, and the hotel may have profited by concealing the infestation and continuing to rent rooms, since refunds may have cost less than closing to fumigate.9 In Cheatham v. Pohle, the defendant photocopied photographs, added Cheatham's name, work location and phone number, her new husband's name, and her attorney's name, and distributed at least sixty copies around the small community where both lived and worked. The jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages on her privacy and emotional distress claims.10
The same outrageous conduct does double duty. The plaintiff had to prove it to establish liability, and the jury weighs it again in deciding whether to punish. Chuy saw no inconsistency in awarding punitive damages by the same legal standard used to determine liability for compensatory damages, because the purposes of the two forms of damages are quite distinct.11 Availability varies by jurisdiction. Chuy acknowledged that not all states recognizing the tort allow punitive damages, contrasting Illinois law, which did not sanction them, with California law, which did.12 Where they are available, the fact that the conduct is also a crime does not bar them in most states. The double jeopardy argument has failed, and so has the argument that due process forbids quasi-criminal punishment without the safeguards of criminal procedure.13
Even where the standard is met, the award is not automatic. Chuy cautioned that liability under § 46 does not make punitive damages proper in every case. The factfinder asks whether punitive damages would be well served in light of all the circumstances, including the character of the act, the motive of the tortfeasor, and the relation between the parties.14
The motive that supports punishment need not be personal hatred. Conduct with the character of outrage is enough, as when a couple forcibly removed a denture from a former employee's mouth to hold as collateral for a loan in Jones v. Fisher. Some states allow malice to be inferred from conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct.15 Intentional conduct is not always enough, however. In Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc., summary judgment on punitive damages was upheld because the agency's actions, although intentional, were neither malicious nor vindictive. In Doe v. Isaacs, a hit-and-run drunk driver's conduct was gross negligence but not the willful recklessness that would support punitive damages.16 Because § 46(1) already requires intent or recklessness together with extreme outrageousness, a plaintiff who wins on liability will usually have shown more than carelessness. That overlap is why one standard can serve both purposes.
Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski applies these rules to a workplace defendant. The Alaska Supreme Court said that the tort will support punitive damages and listed its elements as intentional conduct, which is extreme or outrageous, and which causes severe emotional distress or bodily harm. It held that the jury could reasonably have found those elements on the facts. After Kotowski reported sexual harassment, her employer fired her rather than address her claims on their merits. It used pretextual reasons, broke explicit promises that she would not be fired, and subjected her to a lengthy and hostile interrogation.17 Whether an employer can be made to pay punitive damages for what an employee did is a separate question about responsibility, and the next subsection takes it up.
Employer Liability
A plaintiff who wins against a supervisor, collector, or physician will usually want to reach the employer as well, and Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club shows how the question arises. The statements that caused the harm were the team physician's, Dr. Nixon's, yet the club was the party facing punitive damages. On appeal the Eagles argued that they were innocent of wrongdoing in regard to Dr. Nixon's statements. They said that punitive damages should not be assessed against a principal who neither participated in nor approved its agent's tortious conduct, because damages designed to punish wrongdoers should fall only on those personally responsible.19
That argument separates two questions. The first is whether an employer answers in compensatory damages for an employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is vicarious liability, responsibility imposed because of the employee's act and not because of anything the employer itself did. The second is what more a plaintiff must show before the employer can be punished. The full law of an employer's responsibility belongs to agency, so this subsection covers only what matters for this tort.
Vicarious liability is not confined to negligence. It includes torts negligently or recklessly committed, and it can reach intentional torts committed within the scope of the employment and at least in part in furtherance of the employer's business. The employee's motive or purpose to serve the employer's interest is the key fact.20 An employer may be liable for assault and battery by an employee trying to collect a debt, and the same may be true of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, deceit, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the employee acts in furtherance of the employer's business.21
Debt collection is the standard illustration. A bill collector who intentionally inflicts emotional distress on a debtor in an effort to extract payment subjects the employer to liability.22 Collecting is the work the collector was hired to do, and the tort was committed in pursuit of it. The opposite pole is the employee who acts from purely personal motives, whether out of a desire to avenge the seduction of his wife or in a quarrel in no way connected with the employer's interests. That employee has departed from the employment, and the employer is not liable.23 Whose purpose the conduct served separates the two cases, and the same question decides closer ones. In Manning v. Grimsley, a pitcher threw at hecklers. Whether the club could be vicariously liable depended on whether he acted out of purely personal offense or because the hecklers were interfering with his ability to do his job.24 Whether an intentional tort falls within the scope of employment is generally a question for the jury.25 A minority of courts go further and hold the employer vicariously liable for other intentional torts committed on the job, such as a fight that grows out of an employment-related argument.26
The first caller's dislike of the debtor does not release the agency, because the test asks whether the conduct served the business at least in part. A mixed motive stays on the liable side of the line, and only a purely personal motive takes the employee outside the employment.
Two other routes to the employer bypass the scope question. Where the employer owes the plaintiff a duty of protection, as a carrier, innkeeper, caregiver, or hospital does, the employer is vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort even if the employee acted for entirely personal reasons.27 An employer can also be tied to the wrong through its own conduct. In Norcon, the evidence justified a finding that the employer knew or should have known of Posehn's sexual harassment of female employees and took no remedial measures. Posehn had several victims, and he roomed and partied next door to Norcon's managers, some of whom partied with him. Norcon had not told its employees what to do about harassment, and when Kotowski complained, it turned a deaf ear to the substance of her complaint.28 That finding rests on what the employer itself failed to do, so it does not depend on whether the harasser was acting within the scope of his job.
Compensatory liability does not carry punitive damages with it, because punishment has a different target. Punitive damages are meant to punish the party responsible for the outrage, so imposing them on an employer whose only link to the wrong is having hired the wrongdoer would punish no decision the employer made. The Restatement test quoted in Chuy reflects that logic. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a principal because of an agent's act only if one of four conditions is met. The principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him. Alternatively, the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.29 Each condition ties the penalty to the employer's own choice or to the act of someone who stands in the employer's place. Authorization and ratification show that the employer chose the act, and reckless employment of an unfit agent shows that it chose the risk. A manager's act within the scope of employment is treated as the act of the enterprise.
Jurisdictions do not all draw the line in the same place. In Norcon, the employer argued that punitive damages for sexual harassment require actual participation or willful indifference by upper management. The Alaska Supreme Court answered that willful indifference is a more demanding standard than the reckless indifference standard in the jury instruction. It held that the evidence could support a finding that management was recklessly indifferent. The court relied on the pervasiveness of Posehn's conduct, the managers' association with him in his illicit partying, Norcon's failure to communicate an anti-sexual harassment policy, and its response to the report it received.30 On an exam, apply the standard the question supplies and, if none is given, the Restatement test.