Concept
Meaning of Intent
Battery
Meaning of Intent
Intent is the element on which most battery disputes turn. The Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that the actor act intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the same clause governs offensive contacts.1 Everyday speech uses “intended” loosely: a person who swings an arm on purpose might say the swing was intended whether or not anyone stood nearby. Tort law is stricter. The defendant's mind must be aimed at the contact, or at the apprehension of it, and a defendant who deliberately moves a hand commits a battery only if the defendant meant to make contact by the movement.2
That narrowing is what separates battery from carelessness. The intent requirement confines intentional-tort liability to defendants who act with a higher level of culpability than carelessness: those who act with a purpose to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or with knowledge that the act will cause one.3 Section 18(2) draws the line for offensive contacts. An actor who lacks the stated intention is not liable for a mere offensive contact, even though the act involved an unreasonable risk of it and would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.4 A defendant who wants a contact, or knows it will follow, has chosen to invade another person's body. A defendant who only creates a risk has failed to take care, and negligence law handles that failure.
The four subsections below test this idea in turn. The first supplies the two ways a defendant's mind can be directed at a contact. The others take up the situations in which the definition is most often misapplied: how much risk-taking still falls short of intent, why the defendant's reason for acting does not matter, and how youth and mental illness fit. One question runs through all of them: what was the defendant trying to bring about, or certain would happen, with respect to the contact itself?
Purpose or Substantial Certainty
The Restatement clause names what the intent must be aimed at but never defines intending. Courts supply the definition from the Restatement comment on the character of the actor's intention, which the Washington Supreme Court quoted in Garratt v. Dailey: an act is done with the intention of bringing about a contact when it is done for the purpose of causing the contact, or with knowledge that the contact is substantially certain to be produced.5 A defendant therefore intends a contact in either of two situations: the defendant wants it, or the defendant knows it is all but sure to happen. These are commonly called purpose intent and knowledge intent, and the word or between them means that either state of mind is enough.6
Each route stands alone, which is easiest to see in defendants who have one state of mind and lack the other. A person who hurls a stone at an enemy, doubting that it will carry that far, is not substantially certain of a hit. The desire to hit is nonetheless a purpose, so a stone that lands on the enemy completes a battery, and the long odds are no defense.7 A person who sees a pedestrian walking directly below a second-story window and tips out a scrub bucket has no wish to offend anyone, yet knows the water will land on the pedestrian, and that knowledge supplies the intent.8 Ill will is beside the point on both routes. A jury instruction that demands substantial certainty even from a defendant who acted in order to hit therefore misstates the rule.9
That asymmetry explains when probability matters. If the defendant acts with an intent to cause contact, it does not matter that the probability of harm or offense is low; liability follows if what was intended occurs. If the defendant does not intend contact, there must be a near certainty that it will occur.10
The leading illustration involved a child. Brian Dailey, less than six years old, picked up a lightly built wood-and-canvas lawn chair in a backyard, moved it sideways a few feet, and sat in it. He then discovered Ruth Garratt about to sit where the chair had been, hurriedly got up, and tried to move the chair toward her to help her sit. Because he was small and clumsy, he could not get it under her in time, and she fell and fractured her hip.11 The trial court found that Brian lacked any intent to injure Ruth, to play a prank on her, to embarrass her, or to commit a battery, and it did not hold him liable.12
Brian's moving of the chair was a conceded volitional act, so the act requirement was met and the case turned on intent. Had Ruth proved that Brian moved the chair while she was in the act of sitting down, his purpose of causing her contact with the ground would have been plain.13 The Washington Supreme Court then asked whether a battery could still exist on the facts as found, and it answered yes. A battery would be established if, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that Ruth would attempt to sit where the chair had been, and the absence of any intent to injure, prank, or embarrass would not absolve him if he had that knowledge.14 Because the findings did not squarely address what Brian knew, the court remanded for a finding on that question.15
On remand the trial judge looked more carefully at the time sequence. He found that Ruth had begun the slow process of being seated when Brian quickly removed the chair and sat on it, and that Brian knew with substantial certainty she would try to sit where the chair had been. Judgment for $11,000 followed and was affirmed on a second appeal.16 Both rounds involved the same chair, the same fall, and the same absence of malice, so the finding about what Brian knew when he moved the chair is what changed the result. Had he moved the chair before Ruth was in view and noticed her only as she began to sit, he would have lacked that knowledge when he acted, and the episode would be carelessness at worst.
The test is subjective: the question is what this defendant actually knew. The comment quoted in Garratt says it is not enough that the actor realizes or should realize that an act carries a very grave risk of contact; unless the actor realizes that contact will result to a substantial certainty, the actor lacks the intent battery requires.17 A standard built on what a reasonable person would have known would be the negligence standard under another name. A state of mind rarely has direct proof, so courts allow it to be inferred. The defendant's conduct, in the context of the defendant's surroundings and what the defendant presumably knew and perceived, is evidence of intent, and a fact-finder may infer that the defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of the act in light of circumstances of which the defendant is aware.18 The remand shows the inference at work, since the judge reached the knowledge finding by reading the sequence of events and not by hearing Brian admit it.
A past multistate bar exam question applies the definition. Peavey was walking peacefully along a public street when he met Dorwin, a stranger. Without provocation or warning, Dorwin picked up a rock and struck Peavey. Dorwin was mentally ill and suffered recurrent hallucinations.19 The tempting defenses are that Dorwin did not want to hurt Peavey and that he did not understand his act to be wrong. Neither removes intent, because intent concerns the contact. The one fact that does remove it is that Dorwin did not know he was striking a person, because without that knowledge he could not have committed a wrongful act.20 Jurisdictions differ on whether a defendant must also mean the contact to be harmful or offensive, a split the next section takes up, so this question is best read as testing the knowledge route to intent.
Risk Is Not Intent
Section 18(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts marks the outer edge of intent by saying what falls short of it. An act not done with the intention described in §18(1)(a) does not make the actor liable for a mere offensive contact, even though the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and would therefore be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.22 The subsection concedes a good deal to the plaintiff before it denies recovery. It assumes the risk was unreasonable, which is the ordinary test for negligence, and it allows that the conduct might be reckless. Even so, the actor stays outside battery unless the actor's mind was directed at the contact itself, by purpose or by substantial certainty.
The same boundary holds for harmful contacts, and its source is a Restatement comment that the Washington Supreme Court quoted in Garratt. It is not enough that the act itself is done intentionally, even if the actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact. That realization may make the conduct negligent or even reckless, but the actor lacks the necessary intention unless the actor realizes that the contact will result to a substantial certainty.23 The comment sets two mental states side by side. Negligence and recklessness concern the risk the actor created or should have appreciated, while substantial certainty is a fact about what the actor in fact realized. A very grave risk is still only a risk.
Because the difference is one of degree, the line must be drawn somewhere along a continuum on which the chance of contact runs from remote to foreseeable to nearly sure. Courts place it where the known danger stops being a risk that a careful person would avoid and becomes, in the actor's own mind, a substantial certainty. Certainty of the consequences is what separates an intentional tort from a negligent or reckless one: if the result is intended or virtually certain to occur, the tort is intentional.24 Below that point the claim belongs to negligence, if it exists at all.
A deliberate act reveals little about intent, because the same voluntary movement can accompany either state of mind. A driver who looks away from the road and hits a pedestrian, or a joker who throws a snowball at a tree and hits a pedestrian who unexpectedly steps into its path, has acted voluntarily. Yet neither acted for the purpose of making contact or knowing it was substantially certain, so each may be negligent but neither has committed a battery.25 If a deliberate act were enough, every accident would be a battery and the intent element would do no work. The same person can land on either side of the line depending on what her mind was fixed on. Chu, who bumps Munoz because she stepped off a bus without looking, commits no battery. Chu, who shoves Munoz to get her out of the way, does, because she is substantially certain that Munoz will find the contact offensive.26
The risk-versus-certainty question matters only for a defendant who lacked the purpose to touch. A defendant who acts to make contact is liable even when success was improbable, while a defendant with no such purpose must be shown to have been nearly certain of the contact.27 A plaintiff therefore cannot cross the line by showing only that the defendant ought to have seen danger.
The same boundary governs physical harm: a defendant who negligently or even recklessly drives a car into the plaintiff, intending no contact, commits no battery, as in Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co.28 Litigation often presents the line as a choice between theories. In Wallace v. Rosen, Rosen told Wallace, “you've got to get moving because this is a fire drill.” Wallace testified that Rosen pushed her and she slipped and fell down the stairs, while Rosen denied pushing her but admitted touching her back. The trial court refused Wallace's requested jury instruction on civil battery, and the jury found for the defendants on the negligence count.29 What Rosen meant by the touch is what separates the two theories. A push meant to move Wallace along would be an intended contact, while an incidental touch that caused her to slip would be at most negligence.
A defendant's denial does not end the matter. The defendant's conduct in context is evidence of intent, and a fact-finder may infer that the defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of the act in light of circumstances of which the defendant is aware.30 A cyclist who rides down a pedestrian in plain view on a wide, empty path will have trouble persuading a jury that the collision was unintended. Had Hollis seen a shopper standing in his lane with no room to swerve and kept driving, a jury could likewise find that he knew contact was substantially certain.
The label attached to the conduct decides what the defendant owes. A defendant who commits a battery is liable for all the resulting harm, including injury nobody expected: a defendant who shoves another intending the push answers for an unforeseen concussion, though he had no intent to cause it.31 Malice in an intentional wrong may also support punitive damages.32 The label also bears on who pays. Liability insurance was introduced late in the nineteenth century in response to the increased liability of tort defendants, and it covers, among other things, damages for bodily injury or property damage that a tort defendant must pay a victim.33 Whether a judgment for an intended contact falls within a particular policy depends on the policy's terms, so a defendant has every reason to concede carelessness while denying purpose or knowledge.
Motive Versus Intent
Once intent is defined by purpose or substantial certainty, the remaining question is whether the defendant's reason for wanting the contact matters. For the intent element, it does not. Neither Restatement clause asks why the actor wanted the contact; each asks only whether the actor acted intending it.35 The reason behind the desire is motive, such as revenge, protest, punishment, theft, self-defense, or even a wish to be of help, while intent is the desire or knowledge directed at the contact itself.36 Two actors can therefore intend the identical contact for opposite reasons, one out of spite and the other out of kindness, and each satisfies the element.
The standard illustration is Mohr v. Williams. A patient consulted an ear specialist about her right ear and consented to an operation on it. Once she was unconscious, the surgeon decided the right ear needed no operation, found a worse condition in the left ear, and operated on the left without reviving her to ask. The operation was skillful and successful.37 The Minnesota Supreme Court nonetheless held that the act amounted at least to a technical battery. If the operation was performed without consent and the circumstances did not justify it, the operation was wrongful, and any unauthorized touching of another's person, except in the spirit of pleasantry, is a battery.38 Proof of wrongful intent or negligence is unnecessary when the contact itself is unlawful, though the absence of malice may be weighed in assessing damages.39 The surgeon plainly desired the contact, since he deliberately cut into the left ear, and his reason, the patient's health, was motive. Whether consent or an emergency could have privileged the operation is a separate inquiry that belongs to the defenses, and for the intent element the surgeon's good faith removed nothing.
A helper who presses on over an objection stands in the same position. In Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., the defendant's employee tried to set the plaintiff's broken arm over her protests. He was only trying to help, but he knew from what she told him that she found the contact unwelcome, and that knowledge met the intent requirement for battery.40 The surgeon and the rink employee differ in how the contact came to be unwelcome, since the patient had consented to an operation on the other ear while the skater objected aloud. Each, however, substituted a personal view of what would benefit the plaintiff for the plaintiff's own view, and the plaintiff has the right to decide for herself which contacts are beneficial.41 A playful or kindly reason fares no better, because the absence of any intent to injure, to play a prank, or to embarrass does not absolve a defendant who knew the contact was substantially certain.42
Two supports sit under the rule. The first is each person's authority over her own body: a plaintiff need not submit to the prodding of a defendant who wishes to be gallant.43 If good motive defeated the claim, bodily integrity would be protected only against actors who thought badly of their own conduct, and nearly every defendant, once sued, reports the best of intentions. The second is proof. A fact-finder can infer intent from the defendant's conduct in its surroundings and from what the defendant presumably knew and perceived, whereas a claimed motive lives in the defendant's mind and is easy to assert after the fact.44 Confining the element to the contact keeps the trial on questions the evidence can answer.
Motive is irrelevant to the prima facie case, but it does work elsewhere, and the rule should not be overstated. A plaintiff makes out the prima facie case by showing the defendant's conduct, the invasion of a legally protected interest, and the requisite intent. A defendant's reasons can then matter in a few places: malice may support punitive damages, and self-defense may be a complete defense.45 A defendant who acts in self-defense desired the contact and so satisfies the intent element, yet escapes liability if the conduct is privileged. Good faith also bears on the amount of recovery, and in Mohr the court said the nature of the ailment, the beneficial character of the operation, and the defendant's good faith should be weighed in setting damages.46 The first jury awarded $14,322.50, the trial judge found that sum excessive and ordered a new trial, and the plaintiff prevailed again on retrial.47
Children and Mental Illness
Neither §13(a) nor §18(1)(a) makes an exception for the very young or for people whose thinking is disordered, so the definition from the preceding subsections applies to them as it applies to anyone.49 The Washington Supreme Court said so in Garratt. It described the law of battery it had just applied as the law applicable to adults, attached no significance to Brian's being a child under six, and held that his age mattered only in determining what he knew, where his experience, capacity, and understanding were material.50 Age and mental condition therefore enter the analysis as evidence on a single fact, the defendant's actual desire or knowledge about the contact, and they leave the legal standard where it was.
A uniform standard follows from what the tort protects. A plaintiff with a fractured hip bears the same loss whether an adult or a child pulled the chair, and a rule excusing every defendant who could not appreciate wrongfulness would leave that loss on the injured person. A defendant who truly did not know what the act would do is already protected, because without desire or substantial-certainty knowledge of the contact the intent element fails. Garratt shows the protection at work. The court remanded for a finding on what the child knew, since knowledge to a substantial certainty would establish intent even with no purpose to injure or embarrass.51
Courts applying the rule to children have not drawn a fixed age line. A Texas court in Bailey v. C.S. rejected the argument that a four-year-old who struck a babysitter was incapable of the intent an intentional tort requires. A Louisiana court in Fromenthal v. Clark affirmed a ruling that a two-year-old who bit an infant was too young to form intent.52 The two outcomes suggest that the inquiry is factual and tied to the particular child's capacity to know what the act will do, so a child's years are one input into that finding and never a substitute for it.
Mental illness follows the same path. In Wagner v. State, a mentally disabled man, Giese, attacked Mrs. Wagner and threw her to the ground. The Wagners sued the state for negligent supervision, and the state answered that the attack was a battery, a tort for which it had retained immunity. The Wagners replied that Giese could not have committed a battery because he was mentally incapable of intending harm or offense.53 The Utah Supreme Court held that the actor need not intend the contact to be harmful or offensive, so long as the actor deliberately made the contact and the contact is harmful or offensive under the legal test.54 Because the required intent attaches to the contact, Giese's inability to appreciate harm was no obstacle.
Whether that holding states the rule in a given jurisdiction matters most for exactly these defendants. White v. Muniz, a Colorado decision involving a defendant with Alzheimer's disease, described courts as commingling two definitions of intent, one requiring only an intent to make contact and the other requiring an understanding that the contact would be harmful or offensive. The court observed that the commingling rarely matters when the defendant is a mentally alert adult but becomes critical for the very young and the mentally disabled.55 The same decision treated insanity not as a defense in the ordinary sense but as a characteristic that, like infancy, may make the intent element harder to prove.56 Under the contact-only view, a disabled defendant escapes by showing no desire or knowledge of the contact. Under the dual-intent view, the defendant may also point to an inability to grasp that the contact would be harmful or offensive, a split the next sections examine.
The Peavey and Dorwin problem shows how mental illness is sorted into the right element. A multiple-choice question has already narrowed the field of possible errors, so the work lies in knowing the law and reading closely enough to see which element each tempting answer addresses.57 A defense that Dorwin did not understand his act to be wrongful fails, and so does one that he did not desire harm, because intent concerns the contact and is met by purpose or substantial-certainty knowledge without any appreciation of wrongfulness.58 Dorwin chose to pick up a rock and swing it, and the rule treats an irrational choice as still a choice. Tort and criminal standards also diverge here, for courts have held defendants liable in tort after criminal findings of not guilty by reason of insanity, as in Polmatier v. Russ and Delahanty v. Hinckley.59
Illness does its work on the intent element when it takes away the knowledge that a person is there to be touched.
Illness can also defeat a claim one step earlier, at the act requirement. The Restatement requires that the harmful contact be caused by an act done by the person whose liability is in question.60 A seizure or sudden loss of consciousness produces a movement that no will directs, so there is no act to which liability can attach. A hallucinating defendant who deliberately raises a rock has acted, since the delusion distorts the reasons for the movement and leaves the will behind it intact.
One narrow exception qualifies the general rule. Several jurisdictions hold that an institutionalized patient who cannot control or appreciate the consequences of his conduct is not liable for injuries inflicted on those employed to care for him, and California extended the exception to an in-home caregiver on the theory of primary implied assumption of the risk, a doctrine treated in a later chapter.61 The exception reaches only a defined class of plaintiffs, the people hired to care for the patient. A stranger such as Peavey, or a shopper such as Mrs. Wagner, falls outside that class, and the general rule governs those claims.