Concept
Capacity to Form Intent
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
Capacity to Form Intent
Intent, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the word, is a fact about one defendant's mind: the actor desires to cause the consequences of the act, or believes they are substantially certain to result from it.1 The definition mentions no age, no diagnosis, and no level of sobriety, and it does not ask whether the actor ought to have known better. Capacity to form intent, meaning the ability to hold the purpose or the knowledge the definition describes, therefore enters the analysis as evidence of what this defendant in fact wanted or expected. The evidence is ordinary and circumstantial. The defendant's conduct, read against the defendant's surroundings and what the defendant presumably knew and perceived, supports an inference about intent.2
That structure explains how most courts treat defendants whose minds work differently from an average adult's. A very young child, or a person in the grip of a delusion, is less likely to have wanted a contact or to have known it was substantially certain, and the factfinder weighs that likelihood. A rule excusing whole classes of defendants would go further. It would excuse a child or a mentally ill adult who did desire the contact, and the person injured by that choice would have no remedy. The majority approach keeps the inquiry on the one fact that separates an intentional tort from an accident: what this defendant actually had in mind.
Capacity operates at a different point from the voluntary-act requirement. There is no act without volition, so a convulsion, or a movement during sleep when the will is in abeyance, is not the person's act at all.3 Once the will does direct the movement, the act requirement is met even if the decision came in an instant and under heavy pressure; only a purely reflexive reaction, in which mind and will have no share, falls outside it.4 A defendant of limited understanding who deliberately moves an arm has therefore acted, and what remains open is what that will sought or expected. The act requirement asks whether the defendant's will moved the body. Intent asks what that will aimed at or knew would follow. Children, whose limited understanding most often raises the question, come first; mental illness and intoxication follow.
Minors
The definition of intent contains no age limit, so a child is tested on the same two routes as an adult: purpose and substantial certainty.5 The majority of courts follow where that leads. A young child may be liable for an intentional tort if the plaintiff proves every element, including that the child actually desired the consequence or knew it was substantially certain to occur. Age works as evidence. The younger the child, the less likely it is that the child held the purpose or the knowledge the definition requires, and the factfinder weighs that likelihood against what the child presumably knew and perceived.6 Some jurisdictions replace the case-by-case inquiry with a presumption that children below a stated age cannot form the necessary intent.
The majority position has to be justified at both ends of the age range. Refusing an age exemption keeps the inquiry on the choice that makes a tort intentional. A child who understands that a seated person will land on the floor when the chair is pulled away has made that choice, and an exemption for youth would leave the injured person to bear a loss she did nothing to bring about. At the other end, a toddler may be unable to form the purpose or the knowledge at all, and holding that child liable would charge someone for an invasion no one chose. The majority approach handles both ends by demanding proof of the actual state of mind; the presumption jurisdictions fix the lower end in advance.
Garratt v. Dailey, in which the defendant was a small child, shows the majority approach at work. The plaintiff's sister testified that the plaintiff, an arthritic woman, had begun the slow process of sitting down when the defendant quickly removed the chair and sat on it himself, and that he knew, with substantial certainty, that she would try to sit where the chair had been.7 That testimony goes to the second route to intent, and it makes the question the child's own knowledge. What a small boy knew at that moment was a fact to be found, not a matter of what an adult would have understood.
Other decisions land on either side of the line. Bailey v. C.S. rejected the argument that a four-year-old could not form intent, while Fromenthal v. Clark accepted it for a two-year-old who bit an infant. The difference lies in the inference each age supports. A four-year-old can plausibly be found to have understood that a blow would land and hurt; a two-year-old's grasp that a bite will hurt another person is far harder to establish.
The second scene follows the Restatement's distinction between intending an act and intending its contact. Battery liability attaches when the actor pulled the trigger in order to shoot another person, or knowing it was substantially likely that pulling it would have that result. An actor who intentionally fires a bullet without realizing it will reach anyone, as when the bullet hits a person present in the desert without the actor's knowledge, is not liable for an intentional tort.8 A child who swings a bag without perceiving the classmate stands where that shooter stands.
Youth leaves the act requirement where it was. A child's directed movement is an act, since only a purely reflexive reaction in which mind and will have no share falls outside the requirement.9 Age matters at the intent element, where it supplies evidence of what the child desired or knew. A rebuttable presumption lets a plaintiff overcome the inference with proof about the particular child, while a conclusive one closes the question for every child below the line. On an exam, treat the child's age as a fact bearing on the child's state of mind, state the majority rule, and add that a jurisdiction with an age presumption would bar liability below its line. Whether a parent answers for a child's tort is a different question, not taken up here.
Mental Illness and Intoxication
Most mental-condition cases sort themselves at the first step. There cannot be an act without volition, so the convulsive movements of an epileptic and the movements of a sleeper whose will is in abeyance are not acts of that person.11 A defendant whose illness lies in the mind rather than in the muscles stands on the other side of that line whenever the defendant's own will directs the movement. For that defendant the rule is that capacity to form the required intent makes liability possible, and it is no excuse that mental illness induced the act or kept the defendant from thinking or choosing rationally.12
The rule follows from the definition of intent. Intent asks what the defendant desired or believed substantially certain,13 and a disordered mind can desire a contact as surely as any other. Motive is a separate matter. It may aggravate, mitigate, or excuse a wrong, but it is not the same thing as intent,14 so a delusional reason for striking someone does not erase the intent to strike.
Polmatier v. Russ applies the rule where the stakes are highest. The defendant was held liable for the battery of the plaintiff's decedent even though a criminal court had found him not guilty by reason of insanity for the same incident.15 The defendant in Delahanty v. Hinckley, also found not guilty by reason of insanity, argued that his “deluded and psychotic state of mind” should spare him liability to the police officer injured when he shot at President Reagan. The court rejected the argument.16 An insanity acquittal therefore does not carry into the civil case, and the result keeps the loss with the person whose own movement caused it, away from a plaintiff who did nothing to bring it about.
None of this makes the defendant's condition irrelevant. Mental illness may prevent the specific kind of intent that certain torts, deceit among them, require the plaintiff to prove.17 White v. Muniz, a suit against a defendant with Alzheimer's disease, discusses the one narrow exception to the general rule. Several jurisdictions relieve an institutionalized, mentally disabled patient who cannot control or appreciate the consequences of his conduct of liability for injuries to those employed to care for him, in intentional-tort and negligence cases alike.18 The exception reaches only claims by caretakers and leaves the general rule in force against everyone else. A paid caregiver suing the person in her care is also an old posture. In a 1937 Massachusetts action for assault and battery, the plaintiff was a registered nurse employed to take care of the defendant, and the only question of law reported was whether the judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant.19
The hallucinations are present in both scenes; what differs is what Dorwin knew about the contact. In the first he aimed at a person he saw. In the second he aimed at no one, which puts him where the shooter stands whose bullet hits a person in the desert without the shooter's knowledge. He intended the act and not the contact, so the tort is not an intentional one.20 The illness matters in the second scene only because it explains why he lacked purpose and knowledge, which makes it evidence on intent.
Dorwin acted on both afternoons, because his will directed the swing. A sleepwalker who lashes out at a roommate stands elsewhere, because the question is whether she did anything at all. Movements of the body during sleep, when the will is in abeyance, are not the sleeper's acts, and without an act there is no tort, intentional or otherwise.21 Illness that clouds a defendant's judgment about what he is doing leaves the will operating and goes to intent. A condition that removes the will from the movement removes the act, and intent never arises.
Voluntary intoxication is treated like mental illness. It may explain the conduct, but it does not prevent a defendant from desiring a contact, and so it does not negate intent. Janelsins v. Button, a battery action in which Maryland's intermediate appellate court treated voluntary intoxication as no obstacle to intent, illustrates the point.
A fact pattern that recites a diagnosis, an insanity acquittal, or a finding of unfitness for trial describes the defendant's condition, and the condition alone decides nothing in the civil case. Ask first whether the defendant's will directed the movement. Then ask what the defendant desired or knew about the consequence that defines the tort, and treat the illness as evidence on that second question, never as a free-standing excuse.