Concept
Confrontation Clause Overlay
Forfeiture by wrongdoing
Confrontation Clause Overlay
Rule 804(b)(6) removes one objection, the rule against hearsay, and leaves the Constitution untouched. The list that contains it admits statements “not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness,”1 and paragraph (b)(6) supplies the forfeiture category: a statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.2 A criminal case adds a second objection that no evidence rule can reach. The Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” and the Amendment contemplates that a witness who makes testimonial statements admitted against a defendant will ordinarily be present at trial for cross-examination, and that if the witness is unavailable, his prior testimony will be introduced only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.3 A court that finds the hearsay objection forfeited has therefore answered only half the question.
The same wrongdoing can defeat the confrontation objection, but only on constitutional footing, and the reason is the incentive the Clause creates. Its exclusionary effect applies only when a hearsay declarant fails to testify at trial, so a defendant gains by keeping witnesses off the stand: the trial loses whatever the witness would have said in court, and the statements the witness made to investigators before trial may be excluded as well.4 Giles v. California answers that incentive with a limited forfeiture rule. The first subsection below examines what Giles held and why; the second shows how the constitutional doctrine and Rule 804(b)(6) fit together, and where they come apart.
Giles v. California: Forfeiture Requires Purpose
Giles asked “whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.”5 Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the wrongful act alone is not enough: the exception reaches a defendant who engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.6 The Court reached that answer by testing California's theory against history, and the facts show why the theory mattered.
On September 29, 2002, Dwayne Giles shot his ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie, outside the garage of his grandmother's house. No one saw the shooting, but Giles' niece, inside the house, heard Giles and Avie speaking in conversational tones, then heard Avie yell “Granny” several times, then heard a series of gunshots. The niece and the grandmother ran outside and found Giles standing near Avie with a gun in his hand. Avie had not been carrying a weapon, and she had been shot six times.7 Over Giles' objection, the trial court admitted Avie's earlier unconfronted statements under a California provision, Cal. Evid. Code § 1370, which permits out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable and the statements are deemed trustworthy.8 That provision is a state hearsay exception built on trustworthiness. Rule 804(b)(6) works differently, because its text asks whether the party wrongfully and intentionally caused the declarant's unavailability and says nothing about the statement's reliability.9 A jury convicted Giles of first-degree murder.10
While Giles' appeal was pending, the Court decided Crawford v. Washington, holding that the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront the witnesses who give testimony against him, except where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the time of the founding. The California Court of Appeal then held that admitting Avie's statements did not violate the Clause as Crawford construed it, because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial and because his intentional criminal act made her unavailable to testify. The California Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground.11 That theory needed only one finding, that Giles committed the killing, and that is the same fact the jury was deciding. A judge's conclusion about guilt would have determined whether the defendant kept a constitutional protection at the very trial in which his guilt was at stake.
Crawford permits only exceptions recognized at the founding, so the question was whether California's theory was one of them. One historic exception covers statements made while the speaker is dying, and it was unavailable here because Avie did not make her statements when she was dying.12 California's theory therefore had to rest on forfeiture by wrongdoing, and the Court asked how far that doctrine reached at the founding. The cases and treatises indicate that the rule applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.13 California's theory reached any wrongful act that made a witness unavailable, so the Court held that it was not an exception to the confrontation requirement, because it was not established at the founding, and it vacated the judgment.14
The limit follows from the purpose of the doctrine. The “wrong” and the “evil Practices” to which the old authorities referred were conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. A forfeiture rule covering that conduct is needed, the Court reasoned, because its absence would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them, and “[t]here is nothing mysterious about courts' refusal to carry the rationale further.”15 The doctrine exists to remove that incentive, so it stops where the incentive stops.
Later authority points the same way. No case before 1985 applied forfeiture to admit statements outside the context of conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying, and modern authorities support the view that the exception applies only when the defendant intends to make the witness unavailable. Among them is Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which Davis v. Washington described as “codif[ying] the forfeiture doctrine.”16 The rule's own text carries the same limit, because it reaches only a party that caused the unavailability “and did so intending that result.”17 The purpose requirement of Rule 804(b)(6) and the constitutional limit in Giles therefore draw the same line.
A fact pattern that reports a murder conviction, the victim's earlier accusation, and a judge's finding that the defendant committed the killing invites a quick answer: the defendant forfeited confrontation by killing the witness. That is the reasoning Giles rejected, because it stops at the wrongful act and never asks why the defendant acted. The correct answer looks for a finding that the defendant's conduct was designed to prevent the witness from testifying, and where the trial court made no such finding, forfeiture is not established.
The dissent in Giles argued that at common law no testimony would come in under a forfeiture theory unless it had been confronted. The majority found that contention unsupported by the cases and added that, if it were true, it would not support a broader forfeiture exception; it would eliminate the exception entirely, because previously confronted testimony by an unavailable witness is always admissible, wrongful procurement or not.18 The result for a court is plain: responsibility for the witness's absence is not enough, and the court must also find purpose.
The state courts had treated Giles' intent as irrelevant, so the Court did not decide whether he acted to prevent Avie from testifying. It left the state courts free to consider intent on remand.19 It also said what bears on intent. Acts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, so a defendant's prior abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to do that would be highly relevant to the intent behind a later act that causes the witness's absence, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify.20 On remand, a record of abuse meant to cut Avie off from outside help would support forfeiture, and a record showing only the killing would not.
State courts have applied forfeiture by wrongdoing in intimidation cases. In State v. Aguilar, 181 So. 3d 649 (La. 2015), the defendant violated a protective stay-away order with the victims, who later recanted their testimony, and the court held that witness intimidation creates unavailability and that the violation was the necessary predicate for forfeiture by wrongdoing.21 Intimidation fits the Giles requirement because it is conduct aimed at keeping a witness from testifying, and a bare finding that the defendant committed some crime against the witness does not.
Purpose is the thread that ties this holding to Rule 804(b)(6), and the next subsection follows it.
Two Objections, Two Sources of Law
Rule 804(b)(6) and the doctrine of Giles reach the same conduct, and each removes a different objection. Giles takes away the defendant's Confrontation Clause objection to the absent declarant's statements, and Rule 804(b)(6) takes away his hearsay objections to those same statements.28 The Giles holding is that the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing withdraws a person's Confrontation Clause protections if the person caused a declarant's unavailability at trial by acting in a way intended to accomplish that result, and the loss occurs only if the conduct was specifically intended to prevent the declarant from being a witness.29 A rule of evidence cannot waive a constitutional guarantee, which is why the Constitution needed its own answer.
The two forfeitures travel together because the two objections grew from the same root. A distinction between them would have been surprising, since courts before the founding excluded hearsay largely because it was unconfronted, and, as the plurality said in Dutton v. Evans, “[i]t seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.”30 Giles, Crawford, and Davis concern confrontation rights rather than hearsay, but they validated Rule 804(b)(6), which does deal with hearsay.31 Each objection protects the opponent's chance to test a statement by questioning the person who made it, so when the opponent's own wrongdoing made that questioning impossible, the complaint belongs to the person who created the problem, whatever label it wears.
Both forfeitures also share a limit. Davis described Rule 804(b)(6) as the federal rule that codifies the forfeiture doctrine,32 and the Giles Court explained that the forfeiture rule is needed because its absence would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses.33 The rule's words “intending that result” state that limit on the evidence side, so purpose is required on both sides of the line.34
The two doctrines differ in reach. The confrontation right belongs to the accused in a criminal prosecution, and it attaches to testimonial statements.35 Davis stated that “formality is . . . essential to testimonial utterances,” and formality is generally found for statements made to known police investigators outside ongoing emergencies.36 Rule 804(b)(6) speaks of a statement “offered against a party,” so it runs against any party, not only an accused.37 Davis also shows the constitutional question standing on its own. The Court determined that, absent a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon's affidavit, and it left the Indiana courts to decide on remand, if asked, whether a forfeiture claim was properly raised and, if so, whether it was meritorious.38 A court must therefore reach forfeiture before a testimonial statement comes in against an accused, and a ruling under a rule of evidence does not settle it.
Davis bears on the standard of proof without setting one. The Court took no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate forfeiture, but it noted that federal courts using Rule 804(b)(6) have generally held the Government to a preponderance of the evidence, and it observed that if a forfeiture hearing is required, hearsay, including the unavailable witness's out-of-court statements, may be considered.39 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the standard, but the lower courts have consistently applied a preponderance standard, which is appropriate.40 In a criminal trial the party who must carry that burden is the prosecution, and a prosecutor “represents no ordinary party.” In the words of one source, “[h]is interest in a prosecution is not that he shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”41 The preponderance finding is something the State must earn at the hearing with evidence of wrongdoing and purpose, not assume from the charge. The findings for the hearsay question (wrongdoing, purpose, and causation) are the same findings that decide the constitutional question, so one hearing ordinarily serves both. An answer should still say that the Supreme Court has not fixed the constitutional standard.
The alignment is clean in federal court because the Federal Rules contain Rule 804(b)(6), and it can come apart in a state whose rules lack a counterpart. In a state without a parallel rule, a defendant who has forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights might still be allowed to raise hearsay objections to the absent declarant's statements.42 The states divide on the point. After the principle that forfeiture by wrongdoing can eliminate the confrontation right was approved, courts in some states admitted the evidence under the same concept without creating a formal hearsay rule, while others required that an established hearsay exception be satisfied.43 A constitutional ruling tells the court only that the Sixth Amendment no longer bars the statement; it does not say whether the state's evidence code does.
The objections are two questions that usually receive the same answer for the same reason. In federal court the hearsay answer comes from Rule 804(b)(6) and the constitutional answer comes from Giles, and each asks whether the party acted to make the declarant unavailable. In a state court the constitutional answer is the same, and the hearsay answer depends on whether state law treats forfeiture as an independent route to admission.
The two forfeitures answer the problem this chapter began with. A party who can bribe, threaten, or kill a witness would profit twice if the absence erased the witness's earlier statements along with the live testimony. The Constitution denies the wrongdoer the confrontation objection, and Rule 804(b)(6) denies him the hearsay objection. Purpose is the price of forfeiture on each side, so a party whose wrongdoing was aimed at something other than keeping the witness off the stand keeps both objections.