Concept
Present but Unavailable Declarants
Declarant unavailable as a witness
Present but Unavailable Declarants
A declarant can sit in the courtroom for the whole trial and still be unavailable. Three grounds in Rule 804(a) describe exactly that person: one who is exempted from testifying about the subject matter because the court rules that a privilege applies, one who refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so, and one who testifies to not remembering the subject matter.1 None of the three clauses mentions where the declarant's body is. Each describes what the declarant will not or cannot do as a witness on the subject of the earlier statement.
Presence does not make someone a witness. A witness takes the stand, testifies under oath, and submits to cross-examination, and a declarant who is legally excused, stubbornly silent, or unable to recall delivers none of that.2 The factfinder therefore learns nothing from the declarant on the point the earlier statement addresses. The declarant's body is available, but the declarant's testimony is not, and Rule 804(a) measures that gap. The measurement matters because it is the necessary first step: the court asks whether a Rule 804(b) exception applies only after the proponent has shown unavailability.3
The three grounds share one more feature: each ordinarily rests on something that happens before the judge. The court rules on a privilege, the court issues an order that the declarant ignores, or the declarant gives sworn testimony of no memory. The proponent's showing therefore comes largely from the trial record, not from a list of efforts to find or persuade a missing witness. The privilege ruling comes first, because there the declarant's silence rests on a legal right that the court has recognized.
Privilege Rulings
Rule 804(a)(1) makes a declarant unavailable when the declarant is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the statement because the court rules that a privilege applies.4 The proponent must show three things: an actual ruling, a privilege that fits the situation, and a scope that reaches the subject matter of the statement offered. Each requirement blocks a different way the showing could fail.
A sustained privilege claim counts as unavailability because the legal system itself has decided that this witness cannot be made to speak on this subject.5 The proponent has done nothing wrong and can do nothing more to obtain the testimony. If the earlier statement were excluded as well, the factfinder would hear nothing on the point. The declarant's presence in the courtroom changes none of this, because the question is whether the testimony can be had.
The Rule contemplates an actual ruling: the declarant takes the stand, claims the privilege, and the court sustains the claim. A proponent who merely represents that the declarant would claim a privilege if called ordinarily fails.6 The requirement keeps a proponent from labeling a declarant privileged for convenience, since an untested claim may rest on a privilege that does not exist or does not cover the questions the declarant would face. A ruling also shows the judge which subjects the privilege covers, and that record matters for the scope requirement below.
The privilege most often at issue is the privilege against self-incrimination, which witnesses invoke mainly in criminal cases although it exists in civil cases too.7 A majority footnote in California v. Green observes that the hearsay exception has generally treated a witness as unavailable when a plea of the Fifth Amendment privilege prevents the State from securing live testimony.8 The spousal privilege works the same way once the court rules that it applies: a spouse who is present but excused cannot act as a witness.9 The privilege must be one the declarant can actually assert on the subject at hand, and the court's ruling confirms that the declarant can.
A practice problem set in the made-up State of Franklin (exercise material, not federal authority) shows the spousal privilege doing this work. Hale asserted the spousal testimonial privilege to make his wife, Reed, unavailable as a witness. Rule 804(a)(1) treats a witness as unavailable if the witness is “exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement because the court rules that a privilege applies,” so Reed was unavailable.10 The Franklin materials add a timing condition: the spouses must be married when the privilege is asserted, so an ex-spouse can be compelled to testify about a defendant to whom the witness was once, but is no longer, married.11 A spouse divorced before trial therefore has no privilege for the court to sustain and is not unavailable on this ground. A divorced witness who is ordered to testify and keeps refusing falls under Rule 804(a)(2) instead.12
The third requirement ties the exemption to the subject matter of the declarant's statement, so unavailability reaches only as far as the privilege reaches.13 A declarant whose privilege covers one topic but who can testify freely about everything else is unavailable for statements on the protected topic and available for the rest. If the Rule treated the whole declarant as unavailable, one sustained objection to one line of questioning would open the door to hearsay on every other subject the declarant could have covered live.
One narrow relaxation of the actual-ruling requirement arises when an accused offers a co-defendant's statement as a statement against interest. The co-defendant's privilege against self-incrimination entitles the co-defendant not even to be called as a witness, so the court may treat the co-defendant as unavailable without sending the co-defendant to the stand for a ruling.14 The ruling would be a foregone conclusion, and demanding it would burden the trial without changing the result. The relaxation depends on that feature, a privilege that entitles the declarant to stay off the stand altogether. Where the declarant could be called and asked questions, the general requirement of an actual ruling still governs.
Refusal Despite Court Order
Rule 804(a)(2) makes a declarant unavailable when the declarant refuses to testify about the subject matter of the statement despite a court order to do so.16 Two ingredients must both be present: an order directing the declarant to testify, and a refusal that continues after the order. This ground differs from the privilege ground because the declarant here has no privilege to claim and simply declines to answer the court.17 A declarant whose privilege claim the court overrules moves from the first ground to this one, since silence after the judge rejects the claim and orders an answer is a refusal despite an order. The privilege ground rests on an exemption the court has recognized; this ground rests on defiance of a command the court has given.
The order requirement exists because the Rule needs proof that live testimony truly cannot be had. A witness who tells someone in the hallway that he would rather not testify has expressed a preference, and preferences often change once a judge takes an interest. If a proponent could rely on a report of reluctance, the witness's private unwillingness would unlock hearsay that the Rules treat as second best to live testimony. Requiring the court to command and the declarant to persist forces the judicial machinery to be tried first. In practice the declarant takes the stand, declines to answer, and does not cooperate when ordered, while the judge tries to secure cooperation, typically by threatening contempt.18 A witness who refuses despite all appropriate judicial pressures is practically and legally unavailable, because the system's own coercive tools have been used and have failed.19
Williamson v. United States shows the ground satisfied after the pressure was applied. Harris, a cooperating accomplice, refused to testify at Williamson's trial even after he had been granted immunity and ordered to testify. Immunity removed the usual basis for a Fifth Amendment claim, so Harris's silence was defiance, not privilege. The trial court then ruled that, under Rule 804(b)(3), Agent Walton could relate what Harris had said to him.20
One further point links this ground to a later topic. When a refusal grows out of wrongful conduct by the opposing side that was aimed at keeping the declarant from testifying, the proponent may be able to invoke the forfeiture exception in Rule 804(b)(6), which has its own treatment.21 The common exam error is to treat a witness's stated reluctance, or an out-of-court report that the witness will refuse, as the refusal the Rule requires. The Rule asks whether the court gave an order and the declarant defied it, and a stem that mentions only the declarant's unwillingness has not supplied the first half of that question.
Lack of Memory
Rule 804(a)(3) reaches the quietest of the three grounds: a declarant is unavailable if the declarant testifies to not remembering the subject matter of the statement.23 The clause has three working parts. The declarant must actually testify, the testimony must be a claim of not remembering, and the lapse must reach the subject matter of the statement the proponent wants to offer. Like the other two grounds, it asks whether the testimony can be had. A declarant who cannot recall the events gives the factfinder nothing on the point, even while sitting in court. The majority in Green noted in a footnote that the hearsay exception has generally treated a witness as unavailable when a lapse of memory prevents the State from securing live testimony.24
Unavailability does not depend on whether the forgetting is real. Witnesses claim no memory in many instances, sometimes truly and sometimes because they do not want to testify, and in either circumstance the witness is unavailable.25 A claim of lost memory that is determined to be false exposes the witness to contempt, though the sanction may work less effectively than against open refusal.26 Treating genuine and feigned lapses alike means the unavailability finding does not wait on an inquiry into sincerity, and the factfinder hears nothing either way.
A report that the declarant has forgotten does not satisfy the ground. The declarant must be sworn in as a witness and cross-examined to show that she can no longer remember the matter, and only then may her statement be admitted under a Rule 804(b) exception.27 On the stand the claim becomes testimony. The judge watches the witness, the opposing lawyer can probe what is and is not remembered, and a false claim can be punished. A proponent's say-so, or an out-of-court remark by the declarant that memory has failed, would ask the judge to accept the claim on the kind of evidence the hearsay rule distrusts. This requirement also separates the memory ground from the privilege ground, where the court's ruling supplies the foundation.
The lapse must concern the subject matter of the statement, and that phrase fixes how far the ground reaches. In United States v. DiCaro, Brown took part in a robbery and described it to a grand jury, then testified at DiCaro's trial that he could not remember the robbery. The robbery was the subject matter of his grand jury statement, so his lapse matched the statement exactly and he was unavailable.28 That finding opened only the first step. Whether the grand jury account fit an exception in Rule 804(b) remained a separate question for the proponent to answer. The question to ask of any stem is what the earlier statement was about and whether the witness says he has lost that.
A lapse that covers only part of the subject matter falls between those two scenes. Because the witness can still supply some of the account, the appropriate course is to take the live testimony to the extent of the witness's recollection and to use the hearsay only to the extent required to fill the gap.29 Declaring a witness who remembers most of the event wholly unavailable would let the earlier statement displace testimony that the courtroom can still produce, and the Rule prefers the live version wherever it exists.
The usual trap with memory loss arises when the same witness is examined under a different rule. In United States v. Owens, a witness who suffered severe memory impairment after a brutal attack by a prison inmate testified that he only partially recalled the assault. He could not remember seeing his assailant during the attack, but he did recall identifying a photograph of Owens to an FBI agent in the hospital. Owens argued that, because Rule 804(a)(3) treats a declarant who claims no memory as unavailable, the witness was not subject to cross-examination about the identification, which the exemption for prior statements of a testifying witness in Rule 801(d)(1) requires.30 The Court rejected the idea that unavailability for a hearsay exception is the same thing as being subject to cross-examination under Rule 801(d)(1).31
The two holdings do not conflict, because the two rules ask different questions. Rule 804(a)(3) opens the gate to exceptions whose premise is that the declarant's testimony cannot be had, so the earlier statement is the best evidence left. Rule 801(d)(1) asks whether the declarant is a witness at this trial who can be questioned about the earlier statement. A witness who takes the stand and answers questions, even with gaps, gives the jury and the opponent the chance to expose those gaps. The same memory loss can therefore support unavailability under one rule and leave the witness subject to cross-examination under the other. A stem that asks whether the declarant is unavailable is answered by testimony of no memory, but a stem about a testifying witness's prior statement is not answered by memory loss alone.