484 U.S. 554 (1988)
On April 12, 1982, John Foster was brutally assaulted while on duty as a correctional counselor at the federal prison in Lompoc, California.1 His attacker beat him repeatedly about the head and upper body with a metal pipe, inflicting numerous and permanently disabling injuries, one of which was a profound loss of short-term memory.2 Foster spent nearly a month in the hospital recuperating from his injuries, much of that time in a state of semiconsciousness.3
In an interview during his hospitalization on May 5, 1982, Foster selected respondent James Owens’ photograph from an array of possible suspects and informed FBI Agent Thomas Mansfield that it was respondent who had attacked him.4 Foster testified that at the time he made these statements, he was certain that his memory was accurate. He also recalled choosing respondent’s photograph from those Mansfield showed him.5
By the time of respondent’s trial in December 1983, Foster could no longer remember who had assaulted him or even whether he had seen his attacker.6 Nor could he recall whether any of the prison officials or other persons who visited him in the hospital had ever suggested that respondent had beaten him.7 A medical expert who testified on behalf of the prosecution explained that Foster’s inability to remember most of the details of the assault was attributable to a gradual and selective memory loss caused by his head injuries.8
The government introduced evidence of Foster’s May 5, 1982 out-of-court identification at trial.9 Defense counsel cross-examined Foster, but his memory loss precluded any inquiry into whether he had actually seen his assailant, whether he had an opportunity to see him, or whether hospital visitors had suggested respondent’s name to him.10
Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated by the admission of a witness's out-of-court identification when the witness testifies at trial but, due to memory loss, cannot recall the events underlying the identification or explain the basis for it?11
The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.12
No. Foster testified at trial under oath.13 Defense counsel received an unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine him about the May 5, 1982 identification of Owens.14 This satisfied the constitutional requirement even though Foster's profound memory loss from the April 12 assault prevented any inquiry into whether he had seen his assailant or whether hospital visitors had suggested Owens's name.15
The admission of Foster's out-of-court identification therefore did not violate the Confrontation Clause.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the majority's holding.17 He contended that Foster's profound memory loss rendered the witness no less a conduit for stale and inscrutable evidence than if he had died from his injuries.18 Cross-examination could not elicit any information enabling the jury to evaluate the trustworthiness of the prior identification.19
The opportunity provided therefore failed to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for assessing the truth of the statement as the Confrontation Clause requires.20 In his view, the Clause guarantees more than the mere right to ask questions of a live witness whose memory is dead.21