Concept
Opinions After Beech Aircraft
Public records and reports
Opinions After Beech Aircraft
Rule 803(8)(A)(iii) admits, in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, “factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.”1 The words factual findings invite an objection that nearly every investigative report eventually meets: a conclusion about what caused an event is an opinion, and an opinion is not a fact. The courts of appeals split over that objection. The Fifth Circuit, in Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (1980), read the clause not to reach evaluative conclusions or opinions, and the Eleventh Circuit felt bound to follow it. The other courts of appeals that squarely confronted the issue adopted the broader reading.2
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), the Supreme Court sided with the broader reading and held that factually based conclusions or opinions are not excluded from the clause on that account.3 The opinion calls the clause Rule 803(8)(C), its number before the rules were restyled. This chapter uses the current letter, (A)(iii).
The case began with a Navy plane crash that killed both pilots. Their surviving spouses sued Beech Aircraft, the plane’s manufacturer, and Beech Aerospace Services, which serviced the plane under contract with the Navy. They alleged that a defect in the fuel control system caused a loss of engine power known as rollback. The defendants answered that the pilots erred and that the plane stalled during an abrupt avoidance maneuver.4
The report at the center of the appeal was the JAG Report of the investigating officer, Lieutenant Commander Morgan. Because both pilots died and the aircraft was destroyed, Morgan wrote in the opinions section that it was almost impossible to determine exactly what happened between the plane’s last touch-and-go takeoff and impact. He nonetheless set out a detailed reconstruction, based on pilot error, of events that could have caused the accident. He then added that this sequence was the most likely but did not change the possibility that a rollback occurred, and that the most probable cause was the pilots’ failure to maintain proper interval.5
The trial judge did not sort the report into facts and opinions. He admitted most of the opinions, including the first sentence of paragraph 5 about the impossibility of knowing exactly what happened and the paragraph naming the most probable cause. He barred the rest of paragraph 5 as “nothing but a possible scenario,” and he deleted the paragraph in which Morgan refused to rule out rollback.6 After a two-week trial the jury returned a verdict for Beech. The Eleventh Circuit panel reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the report’s conclusions should have been excluded.7
The Supreme Court began with the text. The clause does not say that “factual findings” are admissible, whatever is often assumed. It says that reports setting forth factual findings are admissible, which makes the report the unit of admission, and the language draws no distinction between fact and opinion inside such a report.8
The legislative history broke no tie. The House and the Senate took different views, and their disagreement was no definitive guide to Congress’s understanding. The Court judged the Senate’s understanding more consistent with the wording of the rule and with the comments of the Advisory Committee.9
A practical difficulty confirmed the result, because neither the language of the rule nor the intent of its framers calls for a fact-versus-opinion line, and such a line is hard to draw. The distinction is at best one of degree. So-called statements of fact are only more specific statements of opinion, and a judge who asks a witness to state the facts is really asking for a more specific account of what the witness saw.10 The Federal Rules also generally relax the barriers to opinion testimony. Rules 702 through 705 let experts testify in the form of an opinion, without excluding opinions on ultimate issues, and Rule 701 lets even a lay witness offer opinions or inferences drawn from her observations when they will help the trier of fact. The Court saw no reason to strain toward a reading of the clause that runs against that liberal thrust.11
The holding follows from those points. Portions of an investigatory report that is otherwise admissible under the clause are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion. A conclusion that rests on a factual investigation and satisfies the trustworthiness requirement comes in with the rest of the report. The trial judge had determined that certain of the JAG Report’s conclusions were trustworthy, so he rightly admitted them, and the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on this issue.12 The result matters because the exception, like the other Rule 803 exceptions, applies whatever the availability of the declarant, so an investigator’s conclusions can reach the jury without the investigator on the stand.13 A clause that admitted only bare observations would leave the factfinder with the clues and none of the investigator’s evaluation of them.
Removing the fact-versus-opinion filter did not make every conclusion admissible, because the Court located the rule’s limits elsewhere. The requirement that a report contain factual findings bars statements not based on a factual investigation, and the trustworthiness provision requires the court to decide whether the report, or any portion of it, is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted.14
The trial judge’s rulings in Beech show the point: he admitted some opinions and excluded others, so the label opinion decided nothing. The District Court also found the JAG Report trustworthy, and because no party challenged that finding, the Supreme Court expressed no view on it.19
The Court also stressed how narrow its question was. The issue was whether the clause recognizes any difference between statements of fact and statements of opinion, and fact versus law was not before it. It therefore expressed no opinion on whether legal conclusions in an official report are admissible as findings of fact.20 Later commentary confirms that Rainey did not decide that question.21
The law outside Beech shows why the negligence sentence is vulnerable. Some states still refuse police accident reports in civil cases, particularly when the reports seem to express determinative conclusions, either by statute or by interpreting their own versions of the rule. Some federal statutes may likewise prohibit conclusions, as when the Sixth Circuit excluded the conclusion section of a Coast Guard accident report in In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d 1200 (6th Cir. 1995). By and large, though, conclusions in administrative reports have become commonplace in litigation since Rainey.22 Beech itself was a civil case. The limits on investigative findings offered against an accused come later in this chapter.