Concept
Examining Versus Treating Physicians
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
Examining Versus Treating Physicians
Rule 803(4)(A) reaches a statement made for, and reasonably pertinent to, “medical diagnosis or treatment,” and the word “or” gives diagnosis a place of its own beside treatment.1 The text never asks who heard the statement. A doctor who sees the patient only to decide what is wrong fits the words, and so does a doctor whose whole role in the case is to testify about that diagnosis. Statements to personnel who treat and statements to personnel who only diagnose therefore have identical status, a break from the doctrine of some common-law jurisdictions, where statements to a non-treating physician receive no hearsay exception at all.2 The break matters because the physician who only diagnoses is often one whose sole purpose in seeing the declarant is to prepare expert testimony for trial.3
The older doctrine sorted physicians by role. Conventional doctrine excluded statements made to a physician consulted only to enable him to testify, on the ground that such statements fall outside the exception's guarantee of truthfulness.4 The examiner was not left empty-handed. If the facts in the patient's statements were proved by other evidence, the examiner could answer a hypothetical question built on those facts and on the examiner's own objective findings, and the examiner could also state the basis of the opinion, including what the patient had said. The patient's statements, however, were not admissible as substantive evidence.5 One circuit's pre-Rules practice followed the majority rule. It excluded statements made to a physician who examined the patient solely to testify, and it also kept out testimony about the cause of an injury as not connected with treatment.6
The federal rule rejected that limitation for a practical reason. The Advisory Committee wrote: “The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation.”7 The position fits Rule 703, under which the facts underlying expert testimony need not be admissible if they are of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field. Rule 803(4) also recognizes that, realistically, a jury cannot distinguish between facts admitted for their truth and facts admitted solely as the bases of an expert's opinion.8 Because the examiner could already repeat the patient's account to explain the opinion, the old rule withheld nothing the jury would not hear. Its only effect was to ask jurors to consider the same words for one purpose and not another. The federal rule drops that instruction and admits the statements as substantive evidence.
The old suspicion survives as an argument. A defendant in one case urged that a doctor employed for the specific purpose of qualifying as an expert witness should have his testimony viewed as more suspect.9 After the abolition, that argument cannot succeed on the examiner's role alone. Iron Shell, as a later court quoted it, says that Rule 803(4) “abolished the [common-law] distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only: the latter usually refers to a doctor who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness.”10 The case itself shows where the inquiry goes instead. Dr. Hopkins testified that his examination of Lucy had two purposes, to treat her and to preserve any evidence that was available. The court did not treat the second purpose as a ground for exclusion. It looked at Lucy's motive, found nothing in the record or in the content of her answers suggesting she responded for any reason other than promoting treatment, and noted that her statements concerned what happened rather than who assaulted her.11 The court described the result as a two-part test that flows from the rule's dual rationale: first, whether the declarant's motive is consistent with the purpose of the rule, and second, whether it is reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.12
Morgan v. Foretich applied the same rule to a witness retained far more extensively than a one-visit examiner. Dr. Dennis Harrison, qualified as an expert in psychology and child abuse, had spent over one hundred hours examining and working with Hilary Foretich. The district court let him give his opinion that she had been abused but excluded every out-of-court statement she had made to him.13 The court of appeals relied on Iron Shell's description of the abolished distinction and held his testimony about her statements “admissible regardless of why he was consulted.”14 The two decisions answer the same question in the same way. Iron Shell involved a doctor with a dual purpose that included treatment, and Morgan involved a witness whose role was tied to the litigation, yet in neither case did the examiner's role decide admissibility.
A Colorado court applying CRE 803(4) reached a comparable result on a record built around diagnosis. The child's mother and a police officer took the child to the doctor so that he could offer a diagnosis of whether the child had been sexually assaulted. The child's statements about where he was hurt were reasonably pertinent to diagnosing the cause of his bruising and redness, and the doctor relied on those statements in concluding that the child had been hurt by a penis. On those facts the trial court properly found the history admissible and the foundation adequate.15 Pertinence to the diagnosis and the doctor's reliance on the statements decided the question, and the reason the child came to the doctor did not.
Jahnke v. State puts the question in its sharpest form, and the clearest discussion comes from a dissent, so attribution matters. A defendant charged in the killing of his father had been examined by a forensic psychiatrist at defense counsel's request. When the defense asked the psychiatrist what the defendant had told him about his family home life and his experiences growing up, the district court sustained the State's objection.16 The trial court explained, in words the dissent quotes, that the exception contemplates a person who goes to a physician for treatment before becoming involved in something, and that a person “cannot go after he is charged with a crime and then be treated for and consulted and examined for the sole purpose of having this doctor testify in a trial.”17 The dissent reports that the majority reached its result on a different ground: the record contained no evidence of an “actual or threatened assault,” so the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior was not in issue.18
The dissent read Rule 803(4) as clearly encompassing statements made to a doctor for medical diagnosis even when the diagnosis was obtained solely for use at trial, and it pointed to the Advisory Committee's note to the identical federal rule as changing the prior doctrine to the contrary.19 Its authorities included O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses.20 The dissent also addressed the objection that a charged defendant may not be candid with a psychiatrist chosen by his own lawyer. Concerns about the defendant's candor, or about the speculative nature of the diagnosis, it said, “may be developed through cross-examination and ultimately resolved by the jury.”21 That is a dissent's view and not the court's holding, but it fits the rule's design. Doubts of that kind go to weight, and the opponent keeps the tool of cross-examination.
Abolishing the examining-physician distinction removes a categorical bar without removing the motive requirement. A separate opinion in the same case observed that Iron Shell and Renville appear to allow statements to a physician seeking a diagnosis in preparation for litigation, yet explicitly hold that “the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment....”22 It pointed to Renville, where the physician explained to the child before questioning that the examination and his questions were necessary to obtain information to treat her and help her overcome the physical and emotional problems the recurrent abuse may have caused.23 That opinion is not the majority's holding, which admitted Dr. Harrison's testimony regardless of why he was consulted. It still marks where an objection belongs: the examiner's job is no ground for objecting, but what the declarant understood the visit to be is.
An exam stem that sends a plaintiff to a doctor picked by the plaintiff's lawyer is testing that motive prong, and the facts that decide it usually concern what the patient understood the visit to be.
The two visits look the same from the clinician's chair, which is why the rule asks about the declarant and not about the examiner's job. Even when the statements qualify, the opponent keeps the cross-examination that the Jahnke dissent identified as the answer to doubts about candor.
Step two does the real work, because it is the only place where the litigation setting matters. A proponent can meet it with the kind of evidence the physician in Renville supplied, such as the explanation the examiner gave the patient at the outset about why the questions were being asked. An opponent who can show that the visit was staged to build a narrative has an objection that survives the abolition of the old distinction.