846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988)
Hilary Foretich was born in August 1982 to Dr. Eric Foretich and Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, who later divorced.1 Heather Foretich, three years older than Hilary, is the daughter of Dr. Foretich and his second wife.2 Dr. Foretich received visitation rights with both girls, and the sisters frequently visited the Foretich home at the same time.3
In the summer of 1983, Dr. Morgan received a telephone call from Heather’s mother expressing concern that the girls were possibly being abused during visitation periods with Dr. Foretich and his parents.4 Dr. Morgan observed signs of physical abuse on Hilary and noted her age-inappropriate understanding of sexual matters along with sexually explicit statements.5 After consulting specialists in child sexual abuse, Dr. Morgan filed this diversity action against Dr. Foretich and his parents seeking damages for alleged sexual abuse of Hilary.6
At trial, plaintiffs attempted to introduce testimony from pediatrician Dr. Charles Shubin, who had examined both girls, and from numerous other professionals and lay witnesses prepared to state that Heather had suffered sexual abuse during visits with the defendants.7 Plaintiffs also offered five specific out-of-court statements Hilary made to Dr. Morgan on March 25, 1985, May 20, 1985, October 21, 1985, January 20, 1986, and July 20, 1986.8 Plaintiffs further sought to introduce statements Hilary made to psychologist Dr. Dennis Harrison after more than one hundred hours of examination and treatment.9 The district court excluded all of this evidence.10
Dr. Foretich counter-claimed against Dr. Morgan for defamation, publication of private facts, false light publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from publicity surrounding the litigation.11 The jury found for Dr. Foretich on the plaintiffs’ claims and for Dr. Morgan on the counter-claims.12 Plaintiffs appealed the evidentiary exclusions, defendants cross-appealed, and the appeals were consolidated for argument before the Fourth Circuit.13
Whether the district court erred in excluding evidence that Hilary’s sister Heather had been sexually abused?14
Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of other acts is admissible if relevant to an issue other than character, such as identity or absence of mistake or accident.15 The rule is inclusionary.16 It requires only that the evidence meet threshold relevance without clear-and-convincing proof of the other acts, provided its probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect.17
Yes. The proffered testimony of Dr. Charles Shubin and other professionals established that Heather Foretich suffered sexual injuries by the same mechanism as Hilary Foretich and that only the defendants had access to both girls during visitation periods.18 This evidence directly identified the defendants as the perpetrators and rebutted defenses that Hilary’s injuries were self-inflicted, fabricated by Dr. Morgan, or accidental.19 The similarity of injuries and exclusive access made the probative value high, comparable to the repeated-incident evidence permitted in child-abuse prosecutions, while any prejudice could have been addressed by a limiting instruction rather than wholesale exclusion.20
The district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of Heather’s abuse.21
Whether the district court erred in excluding out-of-court statements made by Hilary to her mother?22
Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) admits excited utterances made while the declarant was under the stress of a startling event.23 The exception applies even if the declarant would be incompetent to testify at trial.24 Courts consider lapse of time, age of declarant, physical and mental state, characteristics of the event, and subject matter of the statement.25
Yes. Hilary Foretich made the four statements on March 25, 1985, May 20, 1985, October 21, 1985, and January 20, 1986, within three hours of her first opportunity to speak with Dr. Morgan after returning from visitation, while still in an excited and agitated state.26 At under four years old, Hilary lacked the capacity or motive to fabricate detailed accounts of sexual abuse.27 Her physical and mental condition showed hysteria, and the statements were corroborated by medical evidence.28
These factors satisfied the trustworthiness requirements of the excited-utterance exception.29
The district court abused its discretion by excluding Hilary’s statements to her mother.30
Whether the district court erred in excluding out-of-court statements made by Hilary to her psychologist?31
Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) admits statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment when the declarant’s motive is consistent with promoting treatment and the content is reasonably relied upon by the physician.32 The rule applies regardless of whether the declarant is competent to testify.33 It applies regardless of whether the physician was consulted solely for diagnosis in preparation for litigation.34
Yes. Hilary Foretich made statements to Dr. Dennis Harrison during more than one hundred hours of examination after the alleged abuse.35 Those statements concerned the identity of her assailants and were of the type reasonably relied upon in treating intrafamily child sexual abuse.36 Hilary’s young age did not negate her motive to describe her condition accurately.37 The rule abolishes any distinction between treating and nontreating physicians.38
The district court abused its discretion by excluding Hilary’s statements to Dr. Harrison.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell joined the majority on the admissibility of Heather’s abuse evidence and Hilary’s statements to her mother but wrote separately on the psychologist statements.40 He noted that the traditional common-law rationale for Rule 803(4) requires the declarant’s motive to promote treatment.41 This showing was absent here because four-year-old Hilary was never told the examinations were for treatment.42
No evidence established her belief that the statements would aid her recovery.43 Although Rule 803(4) broadened admissibility, Powell concluded that statements lacking the treatment motive carry reduced reliability.44 He would therefore have remanded the psychologist evidence for reconsideration at retrial under Rule 403 rather than holding outright that exclusion was an abuse of discretion.45
Whether the district court erred in its rulings on defendants’ counter-claims for defamation and related torts?46
A party challenging a jury verdict on counter-claims must demonstrate that the district court committed reversible error in its evidentiary or legal rulings. Absent such error the verdict stands.47
No. The defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of Dr. Morgan on the counter-claims for defamation, publication of private facts, false light publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.48 They identified no specific error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings or legal instructions on those claims.49 The jury’s finding for Dr. Morgan therefore stands undisturbed on appeal.50
The district court committed no error with respect to defendants’ counter-claims.51
Whether the district court erred in refusing to dismiss Dr. Morgan’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?52
Under Virginia law as set forth in Womack v. Eldridge, a plaintiff need not have been present during the outrageous conduct to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.53
No. Dr. Morgan alleged severe emotional distress arising from the defendants’ sexual abuse of her daughter Hilary.54 Virginia precedent does not require the plaintiff’s presence at the time of the conduct.55 Defendants identified no authority imposing such a limitation on recovery.56 The district court therefore properly refused to dismiss the intentional-infliction claim.57
The district court properly refused to dismiss the intentional-infliction claim.58