Concept
Under the Stress of Excitement
Excited utterance
Under the Stress of Excitement
Rule 803(2) reaches a statement only if the declarant made it “while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”1 The phrase fixes the moment that counts, which is the instant of speaking, and it measures that moment against the declarant’s mental condition. The exception’s rationale explains why. Such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that is what makes cross-examination superfluous.2 One frequently quoted formulation locates the guarantee in the speaker’s mind: the statement must come before there is time or opportunity to contrive anything to the speaker’s advantage, while nervous excitement still dominates the reflective power.3 The guarantee lasts only as long as the excitement does. When the stress ebbs, the declarant is an ordinary speaker again, and the reason for trusting the statement is gone.
This element often decides the objection. The exception applies whether or not the declarant is available to testify,4 and spontaneity is the principal, and often the only, guarantee of trustworthiness for exceptions of this kind,5 so the judge must be satisfied that the stress was real. The startling event is usually plain from the facts, a collision or an assault or a threat. The declarant’s state of mind is not plain, and no witness can describe it directly, so the judge infers it from everything that sheds light on the speaker’s emotional state: the nature of the event, the speaker’s relationship to it, tone of voice, demeanor, the content of the statement, the speaker’s age, and whether the speaker was injured.6 The declarant must also have personally observed the event, a requirement taken up in the preceding section.7
The subsections below take up the measurement of the window first, because courts ask how long this declarant stayed excited and not how many minutes passed. They then turn to what stretches or shortens the window, the effect of questions and self-interest, the treatment of child victims, and the way a fresh shock can restart the clock.
Excitement, Not Elapsed Time
Rule 803(2) ties its timing demand to the excitement and not to the event.8 The Seventh Circuit, in Boyce, a felon-in-possession case that arose from a foot chase,9 recalled that a statement “need not be contemporaneous with the startling event to be admissible,” and that “the utterance must be contemporaneous with the excitement engendered by the startling event.”10 An older formulation makes the same point vividly by requiring that the mental shock “extend without interruption from the moment of the event to the moment of the statement.”11 The event starts the excitement, and the judge asks whether the excitement was still running when the words came out. The clock is evidence on that question; it is not the answer.
The exception takes this shape because of where its reliability comes from. A shock stills reflection only while it lasts, and shocks do not fade on a schedule. A fixed time limit would exclude the trembling victim who speaks after an hour and admit the calculating speaker who speaks after thirty seconds. Courts therefore treat elapsed time as one factor and never as a boundary. In MacDonald v. B.M.D. Golf Associates, Inc., a witness reached the declarant within minutes of a cart accident and found him trembling, and the court wrote that “[t]he timing of the statement is only a factor to be considered and strict contemporaneity is not required.”12 Another court agreed that the length of time “is not dispositive” but “certainly is relevant.”13 Courts, in short, “have varied greatly as to just how much of a time lapse is too much.”14
Gaps of a quarter hour or so cause little trouble when the declarant is visibly upset. In United States v. Phelps, the Eighth Circuit held the statement of a “visibly distraught” declarant admissible as an excited utterance although the declarant spoke fifteen to twenty minutes after the startling event.15 The Tenth Circuit admitted a statement made about fifteen minutes after the event in United States v. Golden.16 Miller v. Keating likewise approved a statement made ten or fifteen minutes after an accident. Testimony about demeanor usually carries the foundation in such cases. In one street encounter, two men told an officer that a man two blocks away was waving a gun at people and threatening to “shoot somebody,” and testimony described them as “very excited very nervous, like they were hopping around.”17
As the interval grows, testimony about the declarant’s condition does more of the work. A secondary source offers a useful rule of thumb: where the interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded unless there is some proof that the declarant did not in fact reflect, and testimony that the declarant still appeared “nervous” or “distraught,” with a reasonable basis for continuing emotional upset, will often suffice.18 Courts do not agree on how far such testimony reaches. In Arnold, the majority sought to satisfy the temporal element by noting that the district court found the declarant, Gordon, sounded nervous and distraught. The dissent answered that a nervous tone speaks to whether the declarant was under stress, one element of the test, and not to whether the statement came before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, another element, so that treating tone as proof of both “impermissibly collapses” the two.19 On a long gap, the proponent should therefore offer evidence about both the declarant’s continuing condition and what the declarant did during the interval.
Longer gaps come in when the evidence of continuing agitation is strong. In United States v. Tocco, the declarant learned at 11:00 p.m. that some people had remained in a burning building he had helped set, and within three hours he arrived at an acquaintance’s window and announced, “Mario and I lit a building for Jack.”20 The acquaintance described him as “all hyped” and “nervous,” and the Second Circuit held that his excitement “obviously had not subsided.”21 The court counted from the discovery that people might be trapped, reasoning that even if the fire itself was not startling, that realization certainly was. Other courts have found three hours “well within the bounds of reasonableness” where other indicators of trustworthiness were present,22 have accepted about an hour for a young child who had been assaulted,23 and have admitted the statement of a sixteen-year-old victim made nine hours after the event because his behavior revealed “a continuing level of stress arising from the assault that precluded any possibility of reflection.”24
A long gap with nothing to offset it fails. In United States v. Hall, the court upheld the exclusion of testimony that a man had said he and his wife “had to get out of town because of the Jessica Roach abduction.” The witness placed the remark at least two days after the abduction and said the man appeared pale and upset, but a lapse of several days “militates against a finding of spontaneity so as to exclude the possibility of conscious reflection.”25 A second remark in the same case failed for want of proof of who spoke and when, because a proponent must show that the statement was “made under such circumstances and so recently after the occurrence of the transaction as to preclude the idea of reflection or deliberation.”26 A gap of only hours can fail as well when the declarant had the capacity and a reason to shape the account. In United States v. Marrowbone, the court refused to treat a sixteen-year-old’s accusation of molestation, made to officers while he was in custody about three hours after the event, as an excited utterance, weighing both his age and his stake in making the charge. The contrast with Tocco, whose declarant spoke within about the same three hours, lies in the other evidence. The cases read as findings about particular declarants, with no time limit hidden in them.
The finding belongs to the trial judge, who decides under Rule 104(a) whether the declarant was excited.27 The judge may weigh tone of voice, even on a recording, as in United States v. Obayagbona, and may take account of the doubts of the proponent’s own witness. One court noted that the Rule 104(a) inquiry revealed that the officer whose testimony the proponent used to establish the excitement “indicated considerable skepticism” about whether the declarant was genuinely excited.28 Because the finding rests on those circumstances, appellate courts review the admission for abuse of discretion, and a ruling grounded in evidence about demeanor is hard to disturb.29
The third step carries the case when the gap is long, and the fourth carries it when the gap is short but the declarant is calm or interested in the result.
Factors That Stretch the Window
The text of Rule 803(2) does not say what shows that excitement lasted, so courts have supplied a list. The factors that recur come from United States v. Iron Shell: the lapse of time between the event and the declarations, the age of the declarant, the physical and mental state of the declarant, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the statements.31 Each factor serves one finding. The judge must be able to conclude that, when the declarant spoke, the stress of the event still made the statement spontaneous rather than reflective. Some factors lengthen the window and some shorten it, which is why a clock cannot settle the question alone.
Event and age worked together in Iron Shell. The declarant, a young girl named Lucy, spoke to Officer Marshall after an assault, and the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s conclusion that, “considering the surprise of the assault, its shocking nature and the age of the declarant,” she was still under the stress of the attack, in “a state of continuous excitement from the time of the assault.”32 The court noted that the single question “what happened” has been held not to destroy the excitement the exception requires, and that a lapse of about an hour has been held not to remove a statement from the exception, “especially where the declarant is a young child.”33 The opinion also limits itself. It calls it “a truism” that each of these cases must be decided on its own circumstances, and it says that a reviewing court is “not to substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”34 An hour is therefore a result about one child on one record, and it is no limit for children generally.
Physical and mental condition can stretch the window further. In State v. Jeffers, a woman named Penny who had been drugged and was “still bleeding from a fresh cut” reached Mrs. Meek’s office and answered the question “What happened?” An ambulance arrived ten to fifteen minutes later. Mrs. Meek testified that despite Penny’s difficulty with her coordination she “appeared to be very excited” and, although hard to understand, “seemed to know what she was talking about,” and the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances showed Penny was under the stress and excitement of the startling event.35 In Henyard v. State, the officer who arrived found a woman who had been raped and shot “hysterical but coherent,” and the court held that she was “still experiencing the trauma of the events she had just survived” when she spoke to him on the porch.36
Impairment can cut either way. A gunshot victim who regained consciousness groggy and unfocused is in poor condition to invent an account, and State v. Salgado treated his grogginess as supporting admission. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co. shows the limit. A driver with amnesia for an accident described it to his doctor about twenty hours later, and the court could not tell from the record whether he had regained enough reflective capacity during those hours to construct an account. Impairment helps only to the extent that the declarant had not recovered the capacity to reflect by the time of speaking, so the proponent should arrive with evidence of the declarant’s condition during the gap.
The window shortens when the interval itself shows that reflection returned. Proof that the declarant performed tasks requiring relatively careful thought between the event and the statement “provides strong evidence that the effect of the exciting event had subsided.”37 Concern for the event can sustain stress, however. A statement by the victim’s wife made one hour after a traffic accident was held admissible where her husband was still in the emergency room and she was still concerned about his condition, and appellate courts recognize substantial discretion in trial judges to weigh such facts.38
The fifth factor, the subject matter of the statement, links the stress requirement to the next section. Rule 803(2) asks only that the statement “relate” to the startling event, a broader sweep than the present sense impression’s description or explanation of the event.39 Words that stay on the shocking occurrence and the declarant’s continuing worry over it fit lingering stress better than a polished account of events the declarant has had time to consider.
Questions, Self-Interest, and Reflection
Courts also look for signs that the declarant was reflecting instead of reacting. Spontaneity is the principal, and often the only, guarantee of trustworthiness for exceptions of this kind, so circumstances showing its absence are “extremely important” to admissibility.41 Evidence that the statement came in response to an inquiry, or that it was self-serving, indicates reflective thought. Neither is a ground for automatic exclusion, but where the interval permitted reflection, those signs “might swing the balance in favor of exclusion.”42 Five signs recur: suggestive questioning, a self-serving slant, a motive to fabricate, time to plan, and carefully composed detail. Each is evidence on the single question the rule asks, and none works as a bright line.
Questioning comes first because students overread it. Many excited utterances are spoken to someone who has just asked something, and courts do not treat the question as disqualifying. The single question “what happened” has been held not to destroy the excitement the exception requires.43 A court of appeals has added that the fact that a declarant “was answering questions, rather than giving a spontaneous narrative, does not indicate that he was not excited when he provided the answers.”44 The content of the answer shows what produced it. In MacDonald, a witness reached Brett, who was trembling, and asked whether he was okay, and Brett answered by explaining who was driving the cart. The court held that a declarant who may have been responding to a question is not thereby unspontaneous, and it read his volunteered answer as spontaneous rather than prompted by the question.45 In Jeffers, likewise, Penny spoke in answer to the question “What happened?” and the court still found that she was under the stress of the event.46
A question that proposes the answer is different, because it moves the source of the words from the declarant to the questioner. “When questions are suggestive, the possibility increases that the questioner influenced the statement,” although suggestive questions “are sometimes necessary to elicit information, particularly when the information is embarrassing.”47 A drawing in Commonwealth v. Dugan shows questioning carried to an extreme. An artist drew a partial impression and then altered it, step by step, as the declarant instructed over a period of time. One opinion concluded that the drawing was not an excited utterance, because the exception requires a spontaneous reaction to the startling event and not the result of reflective thought.48
Self-serving content raises a different concern, because a declarant who benefits from a story has the motive that reflection would act upon. The hearsay exceptions do not bar self-serving statements as such: when a statement with a self-serving aspect falls within an exception, the judgment that the exception’s assurances of trustworthiness outweigh the hearsay dangers controls, and the statement should be admitted.49 The self-serving quality matters as evidence that spontaneity is missing. United States v. Elem shows the combination. As he was taken into custody, the defendant answered “No” when an officer asked whether the gun was his, and he answered a question about flourishing a weapon with “You won’t be able to make that.”50 He argued that both remarks were admissible as part of the res gestae or as excited utterances,51 but the district court had excluded both as impermissible hearsay.52 A person being arrested has an obvious reason to deny owning a weapon. That motive is the kind of self-serving slant that can signal reflection, so the proponent needs to show a shock strong enough to have displaced it. The same logic applies to the teenager in Marrowbone, whose stake in making his accusation counted against him.
Time to plan can come before the shock as well as after it. It makes no difference to the analysis whether the opportunity to reflect occurred before the alleged exciting event or after it.53 A declarant who saw the shock coming has had the chance to prepare an explanation, and a court may take note when the officer on whose testimony the proponent relies doubts that the declarant was genuinely excited.54
Carefully composed detail points the same way, and a writing is the clearest example. In United States v. Ferber, a declarant named Carey wrote an e-mail that was “removed from the ‘stress’” of the phone call that prompted it, yet because he prepared it shortly afterward it qualified as a present sense impression.55 Failing Rule 803(2) therefore does not end the hearsay inquiry, and the comparison with the present sense impression comes later in this chapter.
These signs operate together, and no single one decides a case. A neutral question, a trace of self-interest, and a short interval can all coexist with a finding of spontaneity when the declarant’s visible condition shows the shock still in control, while a long, organized narrative composed after time to consult can defeat the exception even when the writer claims confusion. Because the judge finds the facts and appellate courts are “not to substitute our judgment for that of the district court,” a finding grounded in the record is hard to disturb in either direction.56 An officer’s question is therefore no reason to stop at exclusion, and a motive to lie is no reason to ignore the shock. The answer comes from weighing each sign against the declarant’s condition and asking whether the words were a reaction.
Child Victims and First Opportunity
Young victims of abuse press the timing requirement harder than any other declarants. A child may have no real opportunity to tell anyone for hours or days, so a clock that ran from the abuse alone would exclude the account at the first moment the child is able to give it. The decisions respond in two ways. They explain why spontaneity can be present despite delay, and they change what the clock measures.
In Morgan v. Foretich, a civil suit in which a mother offered her young daughter’s statements about abuse, the court observed that “much criticism has been directed at courts which place undue emphasis on the spontaneity requirement in child sexual abuse cases.” Children do not necessarily understand sexual contact by an adult as shocking, “especially when the adult is a parental figure from whom the child desires love and affection,” and even a child who grasps what happened may delay reporting because of “confusion, guilt, and fear.”58 Those explanations bear on the exception’s premise. A child’s silence is often explained by obstacles to telling, and a delay with that kind of explanation says little about whether reflection and fabrication had returned.
Morgan’s response was to change what the clock measures. The time lapse to be considered “is not simply the time between the abuse and the declaration,” and courts “must also be cognizant of the child’s first real opportunity to report the incident.”59 The first four statements offered in Morgan were made within three hours of the child’s first opportunity to speak with her mother, and the court held that three hours was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” given the other indicators of trustworthiness.60
Those other indicators carried much of the weight, which is why the first-opportunity measure never works alone. The child was under four, and it was “virtually inconceivable” that a child of that age would have the knowledge of sexual activity or the desire to lie needed to fabricate such a story; her “tender years greatly reduce the likelihood that reflection and fabrication were involved.” She was nearly hysterical just before most of the statements, and she spoke in a vocabulary that belonged to a child.61 The court saw its case as bearing “remarkable similarity” to United States v. Nick, in which the Ninth Circuit admitted statements made by a sexually abused boy to his mother because of “significant guarantees of trustworthiness.”62
The flexibility has limits, and the first is foundation. The plaintiffs in Morgan also offered a declaration “with absolutely no reference to the time of abuse or the child’s first opportunity to speak of the abuse,” and the court held that it “cannot qualify as an excited utterance.”63 The first-opportunity method needs facts to measure, and a proponent who supplies none gives the judge no interval to evaluate. Courts also look at what prompted the disclosure. In one decision, a crying child revealed what had happened only when her mother took her to the bathroom and found that she could not urinate, and the court treated those circumstances as “indicative of sincerity and spontaneity.”64
The second limit is the record of continuing stress, and State v. Huntington shows how far a court may stretch the exception and where a dissenting judge would stop. The child, Jeri, reported incidents two weeks after the last one. The majority acknowledged that “the record is devoid of any information concerning Jeri’s conduct in the two weeks after the last incident and preceding her report,” but it pointed to indications that she had just discovered she would be spending two weeks alone with the defendant. A dissenting justice answered that the court knew only that Jeri was distressed when she recounted the incidents, and that the discovery “does not establish that Jeri was still under the stress of excitement from an assaultive event two weeks earlier.”65 The majority’s reliance on that discovery anticipates the next subsection, where a new stimulus is treated as renewing excitement that had faded, and the dissent shows what a proponent must prove for that argument to work.
Age is a factor in both directions, because the reasoning that tender years reduce the chance of reflection and fabrication gives an older declarant less help. A state court admitted the statement of a sixteen-year-old male sexual assault victim made nine hours after the event because his behavior revealed “a continuing level of stress arising from the assault that precluded any possibility of reflection.”66 An older and separate doctrine, the prompt complaint in a sexual offense case, applies a less demanding time requirement than the excited utterance analysis. The complaint must have been made without a delay that was unexplained or inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense, and it is admitted to rebut the inference that, because no immediate complaint was made, no crime occurred.67 The two doctrines should be kept apart.
The fourth step is where the Huntington dissent presses hardest, since distress at the telling can exist without any excitement left over from the event.
Rekindled Excitement
The preceding subsections treated the startling event as a single occurrence followed by one stretch of excitement that fades. Rule 803(2) allows a different pattern, because it asks whether the declarant spoke “while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused,” and the event or condition that matters is whichever one actually produced the excitement at the moment of speaking.69 A declarant who had calmed after the original shock can be jolted again by the sight of the assailant, by a frightening piece of news, or by a return to the place where it happened. Courts have accepted that excitement can be rekindled when a declarant is suddenly reminded of a traumatic experience, and Arnold took that view.70 When a fresh shock restarts the excitement, the mechanism that justifies the exception starts over, and the statement is measured against the new excitement and not the original event.
United States v. Napier shows how completely a new stimulus can replace the original event as the point from which time is counted. The declarant, shown a photograph of the defendant, exclaimed “he killed me.” The defendant argued that because the statement referred to the assault, the assault was the startling event, and the statement was not made under the stress of excitement the assault caused. The court rejected that analysis: “The display of the photograph, on the facts of this case, qualifies as a sufficiently ‘startling’ event to render the statement made in response thereto admissible.”71 The interval that counted ran from the sight of the photograph to the declarant’s words.
Knowledge can serve as the stimulus as well as sight. In Tocco, the declarant’s realization that people could be trapped inside the building he had helped set on fire supplied the shock, and the court counted the three hours from that discovery. It reasoned that “[t]he fire itself may constitute a startling event, but even if it did not, certainly Tocco’s subsequent realization that people could be trapped inside the burning building, which he had helped set, would comprise a startling event.”72 A return to a place can serve as well. An Ohio appellate court treated a child as having experienced nervous excitement on returning to the scene where, three days earlier, he had witnessed his brother’s murder.73
The restart carries a condition that follows from the rule’s own text. The exception assumes a shock that actually displaced reflection, so a later outburst qualifies only if something startled the declarant and the words came while that excitement lasted.74 Without that tie, a declarant who stayed calm for weeks and then spoke tearfully about an old event would qualify merely by being upset, and the requirement of a startling event would do no work. The Huntington dissent presses the point: it doubted that a child’s discovery that she would soon spend two weeks alone with the defendant showed that she was still under the stress of an assault two weeks old.75
The second step is where proponents most often fall short. Testimony that the declarant simply became upset again identifies nothing that startled the declarant, and without a stimulus the judge has nothing from which to restart the clock.