Concept
The Startling Event
Excited utterance
The Startling Event
Rule 803(2) begins with its most basic demand: the statement must relate to “a startling event or condition.”1 Every other element rests on this one. The exception trusts an outcry because a shock stills the declarant’s capacity to reflect, and a declarant who cannot reflect cannot fabricate. If nothing startling happened, nothing suggests that reflection stopped, and nothing stands in for the oath and cross-examination. An angry or emphatic declarant who is talking about an ordinary matter therefore supplies no foundation, however many exclamation points the transcript contains.
The rule also ties the excitement to its source: the declarant must speak “under the stress of excitement that it caused.”2 The judge therefore looks for an occurrence strong enough to push deliberate thought aside, and for a causal link between that occurrence and the declarant’s agitation. Because the text names a “condition” as well as an “event,” the source of the shock need not be a single sudden occurrence.
Three questions follow, and the subsections below take them in order. How startling must an occurrence be? How does the proponent prove it when the declarant’s own excited words are the only evidence that it happened? And what must the declarant have perceived? The answers fix, in turn, the quality of the shock, the proof of the shock, and the knowledge of the person who felt it.
What Counts as Startling
The rule does not say how startling an event must be, so courts answer from the exception’s purpose. They ask whether the occurrence was strong enough to displace the declarant’s ordinary reflective thinking, because that displacement takes the place of the oath and cross-examination. The question concerns the person who spoke, not the gravity of the event in the abstract. Courts look primarily to the effect on the declarant, and once they are satisfied that the event was such as to cause adequate excitement, the inquiry on this element ends.3
Courts often organize the exception into three parts, and the first part is the subject of this subsection. As one court states the test, the trial court must find:
(1) the presence of a serious occurrence which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed it, and (3) the presence of circumstances, which in their totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark.4
The second and third parts, which concern timing and the circumstances that signal spontaneity, are developed in the sections that follow.
Because the test turns on shock, the range of qualifying events is wide. Physical violence is often present but is not required. An automobile accident, pain or an injury, an attack by a dog, a fight, seeing a photograph in a newspaper, and unexpectedly encountering a feared individual have all qualified.5 One treatise lists the accident case first among the settings where the exception commonly applies: an injured party or bystander describes what happened shortly afterward, as when a slip-and-fall claimant said at the time, “I went flying.”6
Testimony about the declarant’s demeanor is the usual way to show the shock. In an accident case, a boy named Brett made a statement to a man who reached the scene within minutes, and the trial court found the statement an excited utterance.7 The appellate court pointed to Brett’s trembling as a sign that he was still upset from experiencing the accident first hand.8 (The plaintiffs’ objections that too much time had passed and that the statement answered a question are taken up in the next section.) In an Iowa case, a teacher testified that the boys were “very excited” when they made their statement. The appellate court held that this testimony laid a sufficient predicate and that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting it.9
A threat with a weapon qualifies whether the declarant is its target or an onlooker. In United States v. Arnold, a woman who called 911 to report that a man had threatened her with a pistol sounded frightened on the recording and appeared shaken when officers arrived.10 In United States v. Brown, two men approached a police officer who described them as “very excited” and “very nervous,” “hopping around,” and reported that a man was waving a gun at people and threatening to “shoot somebody.”11 The Third Circuit approved the district court’s holding that the declarants’ observation of a man wielding a firearm was a startling occasion, and the defendant all but conceded the point.12
The declarants in Brown were onlookers, and that did not matter, because the exception looks to what an event does to the speaker. The difficulty with bystanders lies in anonymity, not distance. Courts have been reluctant to admit the words of a bystander whose identity is never disclosed, because the proponent then cannot show foundational facts such as first-hand knowledge and the impact of the event on the declarant.13 The perception subsection returns to that problem.
A later stimulus can supply the shock even when the words describe an earlier crime. In United States v. Napier, an attack left the victim with brain damage that limited her to isolated words and simple phrases. About a week after she came home from the hospital, she was shown a newspaper photograph of the defendant, reacted with obvious horror, and said, “He killed me, he killed me.”14 The defendant argued that the words referred to the assault, so the assault was the startling event and the victim was no longer under its stress. The Ninth Circuit rejected that analysis. It saw no reason to confine the exception to accidents and assaults, and it treated the display of the photograph as a startling event in its own right: a victim who had never discussed the attack with her family, suddenly confronted with a picture of the alleged assailant, had no chance to reflect.15 A newspaper photograph is harmless in itself, so Napier shows that the test measures effect on the declarant. The startling event that matters is the one that triggered the statement. The timing requirement does not vanish when the trigger is a later one; the statement is then measured against the excitement the new stimulus produced, a point developed below under rekindled excitement.
The mirror-image error treats haste or distress as proof that a shock occurred. In People v. Coleman, a murder prosecution, the State argued that remarks attributed to the victim were excited utterances because they were made in haste, as when a telephone conversation ended abruptly, or because the declarant seemed emotionally distraught.16 The court found no evidence that a startling event had produced the statements, and it observed that if haste or distress were enough, any impromptu conversation would qualify.17 Distress is evidence of a continuing shock only after something startling is shown to have happened, and how the proponent makes that showing is the subject of the next subsection.
Proving the Startling Event
Before the words can come in, the proponent must persuade the judge that something startling happened.19 Usually the proof is easy: the declarant arrives bleeding or shaking, other witnesses saw the occurrence, or physical evidence remains. The difficulty arises when nothing else exists. A victim attacked alone, or a caller whose recorded outcry is the only trace of what caused the fright, leaves the proponent holding a statement that is both the evidence of the event and the item the event is supposed to qualify. Opponents call this bootstrapping: the statement seems to lift itself into evidence by proving its own foundation.
Most federal courts let the statement help prove the event. One treatise reports that the trend is toward not requiring independent evidence of the exciting event, and it offers a parallel: Bourjaily v. United States held that a co-conspirator’s statement can be considered with other evidence in deciding whether a conspiracy exists.20 The mechanism is Rule 104(a). Under it the judge decides preliminary questions of fact and is not limited by the hearsay rule in doing so.21 The judge finds the foundation fact by a preponderance of the evidence and is not confined to legally admissible evidence in making the finding.22 The excited statement therefore counts as one item of proof, weighed with the declarant’s tone, appearance, and surroundings.
The Third Circuit took this approach in Brown. In light of the volume and persuasiveness of authority, it concluded that an excited utterance may itself be sufficient to establish that a startling event occurred, and that whether corroboration independent of the statement is needed in a given case is committed to the trial judge’s discretion.23 The practical logic is plain. A rule demanding outside proof would disqualify statements in exactly the cases where the shock left no other witness, and the exception would lose much of its usefulness.
The majority view has a limit, and the limit is the unidentified bystander. When the declarant is unidentified, the cases show hesitancy to uphold the statement alone as sufficient.24 The Third Circuit’s decision in Miller v. Keating places a heavier burden on the proponent of such a statement, a burden the next subsection describes.25
A minority of courts demand more. The dissent in Arnold collected decisions from Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Texas holding that a hearsay statement cannot serve as the sole evidence of the startling event that spurred it, and it argued that none of the cases on the other side addresses how such bootstrapping squares with the foundations of the exception. In the dissent’s view, the better rule requires at least some corroborating evidence.26 Two objections drive that position. The first is circularity: the judge uses the statement to satisfy a requirement for deciding whether the statement is reliable. The second goes to the exception’s purpose. The exception trusts an outcry because a real shock leaves no room for contrivance, yet anyone can invent a startling fact and announce it in an excited tone. Without outside confirmation, the dissent reasoned, nothing shows the 911 statements to be more reliable than any made-up out-of-court allegation.27 Defenders of the majority view answer the circularity charge by pointing to Rule 104(a).28
Brown shows how much turns on the lone conduit for the declarants’ words. The majority found corroboration in the fact that Officer Hughes almost immediately came upon Brown, visibly carrying a gun, and that the two declarants identified him as the man who had brandished it.29 The dissent saw the same record differently. Apart from the officer’s self-serving statement that the defendant held the gun, it found no evidence that the gun-waving incident ever happened, and so no evidence of circumstantial trustworthiness, let alone evidence to satisfy a “heavier” burden.30
The Federal Rules do not resolve the dispute, but courts seldom have to, because they can avoid it by reading “independent evidence” broadly. The treatise observes that only a very few cases need confront the problem if courts take that approach, as it says they should where the circumstances and content of the statement indicate trustworthiness.31 The Arnold majority did exactly that. It found that non-hearsay evidence corroborated the event: the act of calling 911, the fear in the caller’s tone, her distraught demeanor as officers observed it, her renewed excitement on seeing the man return, and a gun matching her description found under the seat he had occupied.32 The dissent replied that these items are all part of one whole, and a whole that is perfectly consistent with a contrived accusation.33 The items that carry the most weight are therefore the ones that originate outside the caller’s own account, namely the officers’ observations of her distress and the recovered gun.
Strip those items away, and the two views part. If the only proof of the event were the tape itself, with no officer who saw the caller’s distress and no gun recovered, a court following Brown could still admit the call, treating the words and tone as evidence that a shock occurred. A court following the Arnold dissent or the state decisions it collects would exclude the call for want of outside proof. An exam answer that says a statement can never prove its own foundation therefore presents the minority view as settled. An answer that says the statement always suffices overlooks the minority courts, the trial judge’s discretion, and the heavier burden on unidentified declarants.
Because the judge decides this foundation, the dispute is usually argued with the jury out of the courtroom. A sample transcript in one secondary source shows the routine: the judge announces that the dispute concerns “a technical question of law” and sends the jurors out for about twenty minutes “while we get to the bottom of this thing.”34
The first step does most of the work in practice, which is why the theoretical question so rarely has to be decided. Almost every real case contains some outside circumstance that a court will count, and a proponent who finds it early makes the choice between the two views irrelevant.
Perception and Competency
Rule 803(2) lists what the proponent must show about the event and the declarant’s excitement, but it says nothing about what the declarant must have seen.36 That silence does not waive first-hand knowledge. Rule 602 forbids a witness to testify about a subject without personal knowledge, and the rule applies with equal force to hearsay statements, so the declarant of an excited utterance must personally have observed the startling event.37
The requirement survives because excitement answers only one danger. A shock removes the chance to fabricate, but it does nothing about ignorance. A declarant who repeats what someone else said, or who guesses from the aftermath, may be as unreflective as any victim, and unreflective speech from such a person is only spontaneous error.
The proponent carries the burden of showing perception, and the judge resolves any factual dispute about it by a preponderance of the evidence, drawing on material that need not itself be admissible.38 The showing is lenient in form. Direct proof of observation is unnecessary; it is enough that the circumstances appear consistent with the declarant’s having had an opportunity to observe, though a statement is usually held inadmissible when nothing reasonably suggests such an opportunity.39 The Third Circuit adds that circumstantial evidence of perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the guarantees of trustworthiness that mark every hearsay exception.40 The treatise would send a genuinely doubtful case to the jury, while the Third Circuit has the judge decide by a preponderance; either way, the proponent needs something more than a bare assumption. The statement itself can supply that something. In the court’s example, a statement such as “I saw that blue truck run down the lady on the corner” might stand alone to show perception if the judge is satisfied that the declarant spoke from personal observation.41
The remark in Miller contained no such words. After a collision, an angry declarant said that someone had “tried to cut in,” and the record held no circumstance from which the judge could infer by a preponderance that the declarant saw it happen.42 The trial judge reasoned that the declarant would have spoken only if positioned to see the collision. The Third Circuit rejected that inference, because the words alone did not show that the declarant more likely than not saw the event. The speaker might have been drawing a conclusion from what he saw while approaching the scene, might have been hypothesizing or repeating what someone else said, or might even have been talking about another driver who had just cut in front of him.43
The speaker’s anonymity shaped the analysis. Miller does not treat the statements of unidentified declarants as inadmissible, but it asks the proponent for a heavier showing of circumstantial trustworthiness.44 The reason for the heavier showing is the uncertainty the treatise identifies: with an unknown speaker, a court cannot readily tell that foundational requirements, including first-hand knowledge and the effect of the event on the declarant, are satisfied.45 The question stays open elsewhere. A dissent in Navarette v. California, a case about an anonymous 911 tip, remarked that it is unsettled whether the excited utterances of an unknown declarant are ever admissible.46
A declarant whose identity is known can still fail the requirement. In Bemis v. Edwards, a neighbor named Estep called 911 to report that police officers were beating a man outside. The district court found from the recording that Estep was not watching the events he described but was relaying what others in his house were seeing and telling him, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the call for lack of foundation.47 The court applied the personal-knowledge requirement to present sense impressions and excited utterances alike, and it left the trial court’s finding undisturbed on review.48 A call made close in time to the event therefore cannot make up for second-hand knowledge.
The requirement was met in Brown. The declarants reported that “they just saw a guy with a gun,” which is a claim of direct observation of a concrete fact.49 The remark in Miller could have been a conclusion drawn from what the speaker saw on arriving, and the Brown declarants described what they had seen. The officer’s prompt discovery of Brown, visibly carrying a gun and pointed out by the declarants, supplied corroboration in any event.50
The lobby scene turns on a companion point: the other tests of witness competency, such as the age and mental capacity needed to take the stand, do not apply to the declarant of an excited utterance. The treatise explains that, on the theory that the excitement of the event supplies a countervailing assurance of reliability, an excited utterance is admissible even though the declarant was a child who would have been incompetent as a witness, or was incompetent by virtue of mental illness.51 In Morgan v. Foretich, statements a young child named Hilary made to her mother were offered over the objection that her age made her incompetent to testify. The Fourth Circuit held that, should the statements otherwise qualify as excited utterances, her youthful incompetency would not bar their admission.52 The court also found a three-hour gap “well within the bounds of reasonableness,” given the other indications of trustworthiness, a timing question the next section takes up.53
The difference lies in where each doctrine finds reliability. Competency rules ask whether a person can be trusted to give sworn testimony, understanding the duty to tell the truth and able to narrate events coherently. An excited utterance is not sworn testimony, and its reliability comes from the circumstances in which it was spoken. A very young child or a declarant impaired by mental illness may fail every courtroom test and still be the kind of speaker the exception was built for, because speech forced out by shock leaves no room for calculation. Age still matters in one place: Morgan lists the declarant’s age among the factors that bear on whether the statement was made under the stress of the event.54
Competency asks who may testify, and perception asks what this declarant actually saw. A declarant who passes the first test and fails the second is excluded, and a declarant who fails the first and passes the second is not.