Concept
Contrast with Excited Utterances
Present sense impression
Contrast with Excited Utterances
Rules 803(1) and 803(2) stand side by side, and they overlap. Rule 803(1) admits “a statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”1 Rule 803(2) admits “a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”2 Immediacy is the key to the first, because the declarant describes what she sees as she sees it. Excitement is the key to the second, because a startling event has shaken the declarant and she speaks about it.3 Both exceptions were distilled from the vague common law doctrine of res gestae, which held that event and statement were so closely bound that the happening impelled the words out of the declarant, who had no time to lie or forget.4
A shared root and different triggers mean that one remark may satisfy both exceptions, only one, or neither. A 911 call shows how. In United States v. Boyce, a caller told the operator that the father of her children had just hit her and was “going crazy for no reason,” and when asked whether he had a weapon she answered yes and said he had “a gun.”5 The call came right after the battery, and the court concluded that she made it under the stress of the startling event.6 It held the call admissible as an excited utterance and did not need to decide whether it also fit Rule 803(1).7 A calm remark about a routine scene has no excitement behind it, and a remark that reaches back to cause or blame may exceed what Rule 803(1) allows. Each exception therefore reaches cases the other cannot.
Three differences separate the exceptions: the trigger that sets off the statement, the subject matter the statement may reach, and the time within which it may be made. The three have one source. Rule 803(2) requires a startling event and Rule 803(1) does not, so Rule 803(1) must make up the difference with a tighter tie to perception and a shorter clock.8
Triggers and Rationales
Rule 803(1) requires no startling event and no agitated speaker. Any event or condition qualifies if the declarant describes or explains it while or immediately after perceiving it.9 Rule 803(2) is built on a shock and on a speaker still caught up in it.10 Each trigger carries its own account of why the words deserve trust without cross-examination, and those accounts set the conditions each exception attaches to a statement.
The present sense impression draws its assurance from the clock. Three features support it. Because the report concerns what the declarant is observing as she speaks, a defect of memory cannot intrude. Because the statement is contemporaneous with the observation, little or no time remains for calculated misstatement. And the statement usually goes to a third person who was present at the scene and later testifies to it.11 The primary guaranty of trustworthiness is the “substantial contemporaneity” of event and statement.12 The exception asks for no emotional condition, so a calm speaker can qualify. Without a shock to interrupt reflection, only the shortness of the interval keeps reflection away, and the guarantee is weaker than the one a startling event supplies. The rule compensates by confining the exception to words that pertain directly to what the declarant perceives and to a short window for speaking, limits that the next two subsections take up in turn.13
The excited utterance rests on psychology. A startling event temporarily stills the capacity for reflection, so the declarant speaks without conscious fabrication.14 That premise yields the elements a judge must find: an event or condition startling enough to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; no time to fabricate, because the declarant is still under the influence of the event; and a statement relating to it.15 The shock is also credited with answering the remaining hearsay risks, since it overcomes any motive to lie, and memory is no problem when the statement comes close in time to the event.16 A bystander may qualify as readily as a participant, because one can be startled by an event in which one takes no part.17 A calm remark about a routine scene, however prompt, offers the judge no shock to point to, so it cannot enter through Rule 803(2).
Because both exceptions aim at spontaneity, the same facts can start both clocks at once. An undercover agent in one case made a recorded statement as soon as an arrest was complete. The recording supported a finding of excitement: the agent’s voice was exultant, the pent-up tension of his role had just broken, and the testimony and tape described a quick and somewhat chaotic arrest that continued the excitement of receiving and testing the sample.18 He also spoke at his first opportunity, two minutes and twenty-five seconds after the arrest and less than fifteen minutes after delivery of the sample, and where a precisely contemporaneous declaration cannot be made, near contemporaneity satisfies Rule 803(1).19
The exceptions can also come apart. In United States v. Ferber, an email was prepared shortly after a stressful telephone call. The court held that although the email was removed from the stress of the call, it was prepared shortly afterward and so qualified as a present sense impression. It found that ruling consistent with the excited utterance rule, because an excited utterance must be made under the stress of excitement, and any amount of time between the exciting event and the statement removes the declarant from the stress of the situation.20 Each exception was tested on its own terms, so failing one did not sink the other.
United States v. Boyce shows the divergence running the other way. The caller had run to a neighbor’s house between the battery and her 911 call, and she answered the dispatcher’s questions instead of giving a spontaneous narration. The court acknowledged that answering questions can increase the chance of calculated narration, and it declined to decide whether that concern defeated Rule 803(1), because the call was admissible as an excited utterance in any event.21 The detour and the prompting weaken a theory that rests on substantial contemporaneity,22 but they leave intact a theory that asks whether the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event.23
The trigger therefore poses two separate questions. A statement about an ordinary event fails only Rule 803(2) and stays eligible under Rule 803(1). A startling event, by contrast, proves nothing about Rule 803(1), because shock supplies the trigger for Rule 803(2) and adds nothing to the content and timing that Rule 803(1) tests.
The excited utterance has critics, and their objection goes to its trigger. One treatise, following Professor Morgan, observes that the very emotional impact excited utterances require endangers their reliability, so it makes little sense to admit them while excluding other statements that may carry equal assurances of reliability and lack their inherent defects.24 Admissibility doctrine answers with a narrower question. As a matter of admissibility, the law is satisfied when the declarant’s reflective, deliberative, fabricative capacity is stilled, while the care with which the declarant observed is of secondary importance and is grist for counsel arguing weight to the jury.25
Scope of Subject Matter
Rules 803(1) and 803(2) use different verbs to say how far a statement may range from its event. A present sense impression is “a statement describing or explaining an event or condition,” while an excited utterance is “a statement relating to a startling event or condition.”27 Describing and explaining keep the words on the scene the declarant is perceiving. Relating to asks only for a connection with the startling event. One sentence can therefore hold a clause that satisfies the narrower verb and a clause that satisfies only the broader one, so a single statement may come in whole under one rule and in part under the other.
The verbs track the two theories of reliability. A present sense impression has no startling event behind it, so the only protection against faulty memory and calculated misstatement is the closeness of the words to perception, and that protection covers only the part of the statement that reports what the declarant perceived. Tighter correspondence between observation and statement is therefore appropriate, because without a startling event spontaneity is hard to assume unless the words pertain directly to perception.28 The excited utterance rests on the speaker’s condition, stress that stills reflection, so the rule needs only a broadly defined connection between event and statement. The phrase “relating to” is intended to extend beyond a mere description or explanation, and courts have applied it quite liberally.29
Two decisions show how generously “relating to” has been read. In Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead, a slip-and-fall case, a clerk’s statement that “That has been on the floor for a couple of hours” was held admissible. In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, a driver’s statement that he had to call on a customer and was in a hurry to get home was admitted on the issue of his agency.30 Neither remark simply reports a scene as it unfolds. The first reaches back to how long a condition had existed, and the second supplies a purpose.
A tweet shows the split inside a single sentence. A driver’s son tweets within minutes of a collision: “Dad just ran a red light because he was late picking me up!” The first clause describes what the son saw, so it fits Rule 803(1). The second gives a reason for the father’s act and charges him with fault, which reaches beyond what the son perceived, so it falls outside “describing or explaining” even though it went out in the same post. Timing cannot separate the clauses, because both were sent at once, and only content can. Under Rule 803(2) the result reverses. If the son was still excited when he posted, the whole tweet comes in, because the second clause refers to the cause of the accident.31
Boyce applied the textual difference. The dispatcher asked whether any weapons were involved to learn about the battery and the danger posed by the assailant, and the caller said a gun was involved. That answer gave the dispatcher information about her assailant and the danger she had experienced minutes earlier, and the court held that this description of the threat posed by the man who battered her related to the incident that produced her agitated state.32 The same opinion explained why the call could survive on one rule even if doubtful under the other: the excited utterance exception “allows for a broader scope of subject matter coverage” than the present sense impression.33
Breadth sets only a threshold, and a clause that strays from the exciting event into earlier facts invites a closer look at spontaneity. In one decision, officers discovered contraband in a car’s trunk, and the declarant’s statement concerned the earlier placing of a gym bag in the trunk. The court could not treat the statement as a present sense impression, because its subject was not what the declarant was perceiving as he spoke but something that had happened at a remote earlier time.34 It also counted against an excited utterance theory that the event supposedly causing the excitement, the officers’ discovery of the contraband, was not the subject of the statement.35
The fourth step does the work that separates the two rules, and the fifth keeps the breadth of “relating to” from swallowing the requirement of spontaneity. The next subsection asks how late the words may come.
Time Windows
Rule 803(1) requires that a statement be “made while or immediately after the declarant perceived” the event, and Rule 803(2) requires that it be “made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”37 The two texts start their clocks at different moments. The first runs from the instant of perceiving and tolerates only a brief lapse afterward. The second is measured by the duration of the stress the event caused.38 Because stress is a condition of the speaker and not a count of minutes, an excited utterance can survive an interval that would defeat a present sense impression, and a calm speaker with no stress to measure can fall outside both windows.
The present sense impression window is narrow because the shortness of the interval is the only thing vouching for the statement. With no startling event to interrupt reflection, the guarantee of trustworthiness is weaker, and the permitted period shrinks to match. Exact contemporaneity is not demanded, since some time is needed to turn observation into speech, so the working question is whether enough time elapsed to permit reflective thought.39 The undercover agent discussed above shows the standard in use: he spoke at his first opportunity, and near contemporaneity satisfied the rule.40
The excited utterance window is measured differently because its guarantee comes from a different source. Excitement stills the capacity for reflection, so the guarantee lasts as long as the excitement does, and the standard of measurement is the duration of the state of excitement.41 The court in Boyce put the point as a matter of what must line up with what: the statement “need not be contemporaneous with the startling event,” but it must be contemporaneous with the excitement the event engendered.42 Elapsed time is therefore evidence about the speaker’s condition, one factor beside the nature of the event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the words were volunteered or given in answer to a question.43 The Boyce caller told the operator that she had “just” run upstairs to her neighbor’s house, and an officer’s testimony that she seemed emotional, as though she had just been in an argument or fight, further supported the finding that she spoke under the stress of the battery.44
Stress cannot be seen on a page, so courts look at what filled the interval. Where the time allowed reflection, the surrounding circumstances may swing the balance toward exclusion, and proof that the declarant performed tasks requiring relatively careful thought between the event and the statement is strong evidence that the effect of the event had subsided.45 Trial courts hold substantial discretion on the point, because the factual situations vary so widely.46
Excitement can outlast the present sense impression window by a wide margin. The time that may pass between the exciting event and the statement can be longer than under the present sense impression rule, and what matters is that the declarant is still excited when she speaks, since the stress of excitement is in part what ensures reliability.47
At the near end of the range the windows overlap, and one statement can fit both, as the undercover agent’s did.48 A somewhat longer interval pulls them apart. The email in Ferber qualified as a present sense impression because it was prepared shortly after the call, although its author was already removed from the call’s stress. The court reconciled that result with the excited utterance rule by explaining that any amount of time between event and statement removes the declarant from the stress of the situation, so the contemporaneity requirement of Rule 803(2) refers to temporal proximity to the startling event.49 Boyce words the requirement differently, asking whether the statement was contemporaneous with the excitement and not with the event.50 The two formulations emphasize different things, and they can part ways when a declarant’s stress outlasts the event’s immediate aftermath.
A statement that fits neither window is a near miss. Under the view of some courts, near misses make the residual exception, Rule 807, inapplicable.51 The commentary to Rule 807 clarifies that a court assessing guarantees of trustworthiness may consider whether the statement is a near miss of a Rule 803 or 804 exception, and that a court taking that approach should evaluate all relevant guarantees of trustworthiness and take into account the reasons the statement misses the standard exception.52 A later section returns to that route.
The second and third steps apply different tests to the same facts, so a statement can clear one window and miss the other, or miss both. The common mistake is to assume that a statement that fails one exception on timing must fail the other as well.