Concept
Prior Statements of Identification
Prior statements by witness
Prior Statements of Identification
A witness who picks a suspect out of a lineup has made an out-of-court statement, and a prosecutor who offers it to prove that the suspect is the person the witness saw offers it for its truth. Without an exemption, it is hearsay.1 Rule 801(d)(1)(C) supplies the exemption for a statement that “identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.”2 The declarant must also testify at the current trial and be subject to cross-examination about the statement. That condition is common to every category in Rule 801(d)(1) and does not apply to the party-opponent statements of Rule 801(d)(2).3
Two conditions belong to this category alone. The statement must identify a person, and it must rest on the declarant's personal perception of that person.4 Nothing else that the neighboring categories demand is required here. Subsection (A) admits an inconsistent statement only if it “was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition,” and subsection (B) admits a consistent statement only to answer an attack on the witness's credibility.5 An identification faces neither limit. It is exempt whether it is consistent or inconsistent with the testimony, whether it was made at an earlier proceeding, on the street, or at the stationhouse, whether it was sworn, and whether anyone has charged the witness with influence, motive, or fabrication or needs the witness rehabilitated.6 The proponent need not first impeach the witness.7
The exemption rests on a judgment about identifications in particular. Courtroom identification is unsatisfactory, and constitutional safeguards regulate the out-of-court identifications that police arrange.8 Pretrial identifications may also be more trustworthy. In a proper lineup the array does not single out the suspect, and a “blank” array can expose an overeager identifier or deflate the preconception that the suspect must be one of those shown. The identification often comes close to the offense, before anyone can pressure the witness. And because the identifier testifies at trial, the jury can compare what she says there with what she said before, and the defense can cross-examine her on both.9
That judgment does not extend to witness statements generally. If out-of-court statements by people who become witnesses were generally admissible, well-organized parties would record interviews with prospective witnesses and take the statements with no cross-examination. Opponents of that practice add that the witness at trial may be less willing to change or criticize the recollection than the witness would have been if challenged when first expressing it.10 Subsection (C) is narrower: it reaches only the identification of a person the declarant perceived, and only when the declarant testifies and answers questions about the statement.
The exemption covers identifications made in many settings. A lineup, a showup (a one-on-one viewing of a suspect), a photograph, a sketch, and a prior hearing all qualify.11 So do identifications made on the street, at the stationhouse, and at the crime scene itself, and the person identified may be any relevant person in a civil or criminal case, not only a central actor.12
State v. Motta shows the pattern in one witness's history. On June 3, 1980, Iwashita picked the appellant's photograph from an array of about twenty-five to thirty pictures. Six days later she positively identified him at a preliminary hearing. At trial she confirmed both identifications and pointed him out as the person who robbed her.13 Because she testified, the jury could set her courtroom account beside her earlier identifications, and the defense could cross-examine her on all of them.14
The rule does not require an in-court identification, positive or otherwise. Nothing in its text bars the out-of-court identification of a declarant who denies on the stand that she made it, or who repudiates it.15 Evidence of a pretrial identification is usually admitted even when the witness cannot identify anyone in court.16 United States v. Owens carries that principle to a witness whose memory has failed. The Court wrote that a witness is ordinarily “subject to cross-examination” when placed on the stand, under oath, and responding willingly to questions. Limits that the trial court places on the examination, or a witness's assertion of privilege, may undermine cross-examination until no meaningful cross-examination remains. An assertion of memory loss does not, because memory loss is often the very result cross-examination seeks, and it can destroy the force of the prior statement. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) requires only that the cross-examination concern the statement.17 The House Report points the same way. Memory fades and an identification grows less reliable as time passes, so minimizing the barriers to more contemporaneous identifications is fairer to defendants and prevents “cases falling through because the witness can no longer recall the identity of the person he saw commit the crime.”18
Anyone who was present, such as a police officer, may testify to the identification, because the rule does not confine proof to the identifier's own testimony. The rule is best read to contemplate that the declarant also testifies in court on the subject, and not merely stands available for the defendant to recall. Repeated testimony about the identification can overemphasize it and mislead the jury, and Rule 403 gives the court discretionary control over that overproof.19
The exemption identifies a person and nothing else, so a statement identifying a thing falls outside it.20
Several edge cases remain open. A victim who tells arriving police “She assaulted me” may be reporting a crime and not identifying a person, and the same puzzle arises in child abuse cases when the complainant names a known stepfather, relative, or family friend. A statement that recounts a facial feature, or that refers to a person only by job (“the usher did X”), raises the same question. A sketch appears on the usual list of qualifying identifications, yet it is unsettled whether a composite drawing built with an officer or a computer is an identification within the rule, and whether it survives Rules 403 and 702. Whether a failure to identify is admissible is also unresolved.21
Satisfying the exemption does not guarantee that the identification reaches the jury. The rule has no requirement that the statement follow the perception closely, unlike California Evidence Code section 1238, which demands that the matter be fresh in memory. A stale identification therefore passes the hearsay rule, and memory and influence problems remain. Rule 403 may sometimes supply the limit, because it requires that probative value not be substantially outweighed by prejudice, time consumption, or confusion.22 How the police obtained the identification raises separate constitutional questions, and the safeguards that answer them are part of the reason the rule trusts pretrial identifications.23
Step 1 decides most of the cases in which the exemption fails, and step 2 catches the statements about cars and other objects that sound like identifications but are not.