Concept
Ownership and Control
Remedial measures
Ownership and Control
A defendant who denies owning the walkway where the plaintiff fell has invited proof of a later repair, because a defendant would hardly fix a walkway it did not own or was not at least responsible for.1 Rule 407 makes room for that proof. After barring subsequent measures offered to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or a need for a warning, it lets the court admit the evidence for “another purpose,” and it names ownership and control among them, each available only “if disputed.”2 Ownership asks who holds the property; control asks who was actually in charge of the place or thing where the injury occurred.
The same reasoning works for a vehicle. A defendant who denies owning the car whose brakes allegedly failed, but who paid for later brake repairs, has supplied evidence that makes ownership or control more likely.3 Neither inference asks the jury to treat the repair as a confession. The repair is offered to show who owned or controlled the thing, and that fact matters only because it leads, in the end, to the defendant’s responsibility; but the evidence reaches that point by a more reliable route than the idea that a person who fixes something admits fault.4 That reliability explains why the exceptions exist. Evidence this probative should not be sacrificed to the policy of encouraging repairs, and it is not so likely to be exaggerated or misunderstood.5
The chapter’s supermarket sidewalk shows the exception from the defendant’s side of the table. If the store merely denies negligence, the plaintiff’s chain runs from the new fifteen-minute cleaning schedule to a belief that the old schedule was too lax, and the rule bars it. If the store instead defends by denying that the sidewalk was its responsibility, the chain runs from the same schedule change to a belief that the sidewalk was the store’s job, and no implied confession of earlier fault is needed.6 The schedule change still carries its forbidden inference, so the jury may hear it for one purpose only. The store should ask for a limiting instruction. As one federal court of appeals put it in an impeachment case, the burden of requesting the instruction rests on the party who wants it, and declining the chance waives the objection.7
The exceptions turn on the opponent opening the door, and for ownership and control the door is the word “disputed.”8 A repair comes in on this ground because it bears on a fact the jury must resolve. When nobody contests ownership or control, the repair adds nothing on that point, and the only use left for it is the inference of fault that the rule forbids. Without the gate, a plaintiff could announce that every repair shows control and carry the confession inference in through the side door. The Connecticut court in Smith v. Town of Greenwich therefore treated the central question as the purpose for which the evidence is offered. It restated that repairs tend to prove retained control over an area, but that when the defendant has admitted orally that it controlled the premises where the injury occurred, testimony should make no reference to the later repairs.9 A defendant that admits it controlled the stairway where the plaintiff fell has thus closed the exception on that issue, and the plaintiff cannot reopen it by labeling the repair as proof of control.
A concession on one point does not close the gate on another, and Smith shows how narrow a live dispute can be. The defendant there conceded at trial that the plaintiff fell on the sidewalk abutting its land, but it did not concede that it was the party responsible, if any party was, for creating the snow pile on that sidewalk. Over its motion in limine and timely objections, the plaintiff offered a photograph of Passerelli clearing the pile, photographs of the sidewalk after it had been salted, and testimony from Voisene that he had called Passerelli after the accident.10 The trial court had told the jury to decide which of two defendants, if either, created the pile. The jury could therefore use the photographs to find that this defendant controlled the pile and caused the dangerous condition, and the court held that admitting them as probative of control over the pile was not an abuse of discretion.11
A dissent in Kamla v. Space Needle Corp. draws the same line between what a defendant admits controlling and what is actually contested. The trial court excluded the evidence of later measures because the Space Needle had admitted control over the elevators, reasoning that control was not in dispute. The dissent answered that the contested question was who had control of the work site at the 200-foot level, not control of the elevators, so the evidence should have been admitted on that point.12 Because the view appears in a dissent, it shows how to frame the question rather than settled law, but the framing is sound: the gate opens or closes issue by issue.
The live issues can change over the life of a case, and Handler Corp. v. Tlapechco shows what follows. After Tlapechco’s accident, Handler had a safety rail installed. On retrial, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that genuine issues of material fact were in dispute about whether Handler voluntarily assumed responsibility for safety, and it reasoned that the level of control Handler exerted around the walkway bears on that question.13 Because Delaware’s Rule 407 expressly allows a later remedial measure to demonstrate control, the court held the rail admissible for that purpose and expected the result on retrial to differ.14 The rail was the same. What the retrial added was a live dispute for the rail to help resolve.
A permitted purpose also does not excuse the opponent from objecting at the right time. In Clausen v. Storage Tank Development Corp., Storage Tank did not timely object at trial to evidence of a 1992 alteration to a ramp, so the court of appeals reviewed the admission only for plain error.15
Falling within the exception does not guarantee admission, because Rule 403 remains the last check. In the brake example, the court may keep out the repair payments when ownership is a peripheral issue or can be proved easily some other way and jurors are likely to take the payments as an admission of fault.16 Rule 403 receives fuller treatment later in this chapter. Feasibility, the next permitted purpose, opens the same kind of gate.17