Concept
Exceptions to the Privilege
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Exceptions to the Privilege
A communication that satisfies every element of the psychotherapist-patient privilege can still lose its protection, because the privilege has exceptions. Jaffee did not list them. The Supreme Court has said that Rule 501 manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege and was meant to give courts the flexibility to develop privilege rules case by case,1 so the exceptions have come from lower-court decisions, from state statutes, and from a proposed federal rule that Congress never adopted.
The proposed rule is the best-organized source. Proposed Rule 504(d), approved by the Supreme Court in 1972 but never enacted by Congress, would have removed the privilege in hospitalization or commitment proceedings, in a court-ordered mental examination, and in litigation in which the patient asserts a mental condition as an element of a claim or defense. It binds no federal court, but it serves as a standard for developing federal common law, and courts have added a crime-or-fraud exception to its three.2 Jaffee’s footnote supplies a dangerous-patient example. This unit takes the exceptions in this order: the dangerous patient, crime or fraud, child abuse reporting, and examinations and commitment. The patient who puts a mental condition in issue belongs to the next section on waiver, because it turns on the patient’s own conduct. Courts reasoning by analogy to the attorney-client and marital privileges ask whether the patient has done something like basing a claim on the psychotherapist’s communications or selectively disclosing part of a privileged communication to gain an advantage in litigation.3
The exceptions are narrow because of the way Jaffee justified the privilege. The Court called the mental health of the citizenry a public good of transcendent importance, and it found that protecting an atmosphere of confidence and trust, in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure, serves important private interests. It reasoned that sacrificing those interests for a modest evidentiary benefit would serve no greater truth-seeking function, because the communications would be unlikely to come into being if they were unprotected.4 It also refused to make the promise of confidentiality contingent on a trial judge’s later evaluation of the patient’s privacy interest against the evidentiary need.5 An exception that grew whenever the evidence looked important would restore the contingency Jaffee removed, so each exception below names a kind of situation and stays tied to it.
State statutes add exceptions of their own and differ in their details, so the local text controls in a state-law case, and a federal court applies a state exception only where Rule 501 makes state privilege law govern. Jaffee itself shows how much the details matter: the Court cited one Illinois provision as explicitly extending a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers and observed that a different Illinois statute would have protected the communications in state court.6
An exception presupposes a privilege that attached, and the elements can fail on their own. Federal courts have not agreed on whether the privilege reaches unlicensed counselors: the Ninth Circuit in Oleszko extended it to unlicensed counselors in an employer’s assistance program,7 while in another prosecution the government’s reading would have left a defendant’s records unprivileged because his credentialed counselor had chosen not to seek a state license.8 A court therefore asks first whether the privilege attached and only then whether an exception removed it.
Dangerous Patient
The Supreme Court’s guidance on a dangerous-patient exception comes from a single footnote in Jaffee. The Court wrote that it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, but that it did not doubt there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.9 Because the Court did not need that sentence to decide the case, it is dictum: it signals where the law may go without binding later courts to its details.
The footnote sets a standard with two conditions. The threat must be serious, and the therapist’s disclosure must be the only means of averting the harm. The word only keeps the exception narrow, and the narrowness protects the reason for the privilege. Jaffee justified the privilege by an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient will speak frankly and completely,10 and a patient who expected the therapist to repeat anything that sounded threatening would stop speaking freely about the very impulses that treatment exists to address.
United States v. Glass shows that an alarming statement made in therapy does not by itself remove the privilege. Glass made a statement to his psychotherapist that was later treated as a threat to the President. Ten days elapsed before the Secret Service was contacted, and that contact triggered its interview of the psychotherapist. The record showed no affirmative effort by the psychotherapist to avert the threat and no showing of how the Secret Service averted the threat only through the psychotherapist’s disclosure. The Tenth Circuit could not see how, ten days after the communication, the statement had become a serious threat of harm that only disclosure could avert, and without further facts it saw no difference from the situation Jaffee protected.11
The court held that Jaffee’s privilege was available to protect Glass’s statements from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. It vacated his guilty plea and remanded for the district court to proceed under Rule 104(a), which lets a judge decide preliminary questions of admissibility, and to determine whether the threat was serious when it was uttered and whether disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the President when the disclosure was made. The district court was to hear Dr. Darbe’s opinion of the seriousness of the threat and the opinion of any appropriate authority who deals with the protection of the President.12
The Tenth Circuit also declined to extend its earlier decision in Burtrum. That decision predated Jaffee and addressed only criminal child sexual abuse prosecutions, where the court had balanced the need to protect child victims against the quest for relevant evidence and concluded that significant evidentiary need compelled admission.13 Balancing of that kind sits uneasily with Jaffee, which rooted the privilege in a public good that overrides the quest for relevant evidence and rejected a balancing component that would make confidentiality contingent on a trial judge’s later evaluation of the need for disclosure.14
Glass therefore teaches a reader to keep the two conditions apart. A frightening statement establishes, at most, seriousness. The exception also requires that disclosure was the only means of averting harm, and the court judged the conditions at different moments, seriousness when the statement was made and necessity when the disclosure was made.15
The exception has a tort counterpart in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, which defined the therapist’s duty to act. When a therapist determines, or under the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim. Meeting that duty may call for warning the victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, notifying the police, or taking whatever other steps are reasonably necessary.16
Not every court extends the therapist’s duty beyond the patient. One court concluded that the problem of divided loyalties, together with the strong public interest in the confidentiality of therapist-patient communications, argues strongly against a duty of care toward nonpatients.17 Its concern was that such a duty would push therapists to weigh the effects of treatment choices on third parties and would give them an incentive to compromise treatment to avoid liability, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the therapist’s obligation to the patient.18
California turns the same concern into an evidentiary rule. Menendez v. Superior Court applied the dangerous-patient exception of Evidence Code section 1024, which the court had described in Tarasoff as establishing that psychotherapeutic communication is not privileged when disclosure is necessary to prevent threatened danger, and as a clear expression of legislative policy balancing the patient’s confidentiality against the safety of foreseeable victims. The court emphasized that the exception requires only reasonable cause for the psychotherapist’s belief in the patient’s dangerousness and in the necessity of disclosure, and that it does not demand that the patient be dangerous to someone other than the psychotherapist.19
The facts show the exception working. Dr. Oziel treated Lyle and Erik Menendez. At the sessions of October 31 and November 2 the brothers made threats aimed at him alone that also collaterally endangered his wife and his lover because of their relationships to him. He had reasonable cause to believe the brothers were dangerous and that disclosing all the communications made at those sessions was necessary to prevent harm, and he disclosed them to the two women in separate warnings. The court held the conditions of the exception met as to those sessions.20
The exception did not reach every session. As to another session, the court found that the disclosure-is-necessary requirement was not met, so the exception did not operate there.21 Necessity is therefore tested communication by communication, and dangerousness at one session does not strip protection from the rest of the treatment.
Menendez rests on state law, so it controls a federal court only where Rule 501 makes state privilege law govern. The federal common law of the exception remains unsettled: the footnote predicted exceptions without defining them, and courts of appeals have taken up the question in decisions such as United States v. Chase and United States v. Auster. A student should check the controlling circuit and not assume a uniform rule. Ethics bear on the analysis as well, because therapists are ethically required to warn patients of any limits on confidentiality,22 and a warning given at the outset can affect whether the patient reasonably expected secrecy, a question the confidential-communication element addresses.
Three ideas that exam questions blend should be kept apart. Jaffee’s footnote is federal dictum about when the evidentiary privilege yields. Tarasoff is a tort rule about the therapist’s duty to act, a duty met by steps outside the courtroom such as warning the victim or calling the police. Section 1024 is a state evidentiary exception. Extending the reasoning of an earlier California decision, Menendez held that a therapist’s warning to a possible victim of the patient is not privileged so long as the requirements of the exception are met.23 Whether the patient’s own statements may be used against the patient is a separate question, and Glass answered it by requiring facts showing seriousness and necessity before the statement could be compelled.24
Crime or Fraud
The crime-fraud exception withdraws the privilege from communications made to carry out a crime or fraud, and courts have applied it to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.26 The First Circuit’s decision in re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette) is a leading statement of the rule, and it reached the exception by borrowing from the attorney-client privilege.
In the attorney-client setting, the exception reflects a policy judgment. A completely opaque privilege might give lawyers more chances to discourage illegal behavior, but courts have concluded that this possible benefit does not justify shielding highly probative evidence of antisocial conduct from the factfinder.27
Violette carried that judgment across because the Supreme Court had framed the two privileges in parallel terms. Jaffee likened the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the attorney-client privilege: both foster the confidence and trust that effective counseling requires, but the private interests of the participants do not justify a privilege by themselves, and the justification depends on a public good, which for psychotherapy is mental health.28 Communications meant to advance a crime or fraud do not serve that public good, so the privilege has no claim to protect them.
The First Circuit confined the exception to communications whose purpose is to promote a particular crime or fraud. The limit does real work. A patient decides how much to reveal before any dispute arises, and a patient with a past would hold back the most important material if talking about it could forfeit the privilege. A patient who describes an earlier offense and the guilt it causes is seeking help, not advancing a scheme, so the privilege holds. A patient who invents symptoms to build a false claim, intending the therapist’s notes to prove it, is using the therapy as an instrument of the fraud, so the privilege does not.
A patient’s self-interest does not supply the purpose the exception requires. In Menendez v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held without adequate legal or factual basis any statement or implication by the Court of Appeal that psychotherapy cannot take place under conditions of threat. It added that motive is largely, if not totally, immaterial, because in virtually all psychotherapy the participants are motivated by something other than therapy for its own sake: the therapist sometimes by self-interest, the patient sometimes by self-preservation. The dispositive fact is what the participants do, not why.29 Menendez rests on state law and governs a federal court only where Rule 501 makes state privilege law govern, but it marks the line: showing that a participant was self-interested does not show what the communications were for.
Two routes can lead to the same result, and they should be kept apart. One says the privilege never attached, because a communication meant to advance a crime is not a communication for diagnosis or treatment. The other says the privilege attached and was forfeited. The crime-fraud exception also differs from the dangerous-patient exception: the one asks what the patient was trying to accomplish by speaking, and the other asks whether a serious threat can be averted only by the therapist’s disclosure. A patient who announces a plan to hurt someone is not necessarily using therapy as a tool of that plan.
Child Abuse Reporting
A state reporting statute can displace a therapist’s privilege without ever mentioning the privilege, and Marks v. Tenbrunsel shows how. The trial court dismissed David Marks’s claims against Dr. Pope and Dr. Tenbrunsel, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The main opinion concluded that the psychotherapist-patient privilege had been overruled implicitly by section 26-14-9 of the Alabama Code, which provides immunity for reporters of suspected child abuse.31
Justice See agreed that the claims against Dr. Pope were properly dismissed but dissented as to Dr. Tenbrunsel, because he disagreed that the immunity provision had overruled the privilege by implication. He also stressed that Alabama gives psychotherapist-patient communications the same level of protection as attorney-client communications, so a holding that a statute silently displaced one privilege bears on the other.32
The disagreement concerns method. The argument for finding a conflict is easy to state: an immunity matters only where a report would otherwise expose the reporter to liability, so if the privilege controlled the report, the immunity would protect little in the setting where a professional hears an admission of abuse. The dissent resisted finding a privilege of this standing overridden without clearer statutory language. A student should treat Marks as one court’s answer to how far a reporting statute displaces a privilege when the statute is silent about it. Marks was also a suit against the reporting doctors and not a demand for testimony, a difference the closing section of this chapter takes up when it separates the privilege from the duty of confidentiality.
Colorado draws the boundary in the statute itself. In L.A.N. v. L.M.B. the Colorado Supreme Court applied a provision of the Children’s Code that abrogates the privilege only for communications that form the basis of a report of child abuse or neglect, so other therapy communications in a dependency and neglect proceeding stayed privileged unless waived. A narrow abrogation of that kind preserves the reasons for the privilege: disclosure of therapy communications can be embarrassing to the point of mortification, unrestrained disclosure might discourage people from seeking help, and nearly every state recognizes the privilege.33
California’s cases also read the reporting exception narrowly. In Mathews v. Becerra the California Supreme Court recalled its narrow construction of the child abuse reporting exception: it is impossible to conceive of any meaningful therapy if the patient is aware at the outset that the therapist will violate his confidence and inform law enforcement of their discussions, and a therapist who had already reported was not required to make a second report of the same incidents based on the patient’s later redundant communications.34
Legislatures draw these lines differently, so the governing text must be read in every problem. Alabama’s immunity statute never names the privilege, Colorado’s ties the abrogation to the communications underlying a report, and California’s exception is construed narrowly. The justification in every state is getting suspected abuse to the authorities, so the privilege has little reason to yield for communications on which no report rests.
Federal common law has no settled counterpart. The closest authority is the Tenth Circuit’s pre-Jaffee decision in Burtrum, which addressed only the narrow question whether to recognize the privilege in a criminal child sexual abuse context. The court balanced the need to protect minor victims, who are often intimidated by the legal system and fearful of testifying, against the quest for relevant evidence and held that significant evidentiary need compelled admission of the evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions.35 When Glass later declined to extend Burtrum, it described the welfare of children as a subset of the public good and the sort of situation Jaffee anticipated, but it held that Burtrum’s analysis could not be carried beyond its narrow setting.36 Because Burtrum reached its result by weighing, a method Jaffee rejected for the privilege itself, its force even within its own setting after Jaffee is open to question.
Examinations and Commitment
Proposed Rule 504(d) listed hospitalization or commitment proceedings and a court-ordered mental examination among the situations in which the psychotherapist-patient privilege would not apply. Congress never enacted the rule, so it binds no federal court, and it serves only as a standard for developing federal common law.38 Because this subsection mixes that proposed federal rule with state practice, each statement below should be read for the source of law it describes.
A communication made in a court-ordered mental examination falls outside the privilege because the examiner works for the court and not for the person examined. The reason follows from what privileges are for. Privileges generally encourage the free flow of information between persons within a protected circle,39 and the two recognized rationales are encouraging socially desirable behavior and protecting intimate relationships from governmental intrusion.40 Each assumes a person who has sought out the professional. A patient who has come for treatment needs the assurance of secrecy to speak candidly enough to be helped, but a person sent by a judge to an examiner has no treatment relationship to protect and can see from the start that the examiner will report to the court.
Commitment proceedings reach the same result from a different direction. The question before the court is the person’s own mental condition, and the clinicians who have treated the person often hold the best information on it. If the privilege applied, the patient could keep from the court the very facts the hearing exists to decide. Proposed Rule 504(d) therefore listed hospitalization and commitment proceedings,41 and state physician-patient statutes have likewise been found to withdraw the privilege in commitment proceedings, in some drug prosecutions, and in will contests.42
A custody evaluation ordered by a judge is the court-ordered examination applied to family litigation. When a judge directs a mental health professional to evaluate the parents, privileges do not apply to what the evaluation gathers, and evaluators have each parent sign a document acknowledging that communications during the evaluation are not confidential and that privileges do not apply.43 The advance warning matters because a privilege protects communications that depend on an assurance of confidence, and a parent who has signed the acknowledgment has been told there is none. A stem that calls the evaluator a licensed psychologist and the parent a patient invites an assumption of privilege, and the question that dissolves it is who ordered the contact and for whose benefit it was done.
A parent who contests custody stands differently when the parent sought therapy voluntarily. The argument for exposing the records is that custody turns on a parent’s functioning and a treating professional’s records may be the best evidence of it. Against that stands a consequence courts and commentators want to avoid: if a parent believes that private information shared with a professional could be used in court to deprive the parent of the child, the parent may not get the therapy needed to be a better parent, and public policy favors encouraging parents to seek professional guidance and therapy.44 A child’s own therapy records raise a related question whose answer varies from case to case: one court treated a child’s records as privileged, and another found release of children’s mental health records to a father not in the children’s best interest.45 Legislatures can also settle the matter by statute, since state physician-patient privileges are sometimes withdrawn in child custody proceedings, and the wide variation among those statutes makes the local text indispensable.46
State courts can also create exceptions with no federal counterpart, and Wisconsin’s is a narrow one. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that public policy requires therapist-patient confidentiality and privilege to give way to third-party negligence claims of the kind known as Sawyer claims, but only in limited circumstances.47 The claim arose where negligent therapy allegedly caused false accusations against the parents of sexually or physically abusing their child. Procedure controls the exception. The plaintiffs, the Johnsons, had to present a good-faith, fact-specific basis showing a reasonable likelihood that the records contained information about negligent therapy. If they did, the trial court was to review the records privately, which is the meaning of in camera review, and turn over the relevant evidence to the parties, and the privilege was overcome only as to that evidence.48 Because the exception is a state-court public-policy rule tied to one kind of claim, it reaches a federal court only where Rule 501 sends the privilege question to state law.