Concept
No Balancing Test
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
No Balancing Test
A judge may not release a protected therapy communication because the party seeking it needs it badly. In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the suggestion that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is subject to balancing. “Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure,” the Court said, “would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”1 The privilege is therefore unqualified in one precise sense: courts cannot nullify it through a case-by-case balancing test.2 Once a communication falls inside the privilege, the strength of a litigant's need does not reopen the question.
Some courts before Jaffee treated the privilege as one factor in a weighing. Doe v. Diamond called the privilege highly qualified and required a case-by-case assessment of whether the evidentiary need for a witness's psychiatric history outweighed the witness's privacy interests. On that view, the privilege amounted only to a requirement that the court give those interests consideration as an important factor in the balance.3 The weighing in the Jaffee litigation itself went the patient's way. Officer Redmond and several of Allen's brothers and sisters, four of whom testified at trial, had witnessed the shooting, so the plaintiffs' need for her innermost thoughts was cumulative at best. Her privacy interest in counseling after a traumatic event in the line of duty was substantial.4
The Supreme Court rejected the method even though it had favored Redmond, and the reason is reliance. A qualified privilege is little better than none at all, the Court reasoned, because the patient cannot confidently rely on it.5 Timing makes the point concrete. A patient decides what to say during the session. The weighing comes later, if ever, in a lawsuit the patient may not foresee, so at the moment that matters the patient can only guess how a future judge will value a litigant's need against the patient's own privacy. A patient who must guess has the same reason to hold back as a patient with no privilege. The Court also placed the privilege's source in a public good that overrides the quest for relevant evidence, not in a constitutional right of privacy. It covered licensed clinical social workers because their clients often include the poor and those of modest means, who could not afford a psychiatrist or psychologist but whose counseling sessions serve the same public goals.6 A privilege that rests on that public good cannot be measured by a judge's estimate of one patient's privacy interest.
The reliance premise has critics. Commentary on the physician-patient privilege questions whether the average patient, thinking about illness and cure, spares any thought for a remote disclosure in court. Some analyses support the privilege on humanitarian grounds instead, as a private enclave that lets the patient make informed, independent choices among medical options.7 That debate concerns why privileges exist. It does not change the federal rule the Court adopted for psychotherapists.
Courts of appeals enforce the rule against trial judges who treat privileges as adjustable. The D.C. Circuit held that a district court may not let the plaintiffs' counsel see materials covered by the privilege, “regardless of its assessment of ‘the interests of justice.’”8 An order to disclose all of a litigant's records, without regard to their content and without screening them in any way, was an abuse of discretion, because it could compel disclosure of material subject to a federal privilege.9
The privilege also holds against prosecutors. A court of appeals rejecting a special counsel's proposal that a privilege yield to the grand jury's truth-seeking function called the proposal anomalous, because neither the attorney-client, the spousal, nor the psychotherapist privilege gives way to that function.10 The First Circuit allowed grand jury testimony in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette) not because no psychotherapist privilege exists in that context, but because a crime-fraud exception applies to the privilege. That shows how the privilege ordinarily yields: through a defined exception, not through an assessment of how much prosecutors need the evidence.11 A legislature can draw the same line by statute. In Menendez v. Superior Court, the California court treated the psychotherapist-patient privilege as paramount to prosecution, as a general matter and in the case before it. It noted that the Legislature had written a criminal-proceeding exception for the physician-patient privilege (Evid. Code § 998) and had not done the same for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.12
Fact patterns test this rule by stacking up the requesting party's need to see whether the answer moves. It does not. What moves the answer is a different kind of request, as a pair of demands shows.
The first demand ends at the privilege, because need is not something the judge may weigh. The second reaches material the privilege never covered. One opinion reads Jaffee to extend no further than confidential communications between licensed mental health professionals and their patients,13 so a record that is not such a communication remains subject to ordinary discovery. There Rule 26 requires the court to weigh the patient's privacy interest against the requesting party's need before it orders production.14 Weighing thus survives for material outside the privilege and is absent only for communications inside it. A court facing an unsorted file should sort first and weigh only the remainder, which is the step the unscreened order described above skipped. The edge of the privilege is itself contested, and the edge decides where weighing stops. In United States v. Hayes, the Sixth Circuit extended the privilege to an unlicensed social worker employed by the Veterans Administration and then concluded that the defendant's threats were not subject to it. A dissent noted that the government had not argued that lack of licensing was a relevant consideration.15
Rejecting balancing does not make the privilege boundless. A footnote in Jaffee cautioned against speculating about future developments but said the Court did not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by a disclosure by the therapist.16 The two ideas answer different questions. Balancing asks whether this litigant's need outweighs this patient's privacy, and a judge answers after the conversation is over. An exception marks out a kind of situation in which the privilege does not apply, so patient and therapist can learn the boundary before the conversation begins. Because an exception turns on the situation rather than on how badly a litigant wants the evidence, it preserves the reliance that balancing destroys. Hayes, which held the defendant's threats outside the privilege, and Violette, which applied the crime-fraud exception, show the form such limits take. The next section takes up the exceptions in detail.
A legislature may write balancing back in for a privilege it controls. North Carolina's statute lets a court compel disclosure when, in its opinion, disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice. Jaffee expressly rejected such balancing for the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, but a statute adopting it is certainly possible and may protect privacy against trivial intrusion while permitting the use of critical evidence.17 In federal court, a state statute of that kind applies only where Rule 501 sends the question to state privilege law. The labels also mislead if read too literally. Decisions describe the privilege as unqualified, and some speak of documents withheld as absolutely privileged. Those words mean no case-by-case balancing, not no exceptions.18