Concept
Corporate Clients
Attorney-client privilege
Corporate Clients
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege covers communications between corporate counsel and corporate employees generally, and not only those of senior management, when the employees speak to counsel at their superiors' direction so that the corporation can obtain legal advice. The holding answers a question the earlier parts of this chapter left open. Every element taught so far assumed a client who can be identified at a glance, a person who consults a lawyer and speaks for himself or herself. A corporation has no voice of its own, so the privilege can protect its communications only if the law says whose words count as the corporation's.
A statement by a corporate agent can be one of two things. It may be a communication from the corporate client, which the corporation, as holder of the privilege, can protect. Or it may be the account of an individual witness who happens to work for the company, and the privilege does not reach that.1 The two ends of the range are easy. A confidential communication from the CEO to the company's lawyer, made to obtain legal advice for the company, is protected, while a routine statement that a lower-level employee prepared in the normal course of business does not become privileged because someone later sends it to corporate counsel.2 The second result fits the earlier lesson that the privilege protects communications, not facts: a record created for another purpose is not a communication made to obtain legal advice. The hard cases lie between the poles.3 There the rule must decide how far down the corporate ladder the privilege reaches.
Two interests pull against each other in that middle ground. A modern corporation operates under dense regulation and constantly consults lawyers to learn how to obey the law, so it needs to speak freely with counsel.4 It often must do so through the employees who know the facts, and denying those employees protection would discourage the communication of relevant information to counsel.5 An opponent, for its part, needs access to the evidence generated inside the company, and a privilege that reaches middle management or below puts more of that evidence out of reach.6 The corporate setting also strains the confidentiality and legal-purpose elements taught earlier. Statements may pass through many hands before reaching counsel, counsel's advice may be shared widely inside the company, and the line between legal and business advice blurs, especially in communications with in-house counsel.7
The narrowest answer is the control-group test, which some states still follow.8 It protects a communication only if the officer speaking with counsel has authority both to seek legal advice for the corporation and to participate significantly in the corporation's response to counsel's recommendations.9 The analogy is to the individual client, who can obtain legal advice and then, if he wishes, tailor his conduct to it.10 The test's weakness is that the people who know the facts often sit outside that group. A lawyer investigating illegal dumping of polluted materials, for example, will want to hear from the low-level employees who did the work.11
Upjohn rejected the control group as the measure of the corporate client, and it deliberately declined to replace that test with a rigid formula for every future case. What it offered instead is a set of considerations that work together, and the subsections below take them apart. The first covers the facts of Upjohn and the rejection of the control group. The next three examine what the Court looked at in its place: whether the employee spoke at a superior's direction and knew why, whether the subject fell within the employee's duties, and whether the company kept the communication confidential inside its own walls. The last asks who holds the corporation's privilege and may waive it, and what that means for the employees who speak to counsel.
Control Group Rejected
Upjohn rejected the control-group test, the narrowest of the competing definitions of the corporate client.12 The reasons explain why the privilege reaches employees far below the executive suite and why the Court refused to announce a complete replacement rule. They are easiest to follow after the events that produced the case.
In January 1976, independent accountants auditing one of Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries found that the subsidiary had made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government officials to secure government business, and they reported the finding to Gerard Thomas, the company's Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel.13 Thomas consulted outside counsel and the Chairman of the Board, and the company decided to investigate what it called questionable payments.14 The lawyers drafted a questionnaire that went to all foreign general and area managers over the Chairman's signature. It identified Thomas as the company's General Counsel, told the managers to treat the inquiry as highly confidential, and directed them to send their responses straight to Thomas.15 Thomas and outside counsel then interviewed the questionnaire's recipients and some 33 other officers and employees.16 Upjohn voluntarily reported certain questionable payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission and sent a copy to the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS opened its own investigation and issued a summons for the investigation files, including the questionnaires and the notes and memoranda of the interviews.17
Upjohn refused to produce those materials, and the dispute climbed through the courts on the question of who counts as the corporate client.18 The district court enforced the summons. The Sixth Circuit rejected a finding of waiver but still held that the privilege did not apply to communications made by officers and agents who were not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice, because those communications were not the client's.19 That court feared that a broader privilege would encourage upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and would create too broad a zone of silence.20 Counsel had interviewed officials such as the Chairman and the President, who would plainly fall within the control group, so the Sixth Circuit remanded for the district court to sort out who else belonged in it.21
The control-group test treats the corporation as speaking only through those who decide what it does. It originated in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., which reasoned that an employee of any rank who can control, or take a substantial part in, the corporation's response to counsel's advice effectively personifies the corporation when speaking to the lawyer.22 The Sixth Circuit added that only senior management, which guides and integrates the company's operations, has an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.23 The Supreme Court described its task as a choice between two tests that had gained adherents in the courts of appeals.24 The rival was the subject-matter approach, which also protects communications from employees outside the control group.25 Proposed Rule 503, the draft federal privilege rule, was rejected, so Rule 501 governs and directs courts to apply common-law principles in light of reason and experience. Upjohn is a federal common-law decision about the corporate client.26
The Court's first objection was that the control-group test misunderstands what the privilege protects. The privilege covers the giving of information to the lawyer as well as the giving of advice to those who can act on it, because the first step in solving any legal problem is finding the facts and sifting them for what matters legally.27 For an individual client, the person who supplies the information and the person who acts on the advice are the same, so the two functions never come apart. In a corporation they do, and the people who hold the facts are frequently middle-level and lower-level employees whose actions within the scope of their employment can embroil the company in serious legal difficulty.28 Under the control-group test, a corporate lawyer must choose between interviewing employees below the top, whose communications would go unprotected, and interviewing only the highest officers, who may not know what happened.29 Either way, the test discourages the flow of relevant information to the lawyer, which is the flow the privilege exists to encourage.30
The second objection concerns the opposite direction. Counsel's advice is often more significant to employees outside the control group than to the officers who approve it, because those employees put the company's policy into effect, and the test makes it harder to give them full and frank advice.31 An opinion about how to comply with a regulation is of little immediate use to a Chairman or President until it reaches the personnel who will apply it. Modern regulation also makes corporations unusual clients, because they constantly go to lawyers to learn how to obey the law, and a narrow privilege threatens counsel's efforts to keep the company in compliance.32
The third objection is practical. The test confines the privilege to officers who play a substantial role in deciding and directing the corporation's legal response, and courts applying that phrase reached inconsistent results. One court placed managers and assistant managers of a patent division and a research department in the control group, while another limited the group to division and corporate vice presidents and excluded two directors of research and a vice president for production and research.33 Predictability matters because an employee decides what to tell the lawyer, and the lawyer decides whom to interview, before any court rules on whether the conversation will be protected. A privilege whose reach no one can forecast is worth little, because it cannot induce candor at the moment the employee decides what to say.34 The Court conceded that no abstract test decides such questions with mathematical precision, but it found the control-group formula difficult to apply in practice.35
The line between communications and facts, taught earlier in this chapter, answers the Sixth Circuit's worry about a zone of silence. Extending the privilege to lower-level employees withholds from the adversary only what those employees said to counsel. The Government in Upjohn remained free to question the employees who had spoken with the lawyers, since Upjohn had given the IRS a list of them and the IRS had already interviewed some 25.36 The Court treated the Government's convenience in simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and interview notes as insufficient to override the privilege.37 A broader privilege thus leaves the adversary every route to the facts except the conversation itself, while the narrower control-group privilege would have made the lawyer's own fact-gathering harder.
The Court then applied its reasoning to the facts before it. The foreign managers, who were outside senior management, spoke to counsel acting as counsel, at the direction of corporate superiors, to secure legal advice. The information they held was not available from upper-echelon management and was needed to advise on securities and tax law, foreign law, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation.38 The questions concerned matters within the managers' corporate duties, the managers knew the company was seeking legal advice, and the responses were treated as highly confidential.39 Those facts, and not a formula, carried the result.
The Court was careful about how far it went. It described its task as deciding concrete cases rather than abstract propositions, and it declined to lay down a broad rule or series of rules for all future questions in this area.40 It held the communications before it privileged, said expressly that it decided only the case before it, and left later courts to draw the boundaries in the spirit of Rule 501.41 One fair reading of the case is that the employee's confidential communication must be made at a superior's request to secure legal advice for the corporation on a matter within the employee's duties.42 That reading resembles the subject-matter approach, though the Court never adopted a formula by name.43 The next sections therefore treat the Court's considerations as markers drawn from the facts of Upjohn, taken one at a time, and not as a statute with numbered elements.
The decision also has a limit in the forum. Upjohn rests on federal common law and not on the Constitution, so it binds federal courts applying federal privilege law and does not bind state courts, and some states still follow the control-group test.44 Even a federal court sitting in diversity applies state privilege law to a claim governed by state law, so a control-group state's rule can control there too.45
The communication, the lawyer, and the purpose are the same in both courts. Only the forum's definition of the corporate client changed, and that definition decided the outcome.
Direction and Awareness
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court held the managers' answers privileged because the employees made them to counsel acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors, to secure legal advice for the company, and because the employees were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned so that the corporation could obtain that advice.47 Direction and awareness are the first two markers the Court relied on, and they matter as features of the record before it. The Court declined to lay down a broad rule or series of rules,48 and the ruling leaves open whether all of these factors are central to bringing a communication within the privilege.49 They are better read as signs that a communication is the corporation's own act in seeking legal advice than as elements to be proved in every case.
Direction and awareness do different work, and each has its own reason. A corporation can speak only through individuals, so the privilege has to separate a statement that belongs to the corporate client from the account of an employee who happens to work there. Direction by corporate superiors draws that line, because it shows that the corporation, acting through the people who manage it, decided it needed legal advice and asked the employee for the facts counsel required. Without that link, any employee could sweep ordinary corporate conversation into the privilege by addressing it to a lawyer. Awareness ties the communication to the privilege's justification. The privilege encourages candor by promising secrecy to a person who is speaking in order to obtain legal advice, and an employee who does not know that counsel is gathering facts for that purpose was never induced by the promise. The subject-matter approach that Upjohn is generally read as consistent with lists direction by a corporate superior, and the superior's request made so that the corporation can secure legal advice, among its elements.50
The record in Upjohn supplied both features. The general counsel, Gerard Thomas, consulted the Chairman of the Board and outside counsel and then conducted a factual investigation to learn the nature and extent of the questionable payments and to be in a position to give the company legal advice about them, so the inquiry began with the company's leadership and aimed at legal advice.51 Awareness came from the documents the employees received. The questionnaire identified Thomas as the company's General Counsel and referred in its opening sentence to the possible illegality of payments like the ones under investigation.52 A statement of policy accompanied the questionnaire and went to Upjohn employees worldwide, so even interviewees who never received a questionnaire knew the interviews carried legal implications.53
Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion shows how a rule could be built on direction. He joined the rejection of the control group but wanted the Court to say more, because attorney and client must be able to predict whether a particular discussion will be protected. He proposed that a communication is privileged at least when an employee or former employee speaks with an attorney at management's direction about conduct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one management authorized to inquire and must seek information to evaluate whether the conduct binds the corporation, to assess its legal consequences, or to formulate responses to what others may do about it.54 Direction by management anchors that proposal, though he acknowledged that other employee communications may also be privileged.55 The majority chose to rely on the combination of features and to leave the formula to later cases, so Burger's concurrence is a proposal for a minimum rule and not the holding.
In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. applied the same logic to an internal investigation that the district court thought differed from Upjohn's in important ways, and the D.C. Circuit rejected each difference.56 The first difference was that Upjohn's investigation began after in-house counsel conferred with outside counsel, while KBR's stayed in-house. Upjohn makes outside counsel no necessary predicate, and the general rule is that a lawyer's status as in-house counsel does not dilute the privilege.57 The second difference was that non-lawyers conducted many of the interviews. The investigation ran at the direction of the attorneys in KBR's Law Department, and communications made by and to non-attorneys serving as agents of attorneys in internal investigations are routinely protected.58 The direction there runs from the lawyers to their agents, which keeps the investigators inside the circle of people through whom the lawyer works.
The third difference bears most directly on awareness. As the district court saw it, Upjohn's employees were expressly told that the interviews would help the company obtain legal advice, while KBR's employees were not, and the confidentiality agreements they signed never mentioned legal advice. The D.C. Circuit answered that nothing in Upjohn requires magic words, because KBR's employees knew that the company's legal department was conducting an investigation of a sensitive nature, that the information they gave would be protected, and that they could not discuss their interviews without the General Counsel's advance authorization.59 Awareness therefore turns on what the employees understood from the circumstances, and a recital of legal purpose is one way, though not the only way, to establish it. A student who treats Upjohn's notices as required language will wrongly deny the privilege whenever a company's paperwork omits the words legal advice, and a student who treats the markers as a checklist with every item mandatory will make the same mistake.
The word doubtful is deliberate. Upjohn did not make a superior's order indispensable, and lower courts have suggested that an employee's knowledge that the communication is sought to assist in providing legal advice can exist even without a formal command to speak.60 The clerk's call lacks both markers, which is why the privilege is unlikely to attach. An employee who volunteers information after learning that counsel is investigating on the company's behalf may have awareness without a command, and that is why the status of self-initiated communications is unsettled and not automatically lost.
Scope of Duties
The third marker in Upjohn concerns subject matter. Once the Court had found that the managers' answers went to counsel at the direction of corporate superiors, it added that the communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties and that the employees knew the company was seeking legal advice.63 Direction and awareness, taught above, describe the circumstances in which an employee speaks to counsel, while scope of duties describes what the employee speaks about. Like the other markers, it is a feature the Court found significant on its record and not a freestanding element. It still answers the question every corporate communication raises, which is whether the corporation is speaking or an individual who merely happens to be on its payroll.
The reason lies in how a corporation acts. A corporation has no hands of its own, so whatever it does, it does through employees carrying out their jobs, and conduct within those jobs is what can bind the company or expose it to liability. A lawyer who must advise the company about that conduct needs the facts from the people who performed it, and those people are often managers and staff well below the senior officers. An employee who describes work the company assigned is therefore serving as the corporation's source of information about its own affairs, and the exchange does the same job as an individual client's explanation to a lawyer. An employee who describes something encountered entirely outside the job supplies nothing the corporation knows through its operations, and protecting that account would shelter evidence the privilege was never built to protect.
Upjohn itself shows the privilege reaching a communication that falls squarely within the job. The foreign managers who answered the questionnaire were reporting on the questionable payments made for the subsidiaries they ran, and counsel needed that information, which upper-echelon management did not have, to advise on securities, tax, and foreign law, on duties to shareholders, and on potential litigation.64 The managers were speaking as the company's operating agents about the company's own conduct. As taught earlier in this chapter, the privilege protected only what they said to counsel, so the Government remained free to question the managers themselves about the underlying facts.
The opposite pole casts an employee as a bystander. The question is whether the employee's account concerns the employee's work or merely something the employee happened to see.
A driver of the same company who was at the wheel of the bus on her assigned route when the collision occurred stands in the position of the Upjohn managers. The events she describes took place inside the work the company gave her, so her report is the company learning about its own conduct, and the remaining markers, direction and awareness, would then decide whether the privilege attaches. Employment status is identical in the two scenes, and so is the lawyer's wish to give legal advice. The only variable that moves the answer is whether the subject of the statement lies within the speaker's job. The off-duty driver also loses nothing the facts ever had, since anyone may still depose her about what she saw, and denying protection to her statement costs the company only the secrecy of a conversation that was never about its own conduct.
The same subject-matter logic raises a harder question when the person speaking to counsel no longer works for the company. Litigation often arrives years after the events, and by then the employees who performed the relevant work may have retired, resigned, or been let go. Seven of the eighty-six employees whom counsel interviewed in Upjohn had already left the company when they were interviewed, and the company argued that their statements about activities during their employment should be privileged too. Neither the district court nor the Sixth Circuit had addressed the point, and the Supreme Court declined to decide it without the benefit of treatment below.65 The majority opinion therefore supplies no rule for former employees, and a student who credits it with one has misread the case. The extension comes from a different source.
Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion, discussed above for its proposed minimum rule, filled the gap. His formulation protects a communication at least when an employee or former employee speaks at management's direction with an attorney about conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment.66 The wording that matters here is the reference to former employees together with the limit to conduct within the scope of employment, which makes the privilege turn on what the person is asked about and not on whether the person still holds the job when asked. Most lower courts have accepted that standard, reasoning that the attorney's need to be fully informed about the client's actions covers the conduct of everyone employed during the period in question.67
The reason tracks the rationale for reaching employees at all. A lawyer reconstructing what the company did needs to hear from whoever held the relevant jobs at the time, and the company's need for accurate information about that conduct does not vanish because an employee has since left. A rule keyed to current employment would also make the privilege depend on whether the person happened to be on the payroll on the day of the interview, a fact that has nothing to do with why the person knows what he knows. Nor does the privilege depend on the company's power to compel. Lower courts have said that an employee's knowledge that a communication is sought to assist in providing legal advice can exist without an order to provide information to counsel, so the power to command is not what makes a communication the corporation's.68
Both halves of that interview involved the same lawyer, the same former employee, and the same request from management, so employment status did not separate them. The subject of the question did, and the off-duty driver falls on the same side of the line as the conference observation. On an exam, a former-employee problem calls for the Burger standard and the lower-court consensus, stated together with the point that the Upjohn majority expressly reserved the question.
Need-to-Know Confidentiality
Upjohn treated the company's own handling of the communications as part of the reason they were protected. The Court noted that, on the Chairman of the Board's explicit instructions, the communications were considered highly confidential when made, and that the company had kept them confidential afterward.71 That finding applies the confidentiality element taught earlier in this chapter to a setting where the circle of permitted listeners is hard to draw, because a corporation can function only by passing information among many employees. The question for a corporate client is how far a privileged communication may travel inside the company before it stops being a confidence.
The working answer is a need-to-know approach. Privileged communications may be shared inside the corporation with those who need the information to do their jobs, and the company must take care that those recipients understand they are to keep it confidential.72 The rule has two parts, and each has its own reason. The permission to share exists because a corporation runs on information. Officers must receive the advice before they can act on it, and others must supply facts to the lawyer, so a privilege that forbade all circulation would leave the company unable to use the advice it sought. The limit on sharing exists because the privilege protects only confidences. A company that lets a communication spread to people with no job-related reason to see it has shown that it did not treat the communication as confidential, and once the company itself has not kept the secret, nothing remains to justify withholding the document from the factfinder.
Upjohn's own handling shows the approach in practice. The questionnaire recipients were told to treat the investigation as highly confidential and not to discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing the requested information, and the responses and interview notes were not disclosed to anyone except the general counsel and outside counsel.73 Two features of that handling matter. The instruction did not demand total silence, since it allowed conversation with colleagues who could help supply information, which is the same job-related need that defines the circle. The finished documents, meanwhile, went to a very narrow destination, namely the lawyers. The Court's account of the company's conduct is consistent with the privilege, and later authorities read it as approving that level of internal confidentiality.74
Outside the lawyers themselves, the employees who can receive privileged information without waiver might include three groups.75
- Employees in a position to add to, clarify, or correct the information being supplied to counsel.
- Employees who are directly dealing with counsel on the matter in question.
- Employees who may be required to make decisions on the basis of the legal advice provided.
Each group matches a job the privilege exists to get done: supplying accurate facts to the lawyer, handling the matter with the lawyer, and acting on what the lawyer advises. A disclosure to employees who need the information for none of those purposes raises a question of waiver.76 Rank, title, and seniority do not appear in the list, because the test follows function, and the control-group idea that Upjohn rejected has no role in deciding who may read the advice.
Whether a recipient needed the information is only half the inquiry, because the company must also handle the document so that it stays confidential. Corporations depend heavily on information, so records must remain accessible to those who need them, and the remedy is to restrict access to people with a job-related need. Privileged documents kept in a general filing system must therefore have restricted access, or the corporate privilege will be lost.77 Disclosure outside the company poses an even greater risk, because an outsider rarely has any need tied to the legal representation. Such disclosure should reach only those necessary to the representation, and labels, cover letters, or other precautions help signal that the material is confidential.78 How a voluntary disclosure outside the circle operates as a waiver is taught later in this chapter.
The hardest cases involve a memo circulated widely but not publicly. A published illustration involves a vice president's memo to company counsel about the cause of a vehicle's poor performance, which reached the company's officers and fifty members of the engineering department.79 If counsel shares employees' memos with the officers who are in a position to direct the litigation or respond to legal advice, the privilege would not be lost.80 A copy sent to a newspaper would end any claim of privilege.81 The fifty engineers fall between those poles. Learning the cause of the vehicle's poor performance is clearly within the engineers' responsibilities, so giving them the memo probably does not destroy the privilege, and the argument for keeping it is stronger if the engineers needed the information for a law-related purpose.82 The area is unsettled, and an exam answer should say so.
The wide circulation makes the problem harder than a memo addressed only to the lawyer. In Upjohn the employees communicated directly with the company's lawyer, and although the lawyer reported to corporate officers about the information, he did not disclose its precise substance to others.83 The usual exam error is counting recipients and treating a large number as fatal. The number matters only as evidence of whether each recipient needed the information, so fifty engineers with a job-related need are in a better position than two strangers with none. Confidentiality also cannot cure a missing purpose. A vice president who undertook a study without any request from the lawyer, and addressed it to the engineers, would probably not make the study privileged by sending the lawyer a copy.84
Corporate Holder and Warnings
The preceding sections asked whose statements count as the corporation's. A second question follows once those communications are protected: who decides whether the protection is kept or given up? In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub the Supreme Court began from the point that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals, and then named the difficulty that creates.87 A corporation is an inanimate entity that must act through agents, so it cannot speak to its lawyers directly, and for the same reason it cannot waive the privilege directly when disclosure serves its interest.88 Each of those acts has to be performed by individuals empowered to act for the corporation, which leaves open which individuals hold the power to waive.
For a solvent corporation, the answer is management. The parties in Weintraub agreed that the power to waive the corporate privilege rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors, and the Court added that managers must use the power consistently with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as individuals.89 The reason follows from who the client is. The corporation is the client, and the directors, officers, and employees who deal with counsel are its constituents, acting as its agents when they do.90 A privilege held by the entity has to be controlled by whoever is charged with deciding what is good for the entity, and the fiduciary limit keeps those people from using that control to protect themselves at the corporation's expense.
Because the power belongs to the corporation's current management, it moves when control moves. The Court recognized that new managers installed through a takeover, a merger, a loss of shareholder confidence, or ordinary succession may waive the privilege as to communications made by former officers and directors.91 Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers, even for statements the former managers made to counsel about matters within their own corporate duties.92 The case itself arose in bankruptcy. The Seventh Circuit had held that a bankruptcy trustee lacks the power to waive a corporate debtor's privilege for communications made before the bankruptcy petition was filed, noting that two other circuits had reached the opposite conclusion, and the Supreme Court reversed.93 A trustee in bankruptcy therefore stands in the position of new management and may waive.94
A familiar exam setting is the ousted executive who objects. After a takeover, the new management may waive the privilege for communications the former officers made to the company's counsel, and the former officers' objections do not matter. The displaced chief executive who tries to assert the privilege against current management's wishes fails, even though the conversation concerned his own duties.95 The reason is that the former executive was never the holder. He spoke to counsel as the corporation's agent, so the privilege he now invokes belongs to the entity, and the entity speaks through whoever currently manages it. If displaced managers could block a waiver, the people with the strongest motive to keep old communications buried would hold a veto over the new managers' ability to investigate what happened and to cooperate with authorities.
The transfer reaches the corporation's privilege and nothing more. New management does not gain the power to waive whatever personal privilege a former manager may hold from consulting a lawyer of his own.96 That limit raises the question the rest of this section addresses, which is when an employee who spoke with corporate counsel can claim such a personal privilege at all.
Holder status has a hard consequence for the employee who speaks to the company's lawyer. When a corporate agent tells corporate counsel something that would incriminate the agent, the communication is privileged, but the corporation holds the privilege. If the corporation waives it, most often to cooperate with the government and avoid fines or other penalties, the agent is unprotected and the statements can be admitted against the agent at trial.97 Corporations have reasons to run internal investigations of this kind, since what they learn may be disclosed to authorities as evidence of cooperation, and the corporation may make that disclosure over the employee's objection.98 The agent has no personal privilege to fall back on, because corporate counsel represents the corporation, and a lawyer who tried to represent both would face a conflict of interest: the corporation may find it beneficial to waive and cooperate, leaving the agent exposed.99
Counsel therefore give an Upjohn warning at the start of an interview. The warning tells the employee that the lawyer represents the corporation and not the employee, that the attorney-client privilege applies to the conversation, and that the corporation, as holder, has authority to waive it.100 Professional-responsibility rules point the same way. Under ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) the organization is the client, and Rule 1.13(f) requires an explanation of that kind when the lawyer knows or should know that a constituent's interests are adverse to the organization's.101 The practical danger the warning addresses is a joint-client relationship. If employees reasonably believe the lawyers represent them, the lawyers may inadvertently create one, and the corporation then could not waive the privilege alone.102 The warning is a protective practice and not an element of the corporation's privilege, so omitting it does not strip the corporation of protection. It only leaves room for the employee to argue that the lawyer was acting as the employee's counsel too.103
An employee who claims after the fact that counsel also represented the employee personally carries the burden of proving it, and the task is difficult. The standing presumption is that corporate counsel represents only the corporation, even when the employee is the chief executive.104 Courts typically reject a test built on the employee's subjective belief and require the employee to make five showings.105 The employee must show that:
- The employee approached counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
- The employee made clear, when approaching counsel, that the advice sought was for the employee in an individual capacity and not in a representative capacity.
- Counsel saw fit to communicate with the employee in that individual capacity, knowing that a conflict could arise.
- The conversations with counsel were confidential.
- The substance of the conversations did not concern matters within the company or its general affairs.
The fifth showing explains the structure of the test. Communications about company matters are the corporation's own communications, which is why the corporation controls them. Even a successful showing yields limited control, because the employee controls waiver only to the extent that communications about the employee's individual acts and liabilities can be separated from discussions about the corporation, and the corporation may still waive unilaterally as to anything an officer said in a corporate capacity.106