Concept
Firsthand and Trial Sources
Bases of testimony
Firsthand and Trial Sources
Rule 703 lets an expert reason from facts the expert never witnessed. A lay opinion must be rationally derived from the witness's own perceptions; an expert's opinion need not be.1 The difference follows from why experts testify at all. The jury needs training to interpret the facts, and the person with that training seldom saw the events behind the dispute. The rule's first sentence accordingly allows an expert to “base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”2
That freedom has a price. The material an expert reasons from may itself be inadmissible under Rules 602 and 701 and, as Rules 801 and 802 will show, under the hearsay rules.3 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 sorts the expert's information into three sources: the witness's own firsthand observations, matters presented at trial, and outside data gathered before trial from other sources.4 The first two come from the expert's own perception or from the courtroom itself. The third carries the reasonable-reliance condition and gets its own section next.
Personal Observation
Personal observation is the first source Rule 703 names, and the simplest. An expert who examines, tests, or inspects the person, object, or place at issue before taking the stand has “personally observed” the facts.5 The routine example is a physician who examines an injured claimant and then testifies to the diagnosis and the prognosis for recovery.6 Before trial, that physician had the chance to see for herself the injury she now describes.7
This category resembles the personal knowledge that Rule 602 requires of lay witnesses.8 The expert reports what she saw, measured, or found, and then uses her training to state what those findings mean. The first step is ordinary testimony from personal knowledge; the second is what makes the witness an expert. No one else's statement stands between the expert and the facts, so the reasonable-reliance condition that governs outside data does not come into play. The opponent still has a tool: the expert may be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.9
Because personal observation is a proper type of source, the live question is quantity. Rule 702(b) requires that the testimony rest on “sufficient facts or data,” while Rule 703 addresses the kind of information an expert may use.10 A qualified expert whose opinion would help the jury still needs a proper foundation, which means gathering enough information to support the opinion.11 Pelletier v. Main Street Textiles, LP, 470 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2006), makes the point. The First Circuit affirmed the exclusion of a safety-practices expert who never inspected the facilities and equipment at issue.12 His kind of source was proper, but his observation never reached the subject of his opinion.
A physician who never examined the patient and reasons only from records that other clinicians compiled lacks the firsthand source. That opinion must qualify, if at all, under the outside-data source, which requires that experts in the field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data.13 A physician who examined the patient and also read the charts draws on both sources: the examination is firsthand, and the charts must meet the outside-data condition. When a fact pattern describes expert testimony, ask first whether the witness perceived the person, object, or place directly or learned about it from someone or something else.
Facts Learned at Trial
Rule 703 also reaches facts the expert is “made aware of,” and some of those arrive while the trial is under way.15 The Advisory Committee Note treats matters presented at trial as a source separate from the expert's own pretrial observation, and it identifies two channels. The expert may watch and hear a witness testify, or counsel may put a hypothetical question that summarizes the evidence.16 Either way the facts reach the expert through the courtroom, so the jury hears the same facts the expert relies on. That is why the reasonable-reliance condition, which the rule attaches to outside data, plays no part here.17
The difficulty with trial facts is identification. The jury must know which facts the opinion assumes, because rejecting those facts discounts the opinion. Suppose a physician testifies that the plaintiff has an illness marked by persistent headaches, dizziness, and nausea, and the plaintiff has already testified to all three symptoms. If the defendant then offers conflicting evidence from estranged family members, the trier of fact needs to know how far the diagnosis rests on those symptoms.18
A hypothetical question solves that problem by spelling out the assumptions. Counsel might ask a physician to assume that, during the four weeks before hospitalization and while working near liquid benzene, the plaintiff had persistent headaches, dizziness, and nausea with increasing frequency, and then ask whether the physician has an opinion about the cause. The question informs the witness of the pertinent facts and, in the same breath, identifies the assumed facts on which the opinion rests.19 Counsel could equally ask an expert to assume that a stated amount of asbestos was in the air the plaintiff breathed over a stated period, and then ask for an opinion on the medical consequences. In either form, the question is not evidence; only the answer is.20
Williams v. Illinois recounts an older instruction that puts the point to jurors this way. The questions “are not evidence” but “mere statements to these witnesses,” and the answers are “entitled to no weight” if the statements in the questions are not supported by the proof.21 The mechanism is that an answer to a hypothetical is conditional: if these facts are true, then this conclusion follows. When the proof fails to establish the facts, the condition fails, and the conclusion gives the jury nothing to use.
Counsel can shortcut the procedure by asking the expert to assume that the testimony of earlier witnesses is true and then asking for the opinion.22 The shortcut works when the prior testimony is consistent. It is not practical when a single witness recants or qualifies her direct testimony, or when several witnesses are inconsistent, because the assumed facts become unclear.23 The assumed testimony must be clear to the jury and must not conflict, or the answer may confuse jurors rather than assist them. A request to assume one previous witness's testimony usually meets that test. As the assumption widens to several witnesses or one side's whole case, the risk of confusion grows, and the question can be approved only if the testimony is consistent and simple enough for jurors to recall its outline.24 Where the only account of the plaintiff's symptoms is the plaintiff's own consistent testimony, counsel can simply ask the physician to assume that testimony is true.
The shortcut fails in that scene because the witnesses are inconsistent and the assumed facts have become unclear. When witnesses contradict one another, a hypothetical that states the assumptions is the better tool.25
The traditional requirement for hypotheticals was that admissible evidence support each assumed fact. The reason is simple: if an opinion rests on a fact the jury, for lack of evidence, cannot find to be true, jurors cannot use the opinion as the basis for a finding.26 Trial sources are therefore tied to the record at both ends. The facts the expert hears come from testimony, and the facts the expert assumes need proof.
The hypothetical question remains permissible and popular. The proponent controls its content, and a short, tight hypothesis lets the jury see the factual basis of the opinion clearly.27 Modern rules nevertheless dispense with the need for it. The Williams opinion observes that under both the Illinois and the Federal Rules an expert may base an opinion on facts she lacks personal knowledge of, although that reliance does not make the underlying information admissible evidence.28 Rule 705 completes the change. Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion and give reasons without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, but she may be required to disclose them on cross-examination.29 The cross-examiner therefore elects whether to bring out the factual basis. That election does not lessen the partisanship of the question or the answer on direct, but it simplifies the examination and removes the occasion for reversal over technical flaws in the form of a hypothetical. The judge keeps discretion to require disclosure of the basic facts on direct.30